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 SUMMARY 
 
This dissertation explores how distinctive institutional factors related to property 
rights determine urban development patterns and housing tenure modalities in a 
developing economy context. The first part of the dissertation proposes a choice-theoretic 
model that explains the existence of the antichresis contractual arrangement as a way to 
temporarily divide property rights. This contractual arrangement is present in most 
countries that adopted the Napoleonic civil code, among others, and its prevalence in 
developing countries such as Bolivia or India has not been studied by the main stream 
economics literature.  
The antichresis contract entails a temporal transfer of a property’s right of use 
from a landlord to a tenant in exchange of a large lump-sum payment due at the time the 
contract is signed. After the contractual period expires, the landlord returns the same 
lump-sum payment to the tenant and this one returns the property. There are no monthly 
payments during the contractual period, and the lump-sum returned does not include 
interest or inflation adjustments.   
The model presented in the dissertation explains why the antichresis contract 
dominates the monthly rent contract in terms of landlord profits for certain types of 
property in which the gains in expected profits from solving the adverse selection of 
tenants problem offset the loss of expected profits created by the moral hazard in 
landlords’ investments inherent in division of property right contracts.  
The empirical section of the dissertation provides evidence in support of the 
model. Using data from Bolivia, I find that property types that require less landlord 
ix
x  
maintenance investment have higher capitalization rates under antichresis contracts than 
they would under monthly rent contracts and vice-versa. The theoretical model shows 
that the antichresis contract has limited capacity for helping the poor as suggested by 
recent literature. On the contrary, it can be hurtful for the poor in markets were landlords 
have limited information about tenants’ probability of illiquidity or in markets with 
inefficient court systems or tenant -friendly regulations.  
The second part of the dissertation explores the issue of squatter settlements in the 
developing world. The theoretical model presented in this dissertation explains how the 
landlord-squatter strategies based on credible threats drive capital investment incentives 
and ultimately shape urban land development in areas with pervasive squatting. The 
model predicts that squatter settlements develop with higher structural densities than 
formal sector development. This prediction explains why property owners of housing that 
originated in squatter settlements take longer periods of time to upgrade than comparable 
property owners who built in the formal sector even after they receive titles to their 
property. The higher original structural density increases the marginal benefit of waiting 
in the redeveloping decision creating a legacy effect of high density-low quality housing 
in these types of settlements.  
Geo-coded data from Cochabamba confirm that settlements originated in the 
informal sector present higher structural density than comparable settlements that 
originated in the formal sector. Furthermore, former informal settlements tend to present 
lower housing quality than comparable housing that originated in the formal housing 
sector.   
 
 1 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 In recent years, the developing world has witnessed an unprecedented 
acceleration in urbanization rates. This rapid urbanization poses enormous challenges for 
local and national governments struggling to provide adequate living conditions. In 1990, 
653 million people lived in slums in middle and low-income countries; by 2000, that 
number increased to 857 million (United Nations, 2006). Slum formation in developing 
countries is mainly a problem of lack of access to affordable and decent housing in the 
formal housing sector. With no opportunities in the formal housing sector, the poor resort 
to informal developments in the form of squatter settlements or illegal land sales. This 
phenomenon poses two fundamental questions with important policy implications: (1) 
what type of urban development can we expect in the future if urban growth is dictated 
by informal development? And (2) what are the consequences of this type of 
development for future neighborhood upgrading and overall poverty alleviation 
strategies?  
As poverty becomes an increasingly urban phenomenon, poverty alleviation 
policies must deal with the growth of slums. In the past years, however, housing policies 
in developing countries have dealt almost exclusively with slum upgrading through land 
title granting programs and ignored the process of new slum formation (Ferguson and 
Navarrete, 2003). This approach offers few results in terms of urban poverty reduction. 
Moreover, the failure of these policies has recently sparked a movement that questions 
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the widely accepted link between property rights and economic development (The 
Economist, 2006a, 2006b).  
With slums growing at current rates it is of utmost importance to study the 
processes of slum formation. In this sense, an understanding of the mechanisms by which 
property rights affect urban development is crucial for the design of effective policies that 
can help the poor access decent housing. But access to housing is not synonymous with 
access to home ownership. As in most of the industrialized countries, developing 
countries have dynamic rental housing markets that have been long ignored by 
governments and international organizations in the formulation of housing policies for 
the poor (Kumar, 2001). The study of rental markets and innovative tenure modalities 
that help the poor get access to decent housing is also crucial for the development of 
comprehensive housing policies. 
This dissertation addresses topics of slum formation and rental markets that have 
been overlooked in the design of low income housing policies in developing countries. 
The dissertation is divided into two sections. The first looks at how the division of 
property rights raises inefficiencies that give rise to innovative contractual mechanisms in 
rental markets where contract enforcement tools are weak and information is scarce. 
Specifically, the first section studies the “Antichresis” contract, focusing on how this 
contract functions as a mechanism to access housing in coexistence with the more 
familiar periodic rent contract in a rental market.  The Antichresis, or Anticrético as it is 
known Bolivia, is a mechanism through which property owners make a legal contract to 
give the property’s rights of use to tenants in exchange for a fixed amount of money 
payable at the signature of the contract. The Antichresis gives the tenant the right to use 
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the property in the way specified in the contract for a limited term that usually comprises 
one required year and one optional year agreed by both parties. At the end of the 
specified Antichresis period the owner gives back the lump sum of money specified at the 
beginning of the contract and the tenant returns the property.  
Recent literature describing the Antichresis portrays this contractual arrangement 
as an innovative Bolivian institution that facilitates access to housing by the poor (Payne, 
2002, 2002b). The contract, however, did not originate in Bolivian civil law. The 
Antichresis contract was already in use in early Babylonian law long before being 
adopted by the Greeks and the Romans. The Antichresis contract was also present in the 
Napoleonic civil code, which is believed to have had considerable influence on the 
development of most Latin American civil law. Today, the Antichresis contract is still in 
use in Bolivia, Korea, and India, among other countries. In some Bolivian cities, about 
20% of the non-owner occupied housing is under this modality.  Scholarly literature 
concerning the Antichresis contract is limited to a few descriptive works in the legal 
literature. The topic has been largely ignored in the mainstream economics literature.   
Understanding the economic mechanisms behind the Antichresis contract can help 
explain the institutional factors that determine the use of such contractual agreements as 
opposed to other arrangements such as the periodic rent lease. This dissertation provides 
a theoretical model of the Antichresis contract that explains the economic forces giving 
rise to this type of property agreement. The model also sheds light on the effect “tenant-
friendly policies” may have on landlords’ choice of contractual arrangement and how 
these choices affect housing options for the poorest residents in a rental housing market. 
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The second section addresses how urban development takes place in the informal 
sector of a city (squatter settlements and illegal subdivisions). It presents a theoretical 
model of the process of squatter settlement formation based on the interaction of squatter 
and landowner credible strategies. The literature is somewhat limited on this topic: 
Jimenez (1984,1985), and Jimenez and Hoy (1991) constitute some of the early attempts 
to offer theoretical grounding for urban development under squatting, but offer no 
empirical support for their hypotheses. Existing empirical work is limited to estimating 
the “value of a title” using hedonic models based on household surveys. The dissertation 
begins to fill this gap in the empirical literature. It uses census data from a mid-size 
Bolivian city to observe the effects of urban squatting and illegal subdivisions on land 
development by observing an entire city. The nature of the data permits us to observe 
how informal settlements developed years after they were “legalized” and compare them 
to new informal settlements as well as formal settlements. Furthermore, the data let us 
observe if how the settlement’s origin (formal or informal) influences the future 
upgrading after legalization. 
The dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 gives a general overview of the 
history of the Antichresis contract and a general description of the juridical figure as it is 
used today around the world. Chapter 3 proposes a formal model of the Antichresis 
contract, looking at landlord and tenant incentives in a two-period context to explain how 
the Antichresis agreement can coexist with the periodic rent lease in the same markets. 
The model shows how these two contractual agreements solve different information 
problems inherent in contractual agreements that involve the division of property rights. 
Chapter 4 is concerned with how institutional factors commonly believed to affect 
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Antichresis, such as: inflation, interest rates, taxes, and civil court inefficiency are related 
to the use of Antichresis. Chapter 5 offers an empirical test of the theoretical model 
proposed in chapter 3, using market data from Cochabamba. Chapter 6 deals with 
property rights and their impact on urban development. It starts with a review of the 
literature that examines squatter settlement formation and how the behavior of squatters 
affects urban land markets and urban structure. This chapter also lays out a formal model 
of squatter behavior, introducing a spatial component into Turnbull’s (2008) model of 
squatting and eviction. Chapter 7 deals with upgrading decisions once informal settlers 
are given formal titles to their property. Chapter 7 draws from widely accepted model of 
urban economics to explain redevelopment decisions in the context of squatter 
settlements. The model explains why former squatters tend to hold 
redevelopment/upgrading decisions for longer periods of time than their counterparts in 
the formal sector even after they are given titles for their property. Chapter 8 empirically 
tests the hypotheses proposed in chapters 6 and 7. First, the chapter describes the case of 
Cochabamba, Bolivia, drawing on the history of both formal and informal settlements in 
the city as well as census data from 1976, 1992 and 2001. Second, the chapter presents 
formal hypotheses tests using various econometric specifications that help us examine the 
differences between formal and informal settlements on key urban development variables 
such as land prices and structural density. 
Chapter 9 integrates how the findings in previous chapters relate to policies that 
affect housing for the poor. Specifically, it evaluates current policy towards squatter 
settlements in developing countries in light of our findings. The chapter also provides an 
assessment of current claims that describe the Antichresis contractual arrangement as a 
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tool for housing the poor. Finally, chapter 9 offers some concluding thoughts on the 
importance of research that advances the knowledge of the mechanisms through which 
property rights affect housing markets and economic development in general.   
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CHAPTER 2 
THE ANTICHRESIS CONTRACT 
 
 The word “Antichresis” comes from a combination of the Greek words “Anti” 
(against) and “Chresis” (use) 1 denoting the action of giving a credit “against” the “use” 
of a property. The Antichresis is a mechanism through which a property owner gives the 
rights of use of her property to a tenant in exchange for a fixed amount of money payable 
at the signature of the contract2. The Antichresis agreement gives the tenant the right to 
use the property in the way specified in the contract for a limited term, typically one 
required year with the option of an additional year if both parties agree. At the end of the 
specified period the owner gives back the lump sum of money specified at the beginning 
of the contract and the tenant returns the property. 
 Although this legal contract received its current denomination in Greek law, the 
practice of Antichresis was common in cultures that preceded the golden age of3 (Silva, 
1996). Clay tablets discovered in the ancient city of Nuzi, dated as far as the 15th century 
(BC), prove that the Antichresis contract was used by the Sumerian and Akkadian 
Mesopotamian cultures4. According to Purves (1945), Nuzi tablets entitled “ţuppi 
                                                 
 
 
1 Some authors claim that Chresis stands for “credit” (Farfan, 2002; Payne, 2002b) but this is a faulty 
translation. Chresis or Chrisi (in modern Greek) means “use”  
2 Property rights are usually defined as the rights to “use,”  “exclude,” and “dispose” a property. In this 
sense the Antichresis contract gives the tenant the rights to use and exclude for a specified period of time. 
The rights to dispose stay with the property’s original owner. In this sense the Antichresis system is 
equivalent to the “conveyance” agreement in common law.   
3 I refer to Athens’ golden age as the period between 450-530 (BC) 
4 The city of Nuzi is now buried under the northern Iraqi city of Kirkuk, approximately 250 miles north of 
Baghdad. 
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titenûtu” describe contracts with the same characteristics of what we know today as the 
antichretic pledge. In such tablets, “The creditor has usufruct rights over real and chattel 
pledges. This usufruct right enables the creditor to obtain interest and also provides him 
with a means of forcing the borrower to repay his debt…the titenûtu transfers possession, 
but not title” (p.79). Table 2.1 shows a direct translation of an Antichresis agreement 
found written on a clay tablet in the ancient city of Nuzi.  
 
Table 2.1: Antichresis Agreement Tablet City of Nuzi, 1500 BC 
 
Lines in tablet Text 
1 Antichresis tablet.  
2-4 Uqari, his father, has given Taena son of Uqari in Antichresis to Tulpun-naya for 
six years.  
5-6 Tulpun-naya has given one homer of barley to Uqari.  
6-10 When six years have elapsed, Uqari shall repay Tulpun-naya the one homer of 
barley and take his son.  
10-14 If Taena absents himself from work for Tulpun-naya for one day, Uqari shall pay 
Tulpun-naya one mina of copper per day as compensation.  
15-16 Tulpun-naya shall give barley and clothing rations.  
17-30 14 witnesses 
Source: Maidman (1979) 
 
Babylonian law, which is considered by many as a main precursor of western law, 
adopted the Antichresis contract and modified it to their needs by combining it with the 
mortgage pledge. As Lobingier (1929) explains, in Babylonian law a mortgage pledge 
could become an antichretic pledge if the loan was not promptly paid. 
 Little is known about how and to what extent the Greek culture used the 
Antichresis contract except that it entered Greek Law in the time of Demosthenes5 
                                                 
 
 
5 384 BCE - 322 BCE 
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(Cohen, 1950). The Antichresis pledge was later introduced into Roman law toward the 
end of the classical period6 (Tulane Law Review, 1938). Roman law did not adopt the 
Antichresis pledge as an autonomous institution. According to Silva (1996) it was 
considered a modality under the “pignus” and had the particularity that the usufruct 
obtained from the pledge under Antichresis had to be exactly compensated by the interest 
on the loan7.   
During the Middle Ages the Antichresis was repudiated under Canon law and it 
was specifically forbidden by Pope Alexander III in 1163. These were times when 
receiving interest on loans was condemned, and the Antichresis contract was considered 
an institution that disguised the practice of usury (Cohen, 1950). Silva (1996) attributes 
the emergence of contracts that served the same purpose of the Antichresis contract in 
this period to the ban. One of such contracts was that of the sale with an agreement to 
resell at the same price. 
In modern law, the Antichresis contract reappears in the Napoleonic code to 
legislate the practice of “droit coutumier” that was popular in southern France at the time 
the code was being drafted in the early 1800s (Silva, 1996). Spain, Italy, and most of 
Latin America later adopted most of its contents including the Antichresis contract. In the 
United States, the Antichresis contract is only used in the State of Louisiana, which 
                                                 
 
 
6 500 AD 
7 Civil codes today accept that the usufruct obtained from the antichretic pledge maybe lower than the 
interest on the loan. In those cases the borrower can also take part of the antichretic loan amount as a part 
of his payment.   
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maintains the same features today as it did in the French code and the Louisiana Code of 
1808 (Slovenko, 1958)8. 
Today, the Antichresis juridical figure is present in nearly all Latin American and 
European civil codes but its existence is not limited to these regions. Ambrose and Kim 
(2003), for example, offer a detailed description of how the Antichresis mechanism is 
widely used in Korea, and Kumar (2001) accounts for its increasing popularity in India. 
Even though the spirit of the contractual arrangement remains constant across countries 
since pre-Babylonian times, some minor differences exist between some of the juridical 
details governing the.  
Table 2.2 shows some of the differences in civil legislation concerning the 
Antichresis contract across selected countries. Civil law in all these countries recognizes 
that tenants’ payments for the property can be equated to interest on the Antichresis lump 
sum (and to the principal in selected cases). In all the countries surveyed in table 2.2, 
tenants are required to pay expenses and taxes on the property during the contractual 
period. Similarly, in all of these countries, tenants under Antichresis contracts can ask for 
seizing and sale of the property if the landlord refuses to pay back the Antichresis lump 
sum at the end of the contractual period. If the property is foreclosed due to landlord’s 
illiquidity at the end of the contractual period, the tenant receives priority over other 
creditors in most countries (though not in Louisiana)  
The use of Antichresis since biblical times raises the question of how or why this 
contractual arrangement can coexist with the more familiar lease or rental contract. 
                                                 
 
 
8 Even though the Antichresis contract remains in the Louisiana Civil Code to this day, its use is limited 
(Tulane Law Review, 1959). 
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Recently some authors have described its use in Bolivia as an innovative institution that 
can facilitate access to hosing for the poor in markets that also use common lease 
contracts (Farfan, 2002; Payne, 2002). However, this or other mainstream literature, 
present answers to the basic question of what are the economic incentives that would 
make agents in the marketplace prefer Antichresis as opposed to other contractual 
agreements. This understanding is crucial to assess the mechanisms through which the 
use of Antichresis can benefit (or hurt) the poor and how different policies may affect its 
use and benefits, if there are indeed any benefits for society from using this contractual 
arrangement. The next chapter explores this question and introduces a theoretical model 
that explains the use of Antichresis and its coexistence with the monthly rent contract. 
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Table 2.2: 
Institutional Differences in the Antichresis (Civil) Law across Countries 
 
Country Reference 
in Civil 
Code 
Fruits of 
property 
Needs to 
be a 
public 
contract 
Who pays 
taxes and 
expenses? 
Tenant 
rights in 
case of 
non-
payment 
Tenant has 
first right 
when 
property is 
foreclosed 
Tenant 
can 
sublease 
Spain Chapter IV 
Arts.1881-
1886 
Applied to 
interest and 
capital but can 
convene to 
equate interest 
to fruits 
No Tenant, but 
deducts from 
property fruits 
Can ask 
for seize 
and sale 
of 
property 
Not stated Not 
stated 
France Chapter II 
Arts. 2085-
2091 
Parts can 
equate fruits to 
interests. If not 
convened 
tenant has to 
report fruits to 
landlord. If 
interest on loan 
is not 
stipulated fruits 
are taken from 
capital. 
Yes 
registered 
in public 
document 
Tenant, if not 
otherwise 
stipulated in 
contract, but 
deducts from 
property fruits 
Can ask 
for seize 
and sale 
of 
property 
Yes 
(Tulane law 
rev 1939 pg 
140) 
Yes 
(Tulane 
law rev 
1939 
pg134 ) 
Louisiana 
(USA) 
Title XX 
Arts 3176- 
3181 
Parts can 
equate fruits to 
interests. If not 
convened 
tenant has to 
report fruits to 
landlord.  
No Tenant, but 
deducts from 
property fruits 
Can ask 
for seize 
and sale 
of 
property 
No art 3181 
Tulane Law 
rev 1939 pg 
140 
Yes 
Argentina Titulo 16 
Arts. 3239-
3261 
Parts can 
equate fruits to 
interests. If not 
convened 
tenant has to 
report fruits to 
landlord. If 
interest on loan 
not stipulated 
fruits are taken 
from capital. 
No Tenant, but can 
deduct from 
fruits. But if he 
makes 
investments on 
property 
landlord must 
pay back the 
cost of capital, 
not the added 
value the 
property enjoys. 
Can ask 
for seize 
and sale 
of 
property 
Yes 
(Cabanelas) 
Yes 
Bolivia Libro V, 
Arts 1429 -
1435 
Fruits are 
applied first to 
interest then to 
principal 
Yes 
registered 
in public 
document 
Tenant pays 
taxes and all 
other utilities. 
But can deduct 
such expenses 
from fruits. 
Can ask 
for seize 
and sale 
of 
property 
Yes No 
(Opinion 
of Dr 
Elba 
Medinace
lli in 
private 
communi
cation) 
Source: Own elaboration based on countries’ civil codes, Tulane Law Review, Medinacelli (2006) in 
private communication 
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CHAPTER 3 
A MODEL OF THE ANTICHRESIS CONTRACT CHOICE 
 
The Law and Economics literature usually refers to ownership of an asset as a 
bundle of three basic rights: (1) the right to use the asset, (2) the right to exclude others 
from using the asset, and (3) the right to dispose of the asset. Because the ability of 
owners to transfer some of the rights to others for periods of time can create economic 
gains from specialization (Micelli, 2004), legal systems usually allow these transfers. In 
the case of a lease or an Antichresis contract, the owner temporarily transfers the rights of 
use and exclusion of his property to the tenant but retains the right to dispose of the 
property. This action creates gains for society because it allows landlords to specialize in 
producing housing services and maintenance and tenants to specialize in other economic 
activities.  
 The division of ownership can create gains for society, but it also introduces two 
sources of incentives for inefficient behavior from both landlord and tenant (Epstein, 
1986). First, the adverse selection problem that arises from a landlord’s impediment of 
observing a tenant’s of probability of illiquidity. Second, the moral hazard problem that 
arises from an asymmetry of maintenance incentives in the property after a contract has 
been signed. In this sense, institutions governing the division of ownership have the 
potential to serve an important role in society as long as potential inefficiencies are 
corrected by creating the right incentives in a world with positive transaction costs. This 
is where the legal framework comes into place. Economic agents will make decisions 
under a particular institutional framework and this framework may favor the use of some 
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contractual agreements as opposed to others. The model proposed in this section explains 
how agents choose between contracts based on the incentives these contracts produce 
when faced with the typical problems arising from temporal division of property 
arrangements. We begin by laying out the sequence of events and payoffs in a two period 
world.  
Sequence of Events and Payoffs 
Consider a two-period world in which risk neutral tenants and landlords choose 
between Antichresis and periodic rent contracts. At the beginning of the first period (t0), 
tenant and landlord agree on the total amount of money M asked by the landlord in 
exchange for a temporal use of the property and the type of contract they will sign. If an 
Antichresis contract is signed, the tenant gives the landlord the Antichresis lump sum A, 
which is due at the time the contract is signed9. If a rental contract is signed, the rental 
payment R will be due at the end of the first period (t2). Additionally, during the first 
period, tenant and landlord decide on the level of inputs x and y to be supplied, 
respectively.  These inputs represent maintenance investments on the property, which 
may include preventive maintenance, repairs, and periodic cleaning, among other.  
During the contractual period, the tenant enjoys housing services T, which are a 
function of the maintenance investments x and y, and a parameter λ (λ≥0) that captures 
the marginal effect of landlord maintenance investments on tenants’ enjoyment of the 
                                                 
 
 
9 The Antichresis lump sum A is given by tenants to landlords who will use this sum and obtain a rate of 
return r that is assumed to be known with certainty for the entire contractual period. At the end of the 
contractual period landlords must return the lump sum A in order to receive the property back.  Thus, for 
Antichresis contracts the equivalent rental payments will be given by M=rA 
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property. Thus, the tenant’s enjoyment of the property is given by equation 1 with f’>0, 
g’>0 and f’’<0, g’’<0.  
     T(x, y, λ) = f (x) + λg(y)     (1) 
When the second period arrives, rent R is due for tenants who chose the rental 
contract. However, the tenant faces a probability p of being illiquid at this point of the 
contractual period. In such event, the tenant can no longer pay rent R so he is forced to 
abandon the property and move to an alternative place that yields housing services T0.  In 
case of abandonment, tenants lose any maintenance investment x they made in the 
property and landlords face the costs of re-renting the property C (C>0), which may 
include opportunity costs of forgone income and eviction procedures.  
Finally, at the end of the second period (t3), the contract term expires for 
Antichresis contracts and rental contracts with tenants that paid their rents R at t2. At this 
point, landlords receive the property back. The property’s reversion value L at this point 
is a function of the maintenance investments x and y made during the first period, and 
parameter δ (δ≥0) that measures the marginal effect of tenant investment x on the 
property’s residual value. Thus the property’s reversion value is given by equation 2 
where h’>0, k’>0, h’’<0, k’’<0. 
     L(x, y;δ) = δh(x) + k(y)     (2) 
Additionally, the end of the second period (t3) is the time when tenants who 
signed an Antichresis contract receive the Antichresis amount A back as they relinquish 
the property.  Figure 3.1 shows the sequence of events in a timeline along with the 
actions taken by each part given the different states of the world that can occur and the 
characteristics of the contract. Table 3.1, on the other hand, depicts the payoffs under 
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each contractual arrangement at the end of the second period when the contractual period 
ends. 
 
 
 
E= Event, C=Condition, A=Action 
 
Figure 3.1 
Timeline of Events and Actions in the Contract Choice Decision 
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Table 3.1: Payoffs at the End of the Second Period 
Contract 
Choice 
Tenant is 
Liquid at t2 
Probability Landlord 
payoffs 
Tenant 
payoffs 
Antichresis - - L(x,y)+rA-y T(x,y)-rA-x 
Monthly rent Yes 1-p L(x,y)+R-y T(x,y)-R-x 
  No p L(x,y)-y-C To-x 
 
 
The Hidden Information Problem 
In this section we describe how R and A are chosen under the rental and 
Antichresis contracts with a focus on the hidden information problem exclusively. For 
this reason, this section follows under the assumption that maintenance investment 
decisions do not change with the nature of the contract. In other words we assume that 
the optimal level of investment x by the tenant and y by the landlord are not functions of 
the type of contract chosen. In reality, this is not likely to be the case because of a moral 
hazard problem and its relation with the different investment incentives each contract 
produces. We explain how the moral hazard problem arises and expand the explanation 
of how the equilibrium values x and y change with the contract terms in the next section. 
For now we look at the values of R and A set by the contract for the same levels of x and 
y to illustrate how these contracts are affected by the adverse selection problem. 
The payoffs depicted in table 3.1 show various important aspects of the different 
contractual arrangements. In monthly rent contracts, liquid tenants can either pay rent or 
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abandon the property, but paying dominates abandoning.10 Using the payoffs in table 3.1 
we can obtain the expected social values of Antichresis contracts (ESVA) and rental 
contracts (ESVR) by adding the expected payoffs for tenants and landlords under each 
contractual arrangement. These are given by equations 3 and 4 respectively: 
ESVR = L(x, y) + T(x, y) – p[T(x, y) – T0] – x – y - pC    (3) 
ESVA = L(x, y) + T(x, y) – x – y      (4) 
In equation 3, the probability that a tenant will have to abandon the property is 
costly to society. These costs involve tenants having to move to a unit that yields lower 
utility, not making use of the invested x, and having a vacant unit that results in 
landlord’s costs of re-renting the property to a different tenant. Thus, for a positive p and 
C and equal levels of x and y under both contracts, ESVA > ESVR and society will gain 
more from Antichresis contracts than from rental contracts.11 
 Now consider the difference between rA and R when the contract is being signed. 
The landlord requires the expected profit to be at least M to enter the contract, which 
assuming a competitive market (zero economic profits), is also the maximum she can 
charge. So, in a world where the parties can only choose between pure rent and pure 
Antichresis, tenants who chose pure rent will have to pay more than those who chose 
                                                 
 
 
10 To prove this note that the tenant will only sign a contract if the benefit from it (T(x,y)-To) is higher than 
the costs (R+x). Thus, the participation constraint for the tenant is given by T(x,y)-To-x >R. Paying 
dominates abandoning if T(x,y) – To > R so, by the participation constraint, if liquid, the tenant will always 
pay instead of abandoning.  
11 For this to be true tenants benefit from occupying the property needs to be larger than landlord’s costs C 
of taking possession of and re-renting the property in case of tenant illiquidity: (T(x,y)-To)>C. If this was 
not the case, there would be no threat of eviction and tenants would never pay R. Thus, this condition needs 
to hold for landlords to sign contracts.  
 19
Antichresis12. This means that, holding x and y constant, tenants who choose the 
Antichresis contract are better off than those who choose rent. But the Antichresis 
contract is only available to tenants who can pay the lump sum A at the beginning of the 
contractual period. Therefore, other things being equal, we expect to observe tenant 
sorting by liquidity in the market. Less liquid tenants will sort into the rental market 
while the more liquid tenants will sort into the Antichresis market.  
Ceteris paribus, tenant sorting according to liquidity will also affect the types of 
property we observe under these tenancy contracts. Higher quality property will tend to 
be under Antichresis because more liquid tenants (i.e. higher income) will sort into this 
contractual arrangement as opposed to rent. This empirical question will be addressed in 
chapter 5. But first we look at the problem of moral hazard related to investment 
decisions arising in these types of contractual arrangements.   
Maintenance Investment Decisions 
- Hi, is this the pet shop? Can I buy 20 rats, and 10,000 cockroaches? Oh! and 
add some spiders  to that order please… 
- Sure, but may I ask why would you want that? 
- Well… it’s because my lease contract is over, and my landlord wants the 
apartment returned “just as he gave it to me”    
Popular Ecuadorian joke (translation from Spanish by the author) 
 
Now we turn to landlords’ and tenants’ maintenance or improvements investment 
decisions. This section follows under the assumption that there is no hidden information 
problem in the rental contract and tenants do not face an illiquidity problem during the 
contractual period (p=0). The next section relaxes this assumption, but for now, we 
                                                 
 
 
12 In a world with no illiquid tenants (p=0) renters would have to pay R1  such that R1=rA=M. However, for 
p>0, pure renters pay R2= (R1+pC)/(1-p)=M. Thus, R2> R1, and R2> rA. 
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concentrate exclusively on the hidden action problem that arises in contracts that involve 
a temporal division of property rights ignoring the liquidity problem described in the 
previous section.  
To explain how the problem of moral hazard arises in the temporal division of 
property rights it is important to note that the socially efficient levels of investment on 
maintenance x and y are those that maximize the asset’s net social value V given by   
      V(x, y)= L(x, y) + T(x, y) – x – y    (5) 
This condition is independent of the type of contract chosen by the parties13. Thus, the 
socially optimal levels x° and y° solve the first order conditions:   
    Vx = 1; δh’(x) + f’(x)= 1         (6) 
     Vy = 1; k’(y) + λg’(y)= 1          (7) 
Notice that in the absence of any legal restraints, both tenant and landlord will 
invest less than the social optimum x and y because they do not maximize the social value 
function. Tenants will invest in x up to the point where they can maximize their net 
housing services enjoyment function without taking the property’s reversion value (L) 
into consideration. Thus, in the absence of any legal mechanisms, a tenant’s optimal 
investment x˜  will maximize the net housing services enjoyment function T(x, y) – x  
rather than the asset’s net social value (5).  Similarly, landlords will only invest in y up to 
the point where they can maximize the net property’s reversion value by choosing level y˜  
                                                 
 
 
13 Remember that this statement assumes no probability of illiquidity (p=0). In the case of potential 
illiquidity, the net social value of the asset in a rental contract will be given by V(x,y)=L(x,y)+(1-p)T(x,y)-x-
y-pC. This yields lower optimal values of x and y than an Antichresis contract. The intuition behind this 
result is that, given the chance that tenants may not be able to enjoy the property for the entire contractual 
period due to illiquidity, they adjust the investment levels to account for this possibility. On the other hand, 
tenants under an Antichresis contract can enjoy their investments with certainty that there will be no 
eviction. This certainty leads them to invest higher levels of x and y than in the case of a rental contract..   
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that optimizes the net reversion value of the property L(x, y) – y instead of the asset’s net 
social value (5).  
Under this formulation, the inefficiency arising from the moral hazard problem is 
a function of δ and λ. Consider a property where landlord’s investments have no effect on 
tenants enjoyment of the property (λ =0) so that Ty=0. In such case, the marginal effect of 
an extra unit of landlord’s investment y on the asset’s social value V is equal to the 
marginal effect of an extra unit of y on the property’s reversion value L. That is, Vy=Ly so 
the landlords optimal level of investment y˜ that satisfies Ly=1 is the social optimal level 
of investment (y°=y˜ ). However, when landlord investment affects tenant enjoyment of 
the property (λ>0) so that Ty>0, then the value of landlord investment y° that satisfies Ty+ 
Ly=1 is greater than investment level y˜  that satisfies Ly=114. The same logic applies to 
tenant investment x. When this investment has an impact on the property’s reversion 
value (i.e. δ>0), in the absence of legal restrains, tenants will invest a socially inefficient 
amount x˜  (where x˜ < x°). However, for property with δ=0, x˜ becomes the socially 
efficient tenant investment level (x˜ =x°).     
The rental contract gives the tenant the power to withhold rental payments if the 
landlord fails to maintain the property.  In this sense, the contract gives the tenant a 
credible enforcement mechanism for the landlord to invest in y in higher levels than she 
would in the absence of such mechanism. On the other hand, if the tenant does not invest 
in maintenance x that would affect the residual value of the property the landlord could 
                                                 
 
 
14 This comes from the fact that functions L and T are concave in y and therefore the sum of them V is also 
concave in y. Since V lies above T when L≠0 (i.e. λ>0), then Vy > Ly at any given yo>0. So if  y° satisfies 
Vy=1 and y˜ satisfies Ly=1,then it has to be the case that y°>y˜ wherever Ty>0 
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sue the tenant for waste15. But the enforcement mechanism, in this case reduced to the 
law of waste, will be credible only to the extent of the costs of taking the tenant to court 
are sufficiently low. In other words, if the tenant knows how expensive it is for the 
landlord to take him to court, the threat of a lawsuit will only be credible if the landlord’s 
losses in residual value of the asset are greater than the costs of suing the tenant. In this 
sense, the law of waste need not guarantee efficient tenant investment in maintenance. 
 The Antichresis contract introduces different enforcement mechanisms. The lump 
sum payment at the beginning of the contract serves as an enforcement mechanism for 
the tenant to invest in maintenance x that will affect the asset’s residual value16. Failure to 
maintain the property could result in the landlord discounting the maintenance costs from 
the Antichresis lump sum. On the other hand, the Antichresis payment at the outset 
means that the tenant loses a mechanism to entice landlord maintenance investment while 
the tenant occupies the property. The tenant could sue the landlord under minimum 
habitability provisions but then she would face court costs that are likely to be quite high. 
The landlord knows the court cost so threats of a lawsuit by the tenant may not be 
credible.  For this reason, under an Antichresis contract, equilibrium landlord investments 
for tenant enjoyment of the property y will generally be lower than the efficient level.  
In conclusion, the division of property rights creates problems of moral hazard 
with investment decisions. The Antichresis contract solves the problem of moral hazard 
with tenant maintenance investments but it does not solve the problem of moral hazard 
related to landlord maintenance investments. On the other hand, pure monthly rent 
                                                 
 
 
15 Equivalently, both parties can use security bonding (i.e. security deposits) at the contract outset 
16 At the least it ensures that the tenant is not judgment-proof in the event of litigation. 
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contracts solve the problem of moral hazard in landlord investments but do not solve the 
problem of moral hazard in tenant maintenance investments. Each contract solves a 
different moral hazard problem; as a result, the investment incentives exposed above 
suggest that we should expect some type of self-selection by type of contract depending 
on property characteristics. Other things being equal, property where tenant’s input has a 
large effect on the residual value of the property (property with high δ) will tend to be 
under Antichresis, and property where the landlord’s input is important for the tenants’ 
enjoyment of the property (property with high λ) will tend to be under monthly rent. A 
high λ corresponds to properties in which there are activities that the tenant cannot do 
himself like fixing elevators or maintaining common yards or pools in an apartment 
building that enhance the tenant’s enjoyment or use of the property. Thus, the model 
would predict that, ceteris paribus, property such as office and apartment buildings or 
rooms in a condominium would tend to be under monthly rent. In the case of other types 
of property like detached houses, for example, most investments that affect the tenant’s 
value of the property may not come from landlords’ investments in maintaining common 
areas or facilities. These properties have low λ. Thus, for these properties, the rental 
contract will tend to be less attractive than Antichresis. 
On the landlords’ side, there are properties that require more tenant input than 
others to maintain residual value after the contractual period has expired (i.e. correspond 
to a high δ). For these properties, the Antichresis contract might be more attractive than 
monthly rent. However, most rental contracts today include a mechanism to insure that 
tenants invest efficient levels of x. This mechanism consists of a security deposit payable 
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at the beginning of the contractual period. Thus, other things being equal, in rental 
contracts where a security deposit that ensures an efficient tenant investment x 
Equilibrium R and A with Endogenous x and y 
So far the discussion of the equilibrium R and A that result from a choice of 
contract assumed fixed levels of maintenance investment x and y. This assumption is not 
realistic simply because, as explained in the previous section, both landlord and tenant 
will invest in x and y responding to the incentives created within the contract. In this 
section we begin by describing the equilibrium R, A, x, and y in the two contract 
modalities separately and then we compare them in terms of efficiency. 
The Monthly Rent Contract 
Before choosing a contract, landlord and tenant weight their options based on 
their expected profits under each arrangement. Using the payoffs in figure 3.1 we obtain 
the expected profit for a tenant under a pure monthly rent contract: 
πt,R = (1-p)[T(x, y) – R] + pT0 - x    (8) 
Under the standard assumption that there is a perfectly elastic supply of potential tenants 
allows us to derive the maximum rent a tenant is willing to pay in equilibrium17  
    R= {T(x, y) - p[T(x, y) – T0] – x}/ (1-p)    (9) 
The landlord’s expected profit from a pure monthly rent contract is the sum of the net 
residual value plus the expected rental income.  
    πl,R = L(x, y) –y + (1-p)R – pC    (10) 
                                                 
 
 
17 This gives the familiar bid price equilibrium condition. The assumption follows Eswaran and Kotwol 
(1985) and Micelli, et al (2001). With a perfectly elastic supply of potential tenants, in equilibrium, 
landlords are able to extract tenant profits to the reservation utility level profit (in this case assumed to be 
zero).    
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Substituting the equilibrium rent (9) into (10) we obtain the landlord’s expected 
profit under a pure monthly rent contract. 
    πl,R = L(x, y) + T(x, y) - p[T(x, y) – T0] – x  –y  – pC   (11) 
Expression (10) shows that a landlord receives the expected social value of the 
contract (given also in equation (3)); this follows from the assumption of perfectly elastic 
supply of potential tenants. Thus, the landlord’s return serves us to evaluate the welfare 
properties of each contract.  
 Now consider the efficiency of the pure monthly rent contract in terms of 
investments x and y. The efficient levels of maintenance investment in a rental contract 
are those that maximize the expected social value of the contract given by (10) and yield 
optimal amounts of investment xˆ and yˆ . For simplicity assume that tenants pay the 
optimal amount of xˆ upfront in the form of a security deposit S so that the amount of 
tenant investment is equal and efficient in both contractual arrangements (i.e. xˆ that 
maximizes (3) is paid upfront in both contracts). Recall that at the moment the contract is 
signed the landlord sets the rent R that brings the tenant to his reservation utility. At this 
point the landlord can commit to pay the optimal level of yˆ which would yield a rent that 
maximizes the social value and therefore the landlord’s return. However, the relevant 
question at this point is whether this is incentive compatible. After the contract is signed 
the landlord maximizes (10) taking R as given. This results in the landlord investing y* 
where y*≤ yˆ  as λ≥0.  The tenant knows this at the onset so he will never agree to pay 
unless λ=0. As a result, in the absence of any mechanism that can bring the landlord to 
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credibly commit to invest yˆ for λ≥0, she will only invest y*, making the arrangement 
inefficient18. However, as explained in the previous section, in a pure monthly rent 
contract, the tenant is allowed to withhold rental payments if the landlord is not honoring 
the contractual agreement. As a result, the tenant has an enforcement mechanism that 
allows the landlord to credibly commit to invest yˆ maximizing the social value of the 
rental contract.  
The Antichresis Contract  
In an Antichresis contract, the lump sum payment A is made upfront when the 
contract is signed.  This removes any probability of illiquidity on the tenant’s side during 
the contractual period. Thus the tenant’s expected profit under an Antichresis contract is 
given by:  
     πt,A = T(x, y) – rA – x     (12) 
Assuming a perfectly elastic supply of potential tenants, the maximum amount rA tenants 
will be willing to pay under an Antichresis contract is. 
     rA  = T(x, y) - x     (13) 
 The landlord’s expected profit from a pure Antichresis contract is the sum of the net  
residual value plus the Antichresis lump sum’s income.  
     πl,A = L(x, y) – y + rA     (14)  
                                                 
 
 
18 When the landlord maximizes 10 taking R as given, the optimal level of investment (y*) satisfies the first 
order condition: Ly –1 = 0. However, if the tenant can force the landlord to credibly commit to invest higher 
levels of y with a threat of withholding rent, the landlord will be forced to maximize 11 which would yield 
an optimal investment yˆ that satisfies the first order condition Ly + (1-p)Ty – 1 = 0, Thus, yˆ > y* for p<1 and 
λ≥0 
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Substituting the equilibrium rent (13) into (14) we obtain the landlord’s return under an 
Antichresis agreement, this is equal to the social value of the contract. 
     πl,A = L(x, y) + T(x, y) - x – y     (15) 
As with the rental contract above, assume that tenants pay S upfront in the form of 
a security deposit, which is deducted from rA in the form of a lower A at the time the 
contract is signed19. In the Antichresis contract the landlord can promise to invest the 
optimal amount y˜ at the time the contract is signed20. As with the rental contract, 
however, once the contract is signed and the Antichresis lump sum is received, the 
landlord maximizes (14) as opposed to (15) taking rA as given and invests y*. In the 
monthly rent contract the tenant could bring the landlord to honor the promise of 
investing yˆ by threatening to withhold rent. In the case of Antichresis the tenant loses that 
capacity and can not entice the landlord to invest the efficient level y˜ . In Antichresis the 
landlord cannot credibly commit to invest any more than y*, making the contract 
inefficient when y*≤y˜ as λ≥0. 
Comparing Antichresis and Periodic Rent Contracts 
This section compares the Antichresis and monthly rent contracts in terms of 
landlord profits for different property types. The previous section established that in the 
absence of a landlord maintenance investment a moral hazard problem (i.e. property with 
                                                 
 
 
19 In the Antichresis contract this assumption is irrelevant because the landlord can always make the tenant 
to credibly commit to invest x* since he holds a large lump sum A that serves as a security deposit.  
20 Note that the optimal social amounts of investments in an Antichresis contract come from maximizing 15 
with respect to x and y. This yields optimal social amounts x and y˜ . On the other hand the optimal social 
investments for a rental contract are obtained from maximizing 11 with respect to x and y. This yields 
optimal social values xˆ andyˆ . where y˜ > yˆ  and  x >xˆ  As explained in a previous footnote, this is due to the 
probability of the tenant being forced to abandon the property and not being able to enjoy investments x 
and y. 
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λ=0), the Antichresis contract yields higher expected profits than the monthly rent 
contract. This result is depicted in Figure 3.2, which shows the maximum landlord profit 
under each contractual arrangement as a function of λ. When  λ=0 the Antichresis 
contract yields higher profits due to the inherent risk of tenant illiquidity in monthly rent 
contracts. As the level of λ increases for a property, profits under both contractual 
arrangements increase21. Looking at the relative slopes, however, as tenant’s enjoyment 
of the property increase with landlord’s investment, profits under the monthly rent 
contact increase at a faster rate than profits under an Antichresis agreement.  This result 
implies that, there will be a λo>0 such that πl,R = πl,A. Therefore, for properties where λ < 
λo the Antichresis will dominate the rental contract and the opposite will take place for 
properties where λ > λo.  
 The rental contract dominates the Antichresis contract in terms of maintenance 
investment efficiency because it does a better job at fixing the moral hazard problem. But 
the monthly rent contract does not solve the adverse selection problem as effectively as 
the Antichresis contract. The probability of tenants’ illiquidity in a monthly rent contract 
makes the expected landlord return lower than the Antichresis contract for some types of 
property where the marginal effect of tenant’s investment on tenants enjoyment of the 
property is low (low λ). The shaded region in figure 3.5.1 shows the region where the 
                                                 
 
 
21 This result can be obtained by differentiating the maximized landlord profit functions under each 
contractual arrangement with respect to λ and applying the envelope theorem. For the monthly rent contract 
differentiating (11) with respect to λ and applying the envelope theorem yields 
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Antichresis contract dominates the monthly rent contract. This region corresponds to 
properties with low λ and tenants with positive probability of illiquidity (0<p<1). For 
properties that exceed some threshold value λo the expected profits under a monthly rent 
contract exceed the profits under an Antichresis contract. In this region the monthly rent 
contract dominates the Antichresis contract because the landlord can credibly commit to 
invest higher levels of y and obtain higher profits. An important aspect to note in figure 
3.5.1 is that higher probabilities of tenant’s illiquidity p or higher costs of eviction/re-
renting the property C shift the landlords’ equilibrium expected profits curve 
downward22. This downward shift increases the shaded area in figure 3.5.1 and moves the 
threshold value λo to the right making the Antichresis contract more attractive than the 
monthly rent contract over a wider range of property types.  
 
                                                 
 
 
22 Differentiating the landlords’ equilibrium profit function under a monthly contract with respect to p using 
the envelope theorem can also show this. In the case of higher eviction costs the effect is more evident. 
Increasing C shifts the intercept downward increasing the shaded area and therefore increasing the range of 
property types where Antichresis dominates the rental contract.  
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Figure 3.2: 
Landlord Profits under Antichresis and Monthly Rent Contracts as a Function of λ 
  
Proof 
Differentiating the maximum profit function slope with respect to λ for an 
Antichresis contract we obtain: 
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Recall that, by assumption, g'(y*)>0. Therefore, this result comes strictly from the moral 
hazard problem which determines that the landlord can only commit to pay y* regardless 
of the property characteristics or level of λ.  Once the contract is signed, the landlord 
takes rA as a given. Thus, comparative static analysis on (14) yields 
*
0
y
λ
∂ =∂ because once 
the contract is signed the optimal condition for the landlord does not include tenants 
utility. As a result, for properties with high or low λ, the landlord can only credibly 
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commit to pay y* in the absence of an enforcement mechanism. The tenant knows this at 
the onset so she will never agree to pay a higher rA (i.e. higher profits for the landlord). 
On the other hand differentiating the profit function’s slope with respect to λ for a 
monthly contract (11) we obtain: 
),(
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λ λ
π⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ∂⎝ ⎠ = − >∂  
In monthly rent contracts, tenants can entice landlords to paying optimal levels of 
y by threatening to withhold rental payments, this enforcement mechanism drives 
landlords to maximize (11) after the contract has been signed and allows them to credibly 
commit to pay optimal levels of y.  This in turn lets tenants pay higher levels of R for 
properties that require more landlords input (higher λ). Totally differentiating (11) and 
using comparative static analysis in the usual manner yields
ˆ
0
y
λ
∂ >∂ . Thus, the slope of the 
profit function for monthly rent contracts is increasing in λ. 
Because profits for monthly rental contracts are increasing at a faster rate than profits 
under Antichresis contracts with respect to λ, there will be a λo >0 such that πl,R = πl,A. 
Thus, for properties where λ < λo the Antichresis will dominate the rental contract and the 
opposite will take place for properties where λ > λo. 
Mixed Contracts 
Up to this point we assumed that parties could only choose either rental or 
Antichresis contracts with no possibility of mixed contracts. Under mixed contracts, part 
of the payment could take the form of an Antichresis lump sum A to be returned to the 
tenant at the end of the contractual period and the other portion could be a monthly rent 
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R. Thus, under mixed contracts the contractual amount would be given by rA+R and the 
incentives produced by the contract will depend on the payment mix.  
Consider first a contract where the Antichresis lump sum is set higher than the 
agreed rent (A≥R). In such case, the incentives will be the same as in a pure Antichresis 
contract. If the tenant was illiquid when R is due, the landlord could simply deduct R 
from A without having to evict the tenant. In the same manner if the tenant threatened to 
withhold R to motivate higher levels of landlord maintenance investments these threats 
would not be credible since the landlord can simply deduct the withheld payments from 
A. Thus, mixed contracts where A≥R will create the same incentives a pure Antichresis 
contracts.  
Now consider a mixed contract where the Antichresis lump sum was set lower 
than the rental payments (R>A).23 In this scenario tenants can credible threaten to 
withhold R and enforce landlord investments in y. So mixed contracts where R>A serve 
as pure rental contracts in terms of solving the moral hazard problem24. However 
contracts where R>A+C do not solve the hidden information problem because tenant 
illiquidity can still cause tenant abandonment/eviction and loss to society. 
Conclusions 
The division of ownership can create gains for society, but it also introduces 
incentives for inefficient behavior from both landlord and tenant (Epstein, 1986). The 
Antichresis contract solves the adverse selection problem caused by landlords’ inability 
                                                 
 
 
23 Note that landlords will never agree to contracts where the rental payments are lower than the eviction 
costs R<C. If they did, tenants will never pay rent even if they were liquid. In the case of a mixed contract 
the condition for a landlord to get into mixed contract will be R-A>C or R>A+C.  
24 Note that this contract is equivalent to a monthly rent contract with a security deposit of A.   
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to observe tenants’ probability of illiquidity. By imposing a large lump sum payment at 
the beginning of the contractual period, the Antichresis contract assures that tenants will 
not abandon the property and will not impose the social costs of having an unoccupied 
unit. Although not formally included in the model, we expect the large lump sum to 
ensure that only the more affluent tenants will sort into this type of arrangement.  
The Antichresis contract’s major shortcoming is that it cannot solve the moral 
hazard problem of landlords’ maintenance investment. The initial payment of the 
Antichresis lump sum removes the essential landlord credible commitment mechanism. 
The social cost stemming from this unresolved moral hazard problem of Antichresis 
contracts, however, is not the same for all types of property. The actual impact hinges 
critically on the technology governing the delivery of services from real estate assets. 
Properties where the supply of landlord inputs does not have a large effect on tenant 
value will not lose much from being in an Antichresis contract when compared to the 
monthly rent contract. The model presented in this chapter therefore suggests that 
different types of property will self-select into the alternative lease regimes, Antichresis 
and rent, and the sorting will reflect the underlying real estate services technology. This 
represents one possibly important empirical implication of the theory.   
Although the model presented in this chapter does not fully develop the adverse 
selection issues, it nonetheless illustrates that property types for which the losses arising 
from the moral hazard problem outweigh the expected losses from the adverse selection 
problem will be more likely to be under monthly rent. On the other hand, property types 
for which the expected losses arising from the adverse selection problem outweigh the 
losses from the moral hazard problem will tend to fall under Antichresis. This notion 
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underlies the empirical analysis of property sorting across contract forms in chapter 5.; 
but first we describe the use of Antichresis and monthly rent contracts in Bolivia and 
explain how some institutional factors may affect the demand for such contracts.  
 35
CHAPTER 4 
THE ANTICHRESIS CONTRACT IN BOLIVIA 
 
This chapter provides a description of the use of Antichresis in Bolivia. We begin 
by showing the relative importance of the contract in housing tenure in urban Bolivia. We 
then turn to a description of two institutional factors that are most commonly believed to 
influence the demand for Antichresis contracts: Inflation and interest rates. We briefly 
explore the channels through which these macroeconomic factors could affect the use of 
Antichresis and then test our hypotheses using aggregate data from Bolivian cities. This 
chapter also considers the taxes and fees applied on Antichresis contracts with special 
emphasis on the incentives these might create for tenants to choose between contract 
modalities in the Bolivian case. Finally we examine the costs associated with eviction 
cases arising from a breach of monthly rental contracts in Bolivia by looking at case 
processing times in the civil court system.    
Use of Antichresis in Bolivia 
Although the Antichresis contract is present in several European countries and 
most Latin American countries, Bolivia is one of the few Latin American countries where 
the contract is widely used for residential housing25. A shown in Table 4.1, housing under 
Antichresis tenure increased in Bolivia’s 10 largest cities between 1992 and 2001. 
Although Bolivian civil law prohibits the use of mixed contracts, they are still in use in 
                                                 
 
 
25 For a complete work on housing tenure statistics in Latin America see Rivera (2005) 
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most cities but are relatively small in number. Table 4.1 also shows that rental contracts 
represent the largest proportion of non-owner occupied housing.  
 
Table 4.1: 
Housing Tenure in Bolivia’s 10 Largest Cities 
 
CITY CENSU
S YEAR 
% 
ANTICHRESIS 
 % 
RENT 
% 
OWN 
% 
MIXED 
% GIVEN 
FOR 
SERVICES 
% GIVEN 
BY 
FRIENDS 
% 
OTHER 
Santa Cruz 1992 6.77 24.24 52.04 0.25 5.5 10.06 1.14 
  2001 9.41 27.02 48.11 0.58 3.77 9.45 1.66 
Cochabamba 1992 9.09 27.65 45.82 0.17 4.31 12.07 0.91 
  2001 10.29 26.87 50.6 0.4 2.58 8.02 1.24 
El Alto 1992 1.99 27.83 54.59 0.29 2.93 10.93 1.45 
  2001 2.82 22.59 60.81 0.5 1.78 9.76 1.75 
La Paz 1992 7.77 27.81 44.72 0.28 3.44 15.12 0.87 
  2001 12.09 23.45 49.71 0.45 2.36 10.36 1.58 
Sucre 1992 7.87 31.25 45.62 0.15 3.41 11.15 0.55 
  2001 9.91 28.59 50.01 0.38 2.22 7.77 1.13 
Tarija 1992 2.9 29.17 52.26 0.18 4.13 10.53 0.82 
  2001 5.74 29.88 52.35 0.36 2.93 7.24 1.5 
Potosi 1992 4.94 31.02 43.47 0.08 4.57 15.51 0.41 
  2001 6.77 28.89 51.37 0.37 2.28 9.06 1.25 
Trinidad 1992 1.76 26.6 50.32 0.21 6.9 11.52 2.69 
  2001 3.73 24.03 53.34 0.66 4.82 11.21 2.21 
Oruro 1992 7.44 29.37 44.76 0.1 3.62 13.97 0.73 
  2001 8.79 23.6 53.67 0.34 1.83 9.71 2.06 
Source: Indicadores Sociodemográficos por Ciudades Capitales, Censos 1992, 2001; INE Bolivia, 2004  
 
Bolivians commonly believe that the Antichresis system is popular because of 
Bolivia’s traumatic experiences with high inflation and because of high lending interest 
rates that force landlords to finance their projects using Antichresis contracts. In the same 
line, some authors suggest that in addition to interest rates and inflation, taxes and 
registration costs constitute an incentive for landlords and tenants to prefer Antichresis to 
monthly rent contracts or the opposite (Farfan, 2002; 2004; Durand-Lasserve, 2006). The 
rest of this chapter explores the validity of these claims. First we analyze with the 
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relationship between Antichresis use and the inflation rate and interest rates. We then turn 
to a detailed description of the Bolivian tax system and its application to Antichresis and 
monthly rent contracts.  Finally we explore Bolivian Civil Courts’ efficiency to provide a 
better understanding of the costs involved in contract enforcing in the country. The final 
section offers the conclusions.  
Antichresis Use and Inflation Rate 
Unexpected and steady changes in the inflation rate can produce an arbitrary 
redistribution of wealth among individuals. When the inflation rate differs from the 
expected inflation rate, the interest rate a creditor was expecting when the contract was 
signed (ex-ante) differs from the realized interest rate (ex-post) when the payment is due. 
Higher than expected inflation makes the ex-post real interest rate lower than the ex-ante 
real interest rate and this produces a transfer of wealth from creditors to debtors.  
 This principle suggests that in economies with volatile inflation rates, long-term 
contracts that involve fixed amounts of money (not inflation indexed) are riskier and 
therefore less common. This would certainly be the case for an Antichresis contract 
where landlords receiving an Antichresis lump sum in local currency at the signing of the 
contract would have to give back the same amount of money without taking the inflation 
rate into consideration at the end of the contract. If the inflation rate in an Antichresis 
period was higher than expected, the landlord would return a lower Antichresis amount in 
real terms at the end of the contractual period. As a result, demand for Antichresis 
contracts on the tenants’ side would tend to decrease in periods of high inflation rate 
volatility.  
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The Bolivian case, however, does not show a strong relationship between current 
inflation, past inflation or inflation rate volatility and the percentage of homes under 
Antichresis tenure. As table 4.2 shows, the percentage of homes under Antichresis tenure 
in Bolivia’s three largest cities increased slightly between 1976 and 1992, despite the 
large increases in the inflation rate (current and past). This positive relation is not 
consistent with the hypothesis proposed above26. On the other hand, as inflation rates 
decrease between 1992 and 2001, the percentage of homes under Antichresis increases. 
This negative relation is consistent with the hypothesis proposed above but not with the 
observed relation in the previous period rates.  
 
Table 4.2:  
Antichresis Use and Inflation 
 
Census 
Year 
% Homes under 
Antichresis 
Current year 
Inflation 
Past year 
Inflation 
Inflation Std. 
Deviation      
(previous 5 years) 
1976 7.55 4.49 7.98 23.66 
1992 7.70 12.06 21.44 3.13 
2001 10.55 1.60 4.60 4.01 
Source: Censos de Poblacion y Vivienda 1976, 1992, 2001; INE, Bolivia 
Source: (CPI Inflation) World Development Indicators CD ROM 
 
       
                                                 
 
 
26 This increase of the use of Antichresis in the 1976-1992 period is even more puzzling considering that 
Bolivia suffered one of the worst hyperinflations in the history of the world during that period (in 1985). 
The hyperinflation coupled by a rent control policy and a ban on foreign currency indexation in contracts 
between 1982 and 1985 created a set of perverse incentives that virtually made the rental and Antichresis 
markets disappear. These set of policies were reversed in 1986 when the hyperinflation was controlled, rent 
and price controls were abolished and the use of foreign currency in any type of contract or transaction was 
unrestricted (see Morales and Sachs, 1990; Ugarteche, 1986; and Torrico 1999).  Given the traumatic 
experiences with inflation during this period, the fact that there was an actual increase in the use of 
Antichresis shows that the use of the contract is not sensitive to changes in the inflation rate.    
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The relationship between the percentage of homes under Antichresis and inflation 
rate volatility is also weak. As volatility dramatically decreased from 1976 to 1992, the 
percentage of homes under Antichresis increases slightly as expected by the reasoning 
above. However, the opposite occurred between 1992 and 2001 when the inflation rate 
volatility increased and the percent of homes under Antichresis increased as well by 2.85 
percentage points contradicting the argument above. 
The weak relationship between inflation rates and volatility and the use of the 
Antichresis contract might be explained by the fact that most Antichresis contracts are 
made in US Dollars. If Antichresis contracts are signed specifying payments in a 
relatively stable foreign currency, agents can avoid the uncertainty produced by 
unexpected inflation and devaluation of the local currency. This would make the 
Antichresis contract very attractive, but the use of contracts in foreign currency is not 
exclusive to Antichresis. Most monthly rent contracts are also signed specifying the 
rental payments in US dollars27 . Therefore the choice of Antichresis contracts over rental 
contracts is likely driven by factors other than inflation.     
Antichresis Use and Interest Rates 
Real interest rates are also believed to have an impact on the use of the 
Antichresis contract as opposed to the monthly rent contract and vice versa. This 
assertion assumes that landlords and tenants have different returns for investments. 
Otherwise, other things being equal, the Antichresis contract would only exist if both 
                                                 
 
 
27 In the sample of 300 Antichresis contracts and 300 monthly rent contracts used in the empirical section 
of the dissertation, 100% of the Antichresis and 90% of the monthly rent news paper adds were on listed on 
$US dollars 
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landlord and tenant are indifferent between the two contractual arrangements. To see this, 
assume that both landlord’s and tenant’s best investment option for the Antichresis 
amount was the same banking savings real interest rate rs. Everything else being equal, 
the tenant would take the property under Antichresis instead of monthly rent only if the 
opportunity cost of the Antichresis amount A is lower than what she would have to pay in 
monthly rents R (rsA ≤ R). On the other hand the landlord would only choose Antichresis 
over monthly rent if the gains from the use of the Antichresis amount were higher than 
what she would receive in monthly rental payments (rsA ≥R). As a result, the only way 
Antichresis would exist is if rsA =R so that both landlord and tenant are indifferent.  
Now consider the case where the landlord has a better investment option than the 
tenant for the Antichresis amount A and the tenant faces the same participation constraint 
(rs A ≤ R). In this new case, the landlord could borrow A from the banking system and 
face the lending interest rate (rl) (with rl > rs ) or could finance the investment by putting 
his property under an Antichresis contract and get A from the tenant. The participation 
constraints for landlord and tenant become rlA≥ R and rs A≤ R respectively. Under this 
new set up, the Antichresis contract is beneficial for the landlord even if rs A< R as long 
as the monthly rent payments are lower than the cost of borrowing A from the bank at the 
prevailing landing rate rl (rlA ≥ R). This reasoning suggests that, with other things being 
equal, large differences between rl and rs and different rates of return for landlords and 
tenants may explain the use of the Antichresis contract. Thus, we should observe that an 
increase in the interest rate spread (difference between the lending and savings interest 
rates) would increase the use of Antichresis contracts. However, this hypothesis does not 
hold in the Bolivian case.  
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Table 4.3 shows the percentage of homes under Antichresis in Bolivia’s largest 
cities and the country’s interest rate spread for the latest census years. The observed 
relation between the use of Antichresis and the interest rate in spread is exactly the 
opposite of the prediction stated above. As the interest rate spread decreases by 12 
percentage points, the percentage of homes under Antichresis actually increases by 2.85 
percentage points.  
 
Table 4.3: 
Use of the Antichresis Contract and Interest Rate Spread 
 
Census Year % Homes under Antichresis Interest rate Spread 
1976 7.55 .. 
1992 7.7 22.29 
2001 10.55 10.24 
Source: Bolivian population and housing Census 1976, 1992, 2001, and International 
Financial Indicators (IMF) 
 
The Bolivian case shows that even though inflation and changes in the interest 
rate spread might have an impact on the use of the Antichresis contract, they certainly do 
not provide a complete explanation; the data shows that none of these variables has a 
strong relationship that would logically explain the use or prevalence of the Antichresis 
contract in Bolivia. As a result, we argue that any model that tries to explain the origins 
and use of the Antichresis contract needs to move beyond these variables and the simple 
explanations provided above. Before testing the model proposed in the previous chapter 
with Bolivian data it is useful to explore two other institutional factors that may affect the 
decision to choose Antichresis over monthly rent in the Bolivian context: taxes and court 
efficiency. 
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Taxes and Registration Costs 
Property Taxes 
In Bolivia, the property tax is administered at the municipal level and is one of the 
main revenue sources for municipal governments. The property’s current owner pays the 
property tax once a year28. Landlords will pass the property tax to tenants in the 
Antichresis payments rA if the property is in Antichresis, in R if the property is under 
monthly rent, or a combination of the two if the contract is a mix of Antichresis and 
monthly rent. Under Bolivian Civil Law the tenant under an Antichresis contract is 
obligated to pay for property taxes, but the Antichresis contract can include a provision 
giving the landlord the responsibility to pay the property tax if both parties agree to it 
when signing the contract (Civil Code Art 1434). Such provision will not make the 
Antichresis more or less attractive than monthly rent because the tenant will end up 
paying the property tax either as a part of what the owner will charge in rA if there is a 
provision, or from his pocket if there is no provision29. Thus, property taxes will not 
influence landlords’ or tenants’ decision to choose Antichresis over monthly rent or vice 
versa. The next section explores registration costs and other taxes that are thought by 
some authors (Farfan, 2002) to affect the contract choice decision. 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
28 For taxing purposes, owner is the person whose name appears on the property’s title. 
29 In a full Antichresis contract, the owner will set the amount she wants to receive from the contract M = m 
+ t =  rA where m is the revenue net of property taxes and t are the property taxes. The equality will hold so 
that the tenant always pays the tax: M = m + t = rA (if there is no provision) or M = m = rA-t (if there is a 
provision) 
 
 43
Registration Costs 
Bolivian law requires the Antichresis contract to be a public document (Civil 
Code Art 1430) registered in the Office of Real Estate Registry (Derechos Reales). The 
registry serves two main purposes: (1) It insures that the property involved in the 
Antichresis contract has a clean title registered to the person signing the Antichresis 
contract as owner, and (2) It ensures that the property has no legal claims to it such as 
mortgages or other legal claims. 
 In case of a dispute courts can only intervene and give the tenant the first claim on 
the Antichresis amount A if the if the contract was made public (i.e. signed in front of a 
public notary) and registered in the real estate registry office. If the Antichresis 
agreement lacks either of these two requirements, tenants have to go through ordinary 
debt collection legal procedures, which take considerably longer and are subject to 
disputes of payments with other claimants. The real estate registry office charges 0.4% of 
the Antichresis amount plus a fixed fee of $6 for administrative processing. 
 The registration of an Antichresis contract becomes insurance for the tenant 
because it ensures that the property is free of other legal claims and that the contract can 
be held in a court of law. However, it is common in Bolivia to find situations in which 
tenants do not register the Antichresis contract in the real estate registry office or sign a 
public contract. In most of these cases tenants usually lose their Antichresis amount and 
are evicted from the property when foreclosed by a bank that had a previous mortgage 
claim on it (La Razon, 2002; Farfan, 2002).      
 Registration is not required for monthly rent contracts. According to Bolivian law, 
verbal agreements of monthly rent deals are considered contracts. Thus, other things 
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being equal, registration costs may be a factor deterring agents from using the Antichresis 
contracts as Farfan (2002) states. However other factors have to be taken into 
consideration when looking at how registration costs affect the choice between contracts. 
One of these factors is the value added tax.      
The Value Added Tax on Antichresis and Monthly Rent Contracts 
Economic structural reforms enacted in Bolivia to combat the rampant 
hyperinflation in 1985 included a comprehensive tax reform that replaced the old tax 
system with a Value Added Tax system in 198630. Since then, Bolivia uses the Value 
Added Tax (IVA in Spanish) system to collect revenues for the central government. The 
IVA is a tax on gains and not on the costs of a product. For example, if product X is sold 
at $100 but it costs $90 to produce, the tax will be applied on the $10 gain. In Bolivia, the 
IVA rate is 13%, so the tax in this case would be $1.3  
Firms or individuals who are involved in commercial and or leasing activities are 
required to pay the IVA tax of 13% on gains every month. Complementing the IVA tax, 
salaried individuals are required to pay the RC-IVA (complementary regime value added 
tax in English) that acts like a tax on earnings and is applied to an individual’s taxable 
income minus the expenses the individual made in the current or previous tax periods. 
For every transaction, an individual receives a receipt. At the end of the tax period she 
has to pay 13% of her taxable salary (which is the salary minus 2 minimum salaries). 
However, the individual can use the receipts to discount her taxable base. If her receipts 
                                                 
 
 
30 The tax reform (Law 843) was signed by President Victor Paz Estensoro in May 1986 and was later 
amended in 1994 under President Gonzalo Sanches de Lozada. The major 1994 amendment raised the tax 
rate from 10% to 13%. 
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are equal to the taxable base her RC-IVA taxes would be 0, if her receipts add up to more 
than her taxable salary she will have a credit equal to the exceeding amount for the next 
taxing period. If her receipts add up to less than her taxable salary she will be taxed on 
that difference. To explain the impact of the IVA and RC-IVA taxes on these contracts it 
is necessary to divide the tax burden for landlords and tenants under both contractual 
agreements. We start with the monthly rent contract.  
The Rent Contract 
Each month, the landlord is obligated to pay IVA (13%) on rent revenues (R) but 
can discount the taxable revenues with receipts of all the expenditures made on the 
property (y). Thus, the yearly IVA tax for the landlord amount to IVAt = 0.13(R-y). Note 
that if the expenditures on the property are equal to the revenues (R=y) the IVA tax will 
be 0.    
If there is a breach of contract and a legal dispute arises in the contractual relation, 
courts require proof of IVA tax payments in order to establish a monthly rent contractual 
relationship.  As a result landlords need to have paid their taxes before they can start an 
eviction procedure. This requirement serves as an incentive for landlords to comply with 
tax regulations. However, tax authorities estimate that less than 20% of monthly rent 
contracts pay IVA taxes (Torrico, 1999).   
The landlord is also required to pay the RC-IVA every three months. This tax is 
applied to 87% of the rent revenue minus 2 minimum salaries per month (about $125). 
However, with the RC-IVA the landlord can deduct his taxable base using expenditure 
receipts of any expense not included in his IVA declaration. It is important to note that 
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for monthly rent contracts of $143 per month or less, the taxable base for the RC-IVA is 
0 even if the taxpayer does not present any expenditure receipts31.   
Finally, the landlord has to pay the transaction tax (IT, in Spanish), which is equal 
to 3% of the rents he receives before IVA and RC-IVA taxes. As with the IVA tax, 
authorities estimate 20% compliance for this tax (Torrico, 1999). Tenants are not required 
to pay any taxes related to their monthly rent contract. Tenants are only required to pay 
RC-IVA on their earnings and they can use the monthly rent expenditures to deduct their 
taxable base as explained above. 
The Antichresis Contract 
When an Antichresis contract is signed, both owner and tenant have to register the 
contract in the tax offices and obtain the “Contributors Unique Registration” number 
(RUC in Spanish). Once the contract is signed, both parties are subject to the RC-IVA 
taxes on a supposed yearly income equivalent to 10% of A. As with other RC-IVA taxes, 
the taxable base is calculated by subtracting 2 minimum salaries from the monthly 
income and then subtracting expenditures made previous to the tax payment date not 
claimed in other taxes or taxing periods. 
For example, if an Antichresis contract is done for $17,000, the taxable supposed 
income for the year is $ 1700, which is equivalent to a monthly (supposed) income of  $ 
142. After subtracting 2 minimum salaries ($125) the taxable base becomes $ 17. If the 
taxpayer presents receipts of expenditures amounting to $17 the tax will be 0. But if the 
taxpayer does not present any receipts the monthly tax will be $ 2.21 (13% of $17). For 
                                                 
 
 
31 This is because 87% of a monthly rent of 142.6 contract is equivalent to 2 minimum salaries: $125, 
which is the automatic deduction for the taxable base in the RC-IVA.  
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Antichresis contracts of $15,000 or less, the taxable base for the RC-IVA is 0 even if the 
taxpayer does not present any expenditure receipts32. 
Taxes and Contract Choice 
Table 4.4.4 presents a summary of the total yearly tax burden for both parts under 
each contractual arrangement. For simplicity, table 4.4 assumes that neither landlords nor 
tenants present any receipts to obtain RC-IVA credits or IVA credits in case of the rental 
contract so that they are fully taxed. 
 
Table 4.4: 
Yearly Taxes and Registration Costs for Antichresis and Monthly Rent Contracts 
 
Tax / Registration cost Monthly Rent Contract Antichresis Contract 
  R= Yearly rent A= Antichresis lump sum 
Registration costs 0 .04% of A 
IVA 13 % of R 0 
IT 3 % of R 0 
   
RC-IVA (landlord) 13% of (.87*R -125*12) 13% of (0.1*A -125*12) 
RC-IVA (tenant) 0 13% of (0.1*A -125*12) 
Source: Own elaboration using the Bolivian tax code, 2005 
 
Using the formulas in table 4.4 for different amounts of R and A, we can observe 
the total tax burden on both contracts. Figure 4.1 depicts these tax burdens using yearly 
rents for monthly rent contacts and an equivalent Antichresis lump sum A assuming a 
return of 10% (r=.10). The figure shows that monthly rent contracts where the specified 
yearly rent is below $7,000 have a higher tax burden than Antichresis contracts with 
equivalent yearly rents (rA). This indicates that, for contracts with yearly payments below 
                                                 
 
 
32 This follows from the fact that the supposed monthly income for a $15,000 contract is equivalent to 2 
minimum salaries: $125, which is the automatic deduction for the taxable base in the RC-IVA  
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$7000, we might observe that market rents R for monthly rent contracts may be higher 
than the Antichresis rents rA for identical properties to account for the differences in the 
tax burden. Other things being equal this would tend to drive tenants from rental 
contracts to Antichresis contracts. But taxes alone do not seem to explain contract choice. 
Empirical data from the city of Cochabamba show that 93% of monthly-rent 
contracts are signed for amounts were the tax burden is higher than it would be for 
equivalent Antichresis contracts33. We explore this result further in chapter 5 using 
market data. But now, we turn to another institutional factor that may influence the 
choice of contracts. 
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Figure 4.1: 
Tax Burden for Antichresis and Monthly Rent Contracts 
  
                                                 
 
 
33 The sample contained 300 Antichresis and 300 monthly rental ads posted in the “Los Tiempos” news 
paper in 2005. The results showed that 60% of the Antichresis ads had specified Antichresis lump sums 
below $15,000 US and 95% had lump sums below $30000 US. Among the monthly rental units, 48% were 
offered below $1500 US and 93% below $7000 US annually. 
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Court Efficiency 
The effectiveness of institutions in a country can be critical to the development 
process because they establish the environment in which individuals make decisions and 
therefore determine how an economy performs (North 1990, 1992). Under this logic and 
using the institutionalist and transaction costs approaches, several authors demonstrate 
that efficient judicial systems can improve economic performance as they determine the 
enforceability of property rights (Sherwood, 1994). In the context of contracts that 
regulate the division of property rights such as a monthly rent or Antichresis contracts, 
the judicial system efficiency may play an important role on influencing the type of 
contract tenants and landlords prefer.  
In this section we explore some efficiency indicators in the 10 courts that cover civil law 
cases in the district of Cochabamba, Bolivia, with specific attention to cases that involved 
tenant eviction under Antichresis and monthly rent contracts. The purpose of this section 
is to shed some light on the incentives created by the transaction costs related to 
enforcement of contracts and how this may relate to the choice of Antichresis over 
monthly rent contracts and vice versa. 
Civil Courts’ Efficiency 
The city of Cochabamba has 10 courts in charge of cases that involve civil law. 
Table 4.5.1 shows a summary of cases served by these courts in the November 2004- 
November 2005 period. As the second column in table 4.5 shows, the number of eviction 
cases in each court for the November 2004- November 2005. The third and forth columns 
show the total number of cases introduced between November 2004 and November 2005 
and the number of cases introduced previous to November 2004 with no resolution 
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respectively. The last 2 columns show the number of cases that obtained a resolution and 
the percentage these represent from the total amount of cases for the period.    
 
Table 4.5: 
Civil Court Case Attendance in Cochabamba Between 2004 and 2005 
 
Civil 
court 
Eviction 
cases 
Cases 
Introduced 
in Period 
Pending 
cases from 
previous 
periods 
Total number 
of cases in 
period  
Cases closed 
in period 
% of cases 
resolved 
1 4 912 1551 2463 1637 66.46 
2 4 1260 877 2137 648 30.32 
3 5 955 1506 2461 711 28.89 
4 5 1303 1108 2411 1346 55.83 
5 9 1279 1063 2342 824 35.18 
6 0 1358 1288 2646 743 28.08 
7 7 1140 886 2026 940 46.4 
8 3 1266 1007 2273 803 35.33 
9 13 1065 379 1444 506 35.04 
10 9 1058 703 1761 414 23.51 
Total 59 11596 10368 21964 8572 39.03 
Source: Authors elaboration based on data obtained from Poder Judicial de Bolivia  
Juzgados de Instruccion en lo Civil Cochabamba 
 
Table 4.5 clearly shows that eviction cases do not represent a large percentage of 
the total number of cases in the civil courts in Cochabamba. It also shows that, on the 
aggregate, the numbers of civil cases solved in a year exceed the capacity of the courts to 
solve them in less than a year (column 6 < column 3). This deficit creates a backlog of 
cases that cause the courts to completely process only about 39% of the total number of 
cases pending in a given year. 
Eviction Cases 
In order to have a better understanding of the court costs associated with eviction 
cases, a sample of cases was obtained from each civil court in the Cochabamba district. 
The sample was collected between October 16th and October 25th 2006 by 3 law 
students working at the Consultorio Juridico office in San Simon University under the 
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direction of Dr. Elba Medinaceli. The students collected basic information about 35 
eviction cases from 9 of the 10 civil courts in Cochabamba.  
 The sample revealed some important findings concerning eviction cases: There 
were no evictions involving Antichresis contracts among the 35 sampled cases. All of the 
eviction cases in the sample involved a breach of a monthly contract due to lack of 
payment for more than three consecutive months34. The sample included 22 closed cases 
(63%) and 13 others (37%) that were still pending a final rule at the time the sample was 
collected. The monthly rent amount for property involved in an eviction case ranged from 
$12.50 to $600 with an average of $231. The eviction cases involved a wide range of 
property types. Residential property, including houses, apartments, and rooms, comprised 
37 % of the sample. Commercial property accounts for the remaining 63% (table 4.5.2). 
                                                 
 
 
34 In the Procedural Civil Code this means causal code 623 for residential property and causal code 632 for 
commercial property  
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Table 4.6: 
Sample of Eviction Cases from Cochabamba's Civil Courts 
 
Variable Mean SD Min Max 
All Cases 
Monthly Rent $ US. 231.5 150.79 12.5 600 
Processing time (days) 312.34 191.98 12 793 
Residential property 37% - - - 
Closed Cases 
Monthly Rent $ US. 267.27 153.6 50 600 
Processing time (days) 345.82 145.23 43 544 
Residential property 41% - - - 
Case took more than 1 year 55% - - - 
Sentence was appealed 50% - - - 
Police force was used for eviction 32% - - - 
Cases still open 
Monthly Rent $ US. 170.96 129.69 12.5 500 
Processing time (days) 255.69 248.96 12 793 
Residential property 31% - - - 
Case took more than 1 year 31% - - - 
Sentence was appealed na - - - 
Police force was used for eviction na - - - 
Source: Authors’ compilation 
 
The processing time for eviction cases was the most important variable in this part 
of the investigation. The time was measured in days from the time the case was 
introduced to the court until a final sentence was pronounced including appeals.  For all 
of the closed cases the average processing time was 345 days. Closed cases with no 
appeal took an average of 298 days, while cases where the sentence was appealed took an 
average of 394 days to be resolved.  In the sub sample of closed cases, 50% had an appeal 
and 55% lasted for more than a year. The sub sample of open cases the processing times 
were counted from the day the case was received by the court to the day the observation 
as sampled. These cases had a lower average processing time (256 days) because it 
included cases just introduced in the court system. However, these cases also had a higher 
range of processing times with 15% of them lasting more than 620 days. Finally, the 
 53
relationship between processing time and monthly rent amount was not statistically 
significant either by itself or when controlling for type of property and whether the first 
sentence was appealed35. 
The information collected from the courts shed compelling evidence of the high 
costs landlords face when trying to evict an illiquid tenant. Under Bolivian law, the 
landlord can start an eviction process in the courts for lack of tenant payments after three 
consecutive months of non-payment. Adding these 90 days to 345 days that an average 
eviction sentence will take to be completed (394 if there is an appeal) there is a good 
chance for a landlord facing more than 1 year in lost income if the tenant becomes 
illiquid. These processing times do not seem to be affected by the type of property 
(commercial or residential) or the property’s quality (measured in monthly rent). It is 
important to note that if the landlord can take legal action to recover the lost earnings but 
this would entail even higher costs. Even with a favorable court decision in a bad debt 
case, tenant’s illiquidity lowers the chances of recovering lost earnings. In most cases, 
evicted tenants facing a bad debt case will end up in jail for the bad debts before paying 
because Bolivia does not have bankruptcy protection laws. 
This section has shown that the adverse selection problem included in the 
theoretical model of the Antichresis contract is indeed genuine in the Bolivian case. 
Landlords face high eviction costs in terms of forgone earnings due to court inefficiency. 
Not surprisingly, many cases do not even make it to the courts. According to legal 
                                                 
 
 
35 The Pearson correlation coefficient between processing time and monthly rent was –0.091 (p value 
=0.684). The standardized regression coefficients in a regression of processing times on monthly rent, 
property type, and whether the sentenced was appealed were -.047 (p value =0.83), .03 (p value= 0.89), and 
0.33 (p value= 0.16) respectively.        
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experts, a large number of cases do not make it into the courts because landlords cannot 
prove a legitimate contractual relationship (i.e. they did not have their taxes up to date). 
This situation is very common due to the low tax compliance in this economic activity 
(Medinaceli, 2006). The inability to use the court system and low court efficiency has 
driven landlords facing this problem to recur to their own coercion methods to evict 
illiquid tenants, including changing door locks and violent evictions where tenants’ 
personal property is thrown on the streets or simply stolen. It is also common for 
landlords to pay tenants their cost of eviction (forgone income and out of pocket 
expenses) upfront in order to make them vacate the property (Medinaceli, 2006).       
Conclusions 
This chapter explored four institutional factors thought to have an influence on the 
choice of the Antichresis contract. The Bolivian case shows that inflation and real interest 
rates do not have a direct impact on the use of Antichresis as many Bolivians believe. On 
the other hand, taxes and registration costs make a difference in the market value we 
might observe for similar properties under different contractual arrangements. This may 
alter tenants’ incentives by driving them towards Antichresis contracts. But data from the 
city of Cochabamba shows that most rental contracts are signed with amounts where the 
tax burden for rental contracts is higher than the tax burden for Antichresis contracts. 
This means that there are other factors in play that may determine contract choice.  
 Court efficiency may also be related with contract choice because it determines 
the costs of contract enforceability. If the costs of enforcing a contractual agreement are 
high, agents will choose the type of contract that can best benefit them without having to 
use the courts. The Bolivian case shows the existence of backlogs in civil court cases in 
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general and that eviction cases take about a year to be resolved. In the context of 
Antichresis versus monthly rent contract choice, the incentives created by court 
inefficiency are twofold: If tenants cannot use the courts to enforce minimum conditions 
of habitability regulations they will prefer monthly rental contracts so that they can 
enforce landlord investment by withholding rents. On the other hand, if it is costly for 
landlords to evict tenants they will prefer Antichresis contracts for a wider range of 
property types, as the model proposed in this dissertation predicts. The next chapter tests 
these predictions using market data for the city of Cochabamba. 
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CHAPTER 5 
DATA AND EMPIRICAL TESTS 
 
The theoretical model proposed in a previous section of this dissertation predicts 
that landlords will offer their properties in the market under the contractual arrangement 
that yields the highest expected profit. Specifically, the model predicts that these 
expected profits are a function on the type of property (in terms of landlord and tenant 
investment requirements) and the type of tenant that is likely to demand the property (in 
terms of probability of illiquidity). In this section we use market data for property offered 
under Antichresis and monthly rent contracts to explore the sorting mechanism of 
property and tenants into different contracts based on observable and unobservable 
property characteristics.  
Empirical Methodology 
The strategy in this section is to estimate the differences in rental prices under 
different contractual arrangements using a hedonic price framework. We use this method 
to answer 5 questions: (1) Are there differences in the price generating functions of rental 
property between Antichresis and monthly rent contracts? (2) Are there differences in 
market prices between Antichresis and monthly rent contracts for comparable properties? 
(3) Is there a selection mechanism based on property and tenant characteristics that drives 
landlord decisions to choose between contracts? (4) What is the magnitude of the 
selection effect in terms of landlord profits? (5) Does the selection effect vary with the 
type of property in terms of landlord investment impact on tenant’s enjoyment of the unit 
λ ? 
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Econometric Specification 
In hedonic price models the equilibrium price of a good is expressed as a function 
of a good’s attributes (Rosen, 1974). Housing hedonic models usually model the rental 
price of a housing unit as a function of some physical characteristics in vector X (x1, x2, 
x3,..) using a popular semi-logarithmic specification. 
Ln(M) = Xβ +τ     (1) 
where M is the rental price for a housing unit, and τ is a randomly distributed disturbance 
term uncorrelated with X. The same framework could be extended to test for differences 
between rental and Antichresis prices by estimating two separate regressions.   
Ln(R) = Xβ1 + νi     (2)  
    Ln(rA) = Xβ2 + υj     (3) 
Where R is the yearly rent charged for property under a rental contract, r is a market rate 
of return for capital, and A is the Antichresis lump sum charged for property under the 
Antichresis regime. If property was selected randomly into rental and Antichresis 
regimes, we could obtain consistent estimates of β1 and β2 by estimating (2) and (3) using 
OLS.  
The theoretical model presented in the previous section, however, predicts that 
certain properties will be more valuable under Antichresis than they would be under 
monthly rent and vice versa. This suggests that landlords will offer the property under the 
contractual arrangement that yields the highest expected return, not randomly. This is a 
typical problem of sample selection where consistent estimation of parameters will 
require estimating the expected value of a property under a particular regime given that 
the property is observed in that regime. Estimates of (2) and (3) using OLS will produce 
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biased estimates because of unobservable characteristics in ν and υ related to property 
characteristics X.  
  In the presence of selection, consistent estimation of the parameters in the hedonic 
equations requires the estimation of parameters βi conditional on the property being 
observed under contractual arrangement i. The observed landlord’s decision on the 
preferred contractual arrangement will be based on an expected profit value I* function 
of  the expected contract gains under Antichresis relative to rent36. Thus, consistent 
estimates of βi require the estimation of the system of equations below: 
(4) I* = δ(ln(rA) – ln(R)) + Zγ  + u 
(5) ln(rA) = Xβ1 + ε1  
(6) ln(R)   = Xβ2 + ε2 
 The system represents a switching regression model with endogenous switching (see 
Maddala, 1983), also known as a Tobit type 5 model (Amemiya, 1985) where properties 
will be observed under Antichresis if I*>0 and under monthly rent when I*≤0. I* is 
treated as an unobserved latent variable represented by an observed indicator I that takes 
the value 1 if I*>0 and 0 when I*<0  
Using Heckman’s 2-step method for the parametric estimation of the system 
above requires the assumption that the errors follow a joint normal distribution with: 
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36 This discussion follows Lee’s (1978) discussion of workers decisions to enter unions.  
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Assumption (7) above permits consistent estimation of bi using equations 8 and 9: 
1 1
( )(ln( ) | 1, )
( )u
ZE rA I X X
Zε
φ γβ σ γ= = − Φ             (8) 
2 2
( )(ln( ) | 0, )
(1 ( ))u
ZE R I X X
Zε
φ γβ σ γ= = + − Φ          (9) 
Where σuε1 and σuε2 are estimates of the covariance between u and ε1  and ε1  respectively, 
and ( )
( )
Z
Z
φ γ
γΦ
 is the inverse mills ratio (see Maddala, 1983). The model can also be 
estimated using Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML), which, instead of 
yielding estimates of σuε1 and σuε2, estimates 1 1u ερ σ σ in (8) and 2 2u ερ σ σ  in (9) directly; 
where ρ1 and ρ2 are estimates of the correlation coefficients between u and ε1  and ε1  
respectively37. Statistically significant coefficients of ρ1 and/or ρ2 would suggest that 
landlords are selecting into the contract that would yield them the highest expected 
returns given the property characteristics. 
Market Data 
The data was extracted from newspaper ads in the most important newspaper in 
Cochabamba. The ads were obtained in electronic format from the “Clasificados” unit of 
the paper and corresponded to the November 2005- May 2006 period. Ads that did not 
contain property characteristics, location, or price were dropped from the sampling frame.  
                                                 
 
 
37 Breen (1996) shows that the estimates of rho sigma obtained by the maximum likelihood method are 
equivalent to the covariance estimates of the Heckman model: 11 1 1 1
1
u
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u
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σρ σ σ σ σσ σ= =  
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 The final sample of 300 Antichresis, 300 rent, and 300 sale ads was obtained 
randomly by an independent party and transferred to a spreadsheet for analysis38. The 
majority of the ads did not contain specific addresses of housing units but they had 
sufficient information to place the units in one of 14 municipal districts of the city of 
Cochabamba or in a neighboring municipality. Neighborhood level variables were 
obtained using census information from the year 2001 and aggregating it to the municipal 
district level. Not all the variables could be obtained for units located in neighboring 
municipalities so these observations were dropped from the sample.  
Table 5.1 presents a summary of all the variables used in the hedonic models. The 
dependent variable in the Antichresis and monthly rent hedonic models is after-tax yearly 
rental prices. All prices in table 6 are expressed in US dollars. In the Antichresis and sale 
samples all the ads had prices listed in US dollars. In the monthly rent sample, 20 % of 
the ads were listed in local currency. These prices were converted to US Dollars using the 
average exchange rate for the November 2005- May 2006 period. The rental price for 
property under Antichresis was calculated using a 10% return rate on the advertised 
Antichresis amount39. The dependent variable in the for-sale property hedonic model is 
the advertised price.  
The neighborhood characteristics included in the hedonic models were distance 
from the CBD, measured in Kilometers from the heart of the CBD (Plaza 14 de 
Septiembre) to each district’s centroid, an indicator of neighborhood’s median income, 
                                                 
 
 
38 The services of a sociologist student from San Simon University were contracted to extract the ads 
randomly from the sampling frame and transfer them to a spreadsheet.   
39 This rate of return is based on the average real interest rates in the 2003-2005 period using data from the 
World Bank Development Indicators.  
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and a set of binary indicators reflecting whether the neighborhood is in the northern, 
central, or southern part of the city in order to capture rental price differences attributed 
to geographic orientation in the city40. All of the hedonic models included the number of 
suites (bedrooms with bathrooms), total number of rooms and a set of binary indicators 
reflecting the type of property being advertised. We identified 5 types of properties: 
apartments, chalets, houses, commercial, and single rooms. Each of these property types 
is described below and shown in table 5.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
40 We used information of the 2001 census at the block level to construct an income scale using factor 
analysis. The variables included in the analysis were: percent of households in the block that own a TV set, 
percent of households in the block that own a car, percent of households in the block that own a refrigerator 
in the kitchen, and percent of households in the block that own a telephone line. These 4 variables produced 
a highly reliable index of city block income. The median income variable at the neighborhood level shown 
in table 5.1.2 represents the median value of the constructed block income variable. 
For details on the construction of this variable please refer to the appendix section. 
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Table 5.1: 
Market Data Descriptive Statistics 
 
  
Monthly Rent 
ads Antichresis ads For-Sale ads 
Property type n Percent n Percent n Percent 
Apartment 80 28.17 120 43.32 68 27.2 
Chalet 3 1.06 10 3.61 26 10.4 
Commercial (store, office) 47 16.55 10 3.61 15 6 
House 76 26.76 113 40.79 140 56 
Room 78 27.46 24 8.66 1 0.4 
           
Geographic Orientation n Percent n Percent n Percent 
North 209 73.43 221 79.86 197 78.8 
Central 71 24.82 50 17.99 34 13.6 
South 5 1.75 6 2.16 19 7.6 
           
Property Characteristics Mean Std. Mean Std. Mean Std. 
Number of Suites 0.192 0.661 0.152 0.407 0.428 0.81 
Total Number of rooms 2.243 1.416 2.818 1.027 3.531 1.65 
           
Market Prices Mean Std. Mean Std. Mean Std. 
Yearly rent (R ) for rental contracts $2,344 3,070 - - - - 
Yearly rent for rental contracts after 
tax* $1,849 2,260 - - - - 
Antichresis amount (A) - - $13,486 10,035 - - 
Yearly rent (rA) for Antichresis 
contracts - - $1,349 1,004 - - 
Yearly rent for Antichresis contracts 
after tax* - - $1,345 995 - - 
Sale price         $62,841  41,572 
           
District variables Mean Std. Mean Std. Mean Std. 
Distance from the CBD (Km) 2.338 1.72 2.64 1.638 3.041 1.724 
Median income 0.913 0.542 0.888 0.561 0.761 0.68 
Proportion of population employed in 
commerce 0.207 0.019 0.208 0.02 0.213 0.028 
Proportion of population younger than 
15 0.269 0.045 0.276 0.046 0.289 0.051 
Proportion of children born in hospital 0.871 0.035 0.87 0.038 0.857 0.058 
Number of valid observations 284 277 250 
* Taxes are estimated for the landlord using the highest 
taxable rate     
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Apartments 
This type of property is generally located in buildings. We consider apartments to 
be the property type with the highest λ. In apartment buildings landlord presence is 
relatively more important because these settings generally need maintenance investments 
that are out of tenants’ normal possibilities such as elevator repairs, or the cleaning and 
fixing of common building areas. Apartments have the highest relative frequency in both 
rental property samples, but have the second highest relative frequency in the sales 
sample.   
Houses 
This type of property had the second highest relative frequency in both rental 
property samples but the highest in the sales sample. We consider that tenants in houses 
generally need lower levels of landlord involvement to enjoy the property than tenants in 
apartment buildings. Even though the city of Cochabamba has recently been experiencing 
a growth in housing in gated communities, the majority of houses in the market are still 
in non-gated communities and generally in higher density areas than chalets.       
Chalets 
The concept of chalets was introduced in Cochabamba in the mid 1940’s when 
architects begun applying the ideas of Ebenezer Howard and his garden city model. The 
term chalet in other parts of the world is used for rural housing; in fact, Webster’s 
dictionary defines a chalet as "A wooden dwelling with a sloping roof and widely 
overhanging eaves, common in Switzerland and other Alpine regions.” However, 
according to Solares (2006), in the city of Cochabamba the term chalet is commonly used 
for detached up-scale housing units. We consider chalets to have lower need for 
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landlords’ maintenance investment than apartments and houses because of their detached 
nature. 
Commercial 
This classification involves any non-housing property including offices, stores, 
and storage. We consider commercial property to have relatively lower needs of landlord 
maintenance investment than apartments, houses, and chalets for the tenant to conduct 
her business in this type of property.  
Rooms 
This type of property refers to portions of other property that are offered in the 
rental market. Homeowners that decide to put spare rooms in their own houses in the 
market for extra income usually offer them under rent or Antichresis to college students. 
In terms of our model, this type of housing is of special interest because it creates a 
situation where landlord and tenant live in the same property. In this setting, tenants’ 
need to commit landlords to make maintenance investment disappears because landlords 
will invest in the property for their own utility41. For this reason, we consider single 
rooms to have the lowest levels of λ from all types of property.  
Estimation 
Identification of the switching regression model requires that the selection 
equation (4) to include a set of instruments that have an effect on the landlord decision to 
offer the property under a particular contractual regime but not on property value. For 
this purpose, we include the proportion of individuals employed in the commerce sector 
                                                 
 
 
41 This is similar to the effect of owner tenancy in commercial buildings (Glascock, Sirmans, Turnbull, 
1993) 
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of the economy and the proportion of children born in a hospital in the district where the 
property is located. These variables are used as proxy indicators of liquidity risk of 
potential renters. Bolivian data shows that 80% of commerce employment is in the 
informal economy42. Furthermore, mothers not covered by insurance commonly offered 
in formal sector jobs tend to avoid hospital deliveries and have their children by other 
means such as contracting nurse practitioners or friends. We consider that landlords who 
cannot observe tenants status of employment  (formal or informal) will tend to prefer 
Antichresis contracts in places where they think they are more likely to get a tenant that 
works in the informal sector.  We do not expect this indicator to be related with how 
much a landlord can charge for the property once we control for property characteristics, 
neighborhood income, and distance from the CBD.   
 In order to test instrument validity we introduced the instruments in a yearly rent 
regression for a pooled sample of Antichresis and monthly rent property. An F test on the 
instruments confirmed, at the α =.05 level of significance, that the instruments in the 
selection equation as a group do not enter the yearly rent regression after controlling for 
other property characteristics43.  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
42 This number was obtained using data from the 2002 MECOVI survey conducted by the Inter-American 
Development Bank and the Bolivian institute of statistics (INE). 
43The F statistic was: F(3,  547) = 2.17; yielding a P-value = 0.09. We also used the Sargan test of 
exclusionary restrictions in each hedonic equation. The P-values under the null that the instruments are 
uncorrelated to the residuals in the monthly rent and Antichresis regressions were 0.06 and 0.18 
respectively.  
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Results 
The models were estimated using OLS and a switching regression framework 
using FIML. Table 5.2 shows the results of the hedonic price functions estimated by 
OLS.  The first 2 columns show the hedonic price equations for properties under 
Antichresis and rent contracts respectively. The third column shows a hedonic price 
function of property for sale. The OLS parameter estimates showed differences in some 
coefficients across the different samples. Mainly, single rooms earn less than apartments 
under monthly rent contracts than they do under Antichresis holding other variables 
constant. In addition, the number of suites and rooms seem to have a larger effect on 
price under Antichresis than under monthly rent contracts holding other variables fixed.  
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Table 5.2: 
Hedonic Price Functions Estimated by OLS 
 
  Antichresis Monthly Rent Sale 
  log(rA) after taxa log(R) after taxb log(Sale price) 
Distance from the CBD 
(Km) -0.106 -0.062 -0.136 
  [0.080] [0.059] [0.094] 
Northc -0.143 0.409 0.669 
  [0.248] [0.248]* [0.179]*** 
Centerc -0.488 0.182 0.223 
  [0.212]** [0.180] [0.318] 
Housed 0.376 0.264 0.311 
  [0.076]*** [0.081]*** [0.090]*** 
Chaletd 0.7 0.713 0.711 
  [0.154]*** [0.130]*** [0.113]*** 
Commercial (office, store) d -0.283 -0.273 -0.261 
  [0.172] [0.100]*** [0.139]* 
Single Roomd -0.683 -1.067 -0.542 
  [0.139]*** [0.077]*** [0.111]*** 
# of Suites 0.34 0.129 0.103 
  [0.070]*** [0.095] [0.057]* 
Total # of Rooms 0.25 0.166 0.092 
  [0.046]*** [0.038]*** [0.033]*** 
Median income(scale) 0.261 0.053 -0.072 
  [0.162] [0.151] [0.191] 
Constant 6.309 6.75 10.169 
  [0.303]*** [0.207]*** [0.424]*** 
        
Observations 277 284 250 
R-squared 0.58 0.69 0.41 
Robust standard errors in brackets    
* Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1% 
a. rA was calculated using a 10% rate of return 
b. R was calculated subtracting all applicable taxes 
c. Reference group is the southern part of the city 
d. Reference group for property type dummies = Apartment 
 
 
Table 5.3 presents the parameter estimates of the switching regression model 
estimated by FIML. The selection equation estimates are consistent with some of the 
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model predictions proposed in the previous section. Mainly, holding other variables 
constant, more expensive property such as chalets is more likely to be under Antichresis 
than apartments. Surprisingly, though, apartments are more likely to be under Antichresis 
than commercial property and single rooms. Larger property (greater total number of 
rooms) is also more likely to be under Antichresis than under monthly rent. Property in 
neighborhoods with a larger proportion of workers in the commerce sector is more likely 
to be under Antichresis. Finally, the percentage of children delivered in hospitals increase 
the likelihood of properties being under Antichresis. However this increase has a lower 
rate in neighborhoods with high proportion of workers in the commerce sector, as the 
negative sign on the interaction term between the two instruments reflects.    
A comparison between tables 5.2 and 5.3 reveals several important discrepancies 
between the OLS and the switching regression estimates: The difference in prices in the 
south of the city compared to other part of the city disappears once we control for self-
selection. The estimated difference between apartments and chalets in the monthly rent 
equation and apartments and commercial property tends to disappear as well once we 
control for the selection effect. The difference between apartments and single rooms is 
not significant in the Antichresis equation once we control for the selection effect but it is 
still significant in the monthly rent regime. The number of suites has a similar effect on 
price in both regimes after controlling for selection but the number of extra rooms 
becomes non-significant in the Antichresis equation once we introduce the selection 
effect. 
Table 5.3 also shows estimates of the correlations between the selection equation 
errors u and the hedonic equations’ errors ε1 and ε2 denoted as ρ1 and ρ2 respectively.  
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Statistically significant estimates of these parameters denote the presence of a selection 
mechanism.  The negative sign in ρ1 implies a negative covariance between the error 
terms in the selection equation (i.e. property under Antichresis) and the Antichresis 
hedonic equation or σuε1<0. Conversely, ρ2 >0 implies σuε2>0. This, in turn, implies that 
(σuε2 - σuε1 )>0 and provides evidence that properties are being selected into the regime 
where they can earn the highest yearly gross income44. 
                                                 
 
 
44 For a detailed explanation on how to interpret the selection effects based on the size and magnitude of 
these covariances see Maddala (1983) pg 258, 262.  
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Table 5.3: 
FIML Estimation of Hedonic Equations Corrected for Self-Selection 
 
  Selection Eq 
Marginal 
effectsa Hedonic Eq (1) Hedonic Eq (2) 
  Antichresis =1 Antichresis=1 log(rA) after tax log(R) after tax 
Distance from the CBD (Km) 0.389 0.241 -0.113 -0.062 
  [0.219]*  [0.084] [0.070] 
Northb -0.833 -0.175 0.073 0.44 
  [0.941]  [0.317] [0.306] 
Centerb 0.816 0.389 -0.278 0.203 
  [0.958]  [0.297] [0.268] 
Housec -0.075 0.0004 0.391 0.27 
  [0.141]  [0.083]*** [0.092]*** 
Chaletc 0.803 0.309 0.455 0.888 
  [0.416]*  [0.230]** [0.304]*** 
Commercial (office, store) c -1.179 -0.382 0.138 -0.509 
  [0.234]***  [0.198] [0.124]*** 
Single Roomc -0.964 -0.346 -0.327 -1.273 
  [0.176]***  [0.148]** [0.102]*** 
# of Suites -0.453 -0.077 0.478 0.057 
  [0.119]***  [0.094]*** [0.056] 
# of Rooms 0.067 0.032 0.225 0.178 
  [0.059]  [0.042]*** [0.031]*** 
Median income (constructed scale) -0.985 -0.217 0.219 0.038 
  [0.661]  [0.170] [0.146] 
% of workers in the commerce sector 203.243 0.959 6.516 7.087 
  [103.912]*  [0.362]*** [0.321]*** 
% hosp born children*% commerce sector 
emp. -250.812 
-0.837 
   
  [127.285]**     
% of children born in hospital 79.616 0.863    
  [40.279]**     
σε   0.642 0.569 
    [0.052]*** [0.044]*** 
ρ   -0.797 0.691 
    [0.083]*** [0.109]*** 
Constant -65.76  6.516 7.087 
  [33.557]*  [0.362]*** [0.321]*** 
Observations 561   561 561 
* Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1% 
a. Measures the change from 0 to 1 for property type and geographic location dummies. For continuous variables, it 
measures the change from 1/2 std. dev. below the mean to 1/2 std. dev. above the mean 
b. Reference group for geographical orientation dummies = South 
c. Reference group for property type dummies = Apartment 
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Following Lee (1978) we estimate the average percent increment of the yearly 
income from a property being in monthly rent compared to one in Antichresis. Tables 5.4 
and 5.5 show the average predicted yearly income using OLS and the selection corrected 
FIML estimates respectively. Each table shows the predicted average incomes for 
different types of property under the two contractual regimes for both samples. For each 
sample in both tables the first two rows show the average yearly gross income after taxes 
under monthly rent and Antichresis respectively.  The third and fourth rows for each 
sample in both tables represent the ratio of the property’s gross operating income to its 
estimated sale price under monthly rent and Antichresis respectively. This ratio is known 
as the gross capitalization (cap) rate. The fifth row for each sample in both tables 
represents the percentage gain in gross income after taxes that the average property could 
make by switching from Antichresis to monthly rent. For example, the fifth row in table 
5.5 shows that the average apartment in the Antichresis sample would increase its after 
tax gross earnings by 88% by switching from Antichresis to monthly rent. This difference 
represents an increase of 2.10 percentage points in its gross cap rate.   
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Table 5.4: 
Predicted Income Under Antichresis and Monthly Rent Contracts by Property Type 
Using OLS Estimates 
 
Antichresis Sample ROOMS COMMERCIAL CHALET HOUSE APARTMENT TOTAL 
Predicted R  $493  $1,080  $4,590  $2,509 $1,768  $2,037  
Predicted A  $337  $502  $3,005  $1,567 $937  $1,201  
Predicted R/S 2.36% 3.90% 4.99% 4.43% 4.34% 4.21% 
Predicted A/S 1.61% 1.79% 3.12% 2.69% 2.25% 2.39% 
Difference in gross income  46.24% 114.96% 52.75% 60.18% 88.78% 69.66% 
Difference in cap rates 0.75% 2.11% 1.87% 1.74% 2.10% 1.83% 
Monthly Rent Sample ROOMS COMMERCIAL CHALET HOUSE APARTMENT TOTAL 
Predicted R  $473  $1,026  $4,898  $2,920 $1,720  $1,617  
Predicted A  $312  $469  $3,946  $2,407 $915  $1,107  
Predicted R/S 2.31% 3.84% 4.98% 4.59% 4.25% 3.75% 
Predicted A/S 1.50% 1.74% 3.65% 3.36% 2.20% 2.26% 
Difference in gross income 51.93% 118.92% 24.13% 21.32% 87.88% 46.14% 
Difference in cap rates 0.82% 2.10% 1.32% 1.24% 2.05% 1.49% 
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Table 5.5: 
Predicted Cap Rates Under Antichresis and Monthly Rent 
Contracts by Property Type Correcting for Self-Selectivity* 
 
Antichresis Sample ROOMS COMMERCIAL CHALET HOUSE APARTMENT TOTAL 
Predicted R  $580  $1,226  $7,461  $3,685 $2,564  $2,978  
Predicted A  $663  $1,062  $3,816  $2,151 $1,288  $1,669  
Predicted R/S 2.78% 4.43% 8.18% 6.50% 6.31% 6.08% 
Predicted A/S 3.16% 3.80% 3.91% 3.69% 3.08% 3.39% 
Difference in gross income  
-
12.40% 15.42% 95.51% 71.30% 99.01% 78.40% 
Difference in cap rates -0.38% 0.63% 4.28% 2.82% 3.22% 2.69% 
Monthly Rent Sample ROOMS COMMERCIAL CHALET HOUSE APARTMENT TOTAL 
Predicted R  $556  $1,163  $7,679  $4,185 $2,470  $2,242  
Predicted A  $619  $995  $5,958  $3,792 $1,285  $1,774  
Predicted R/S 2.71% 4.35% 8.00% 6.62% 6.12% 5.04% 
Predicted A/S 2.97% 3.69% 5.32% 5.13% 3.09% 3.73% 
Difference in gross income 
-
10.21% 16.87% 28.88% 10.36% 92.26% 26.35% 
Difference in cap rates -0.26% 0.65% 2.68% 1.49% 3.03% 1.32% 
* Selection term not included in the predictions 
 
Comparing tables 5.4 and 5.5 we can observe that OLS estimates tend to bias the 
earnings under Antichresis for most types of property downwards. The bias is especially 
large for commercial property and single rooms, which tend to have low λ.  Once we 
control for this bias, we observe in table 5.5 that the average property under Antichresis 
would increase its gross earnings by about 80% if it switched to monthly rent. This 
represents an increase of 2.8 percentage points in its gross cap rate. Conversely, the 
average property currently under monthly rent would gain about 26% if it switched from 
Antichresis to monthly rent. This represents an increase of 1.3 percentage points in its 
gross cap rate. This difference may be explained by the risk premium in each market. 
Larger and more expensive property tends to be in the Antichresis market. Because of its 
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price this is also more risky property in terms of tenant’s illiquidity. This higher risk is 
translated into a higher risk premium under monthly rent, which adds to the cap rate. This 
is the reason why property seems to earn more under monthly for all property types with 
the exception of rooms. 
According to our theoretical model, once we control for the selection mechanism, 
we should observe that a property’s yearly gross income under different contractual 
arrangements should vary by type. In other words, property with high λ should earn more 
under monthly rent than property with low λ. In our sample we expected that controlling 
for other characteristics, apartments, houses, chalets, commercial property, and single 
rooms should earn more under monthly rent than under Antichresis in that order judging 
by the size of λ in each of those property types. 
The sixth rows for each sample in table 5.5 show that the theoretical predictions 
are consistent with what we observe for most types of properties. Mainly: After 
controlling for self selection, the property type with the highest λ (apartments) has the 
greatest increase in monthly rent earnings from switching from Antichresis to monthly 
rent in both samples. On the other extreme, property with the lowest λ (single rooms) is 
the type of property that loses the most by switching from Antichresis to monthly rent in 
both samples. In the same line, chalets and houses tend to benefit more from monthly rent 
contracts than commercial property, which tends to have lower requirements of landlord 
input (lower λ). Interestingly, chalets appear to benefit more than houses from monthly 
rent contracts in both samples. We expected the opposite considering that we suspect that 
chalets would need lower requirements of landlord input than houses, in part because of 
the greater effect of landlord on the property’s residual value.  
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Finally, following Maddala (1983) and Cameron and Trivedi (2005) we computed 
the average gross benefit of choosing Antichresis (AGBA) for each property i currently 
observed under Antichresis using the expressions: 
    ( | 1) ( | 1)A i iAGB E rA I E R I= = − =     (10) 
     ( )1 2 2 2 1 1 ( )( ) ( )( )ii
Z
i ZX
φ γ
γβ β ρ σ ρ σ Φ= − + −     (11) 
Table 5.6 presents the average AGBA for each type of property45. The first and 
second columns present the first and second terms of expression (11) respectively. The 
selection effects are all positive; this means that, given the observable property 
characteristics in the model, properties are self-selecting into the regime that gives them 
the highest yearly gross earnings. The third column shows that the AGBA are positive for 
commercial property and single rooms and negative for apartments, chalets, and houses. 
These results are consistent with the model predictions.   
 
Table 5.6: 
Average Gross Benefits of participation in the Antichresis Regime by Property Type 
 
Property type Average X(β1- β2) Selection Effect Average AGB 
APARTMENT -0.739 0.554 -0.185 
HOUSE -0.592 0.580 -0.012 
CHALET -0.834 0.388 -0.446 
COMMERCIAL -0.163 1.336 1.173 
ROOMS 0.122 1.167 1.289 
Total -0.587 0.640 0.053 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
45 The analysis presented in previous pages looks at averages of samples. This analysis uses property-by-
property calculations and isolates the contract selection effect. 
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Conclusions 
This chapter used market data on properties from the city of Cochabamba, 
Bolivia, to test the theoretical Antichresis contract model. The data was obtained from 
newspaper ads reflecting property characteristics, prices asked, and type of contractual 
arrangement. The econometric specification found a strong presence of self-selection of 
properties into Antichresis and monthly rent. The results indicate differences in the price 
generating functions between contractual arrangements once we control for selection 
effects. Furthermore, property under monthly rent tends to earn more (higher cap rates) 
than comparable property under Antichresis after controlling for self-selectivity. This 
difference is likely due to the risk premium inherent in monthly rent contracts.  
The most important finding came from analyzing the selection mechanism that 
makes one regime more attractive than the other. Our results confirmed that the 
incentives pulling landlords towards the Antichresis regime are higher for property where 
landlord’s investment impact on tenant’s enjoyment of the property is lower (lower λ). 
This was the case for rooms and commercial property. On the other hand, for properties 
where landlord’s investment impact on tenant’s enjoyment of the property is high (higher 
λ), the incentives pulling landlords towards Antichresis were lower. This was the case 
with apartments, chalets and houses. 
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CHAPTER 6 
SQUATTER SETTLEMENTS AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT 
 
In previous chapters we explored how the division of property rights creates 
incentives that may resolve or create economic inefficiencies. The theoretical lease model 
presented in chapter 3 suggests that the periodic monthly rent and the Antichresis 
contracts arise to solve different problems associated with information asymmetries and 
moral hazard. We explore the importance of understanding the economic forces behind 
these contracts in the analysis of housing policy for the poor in greater depth in chapter 9 
where we evaluate current claims that present the Antichresis contract as an innovative 
tool for low income housing provision. In this and following chapters, we explore how a 
different dimension of property rights can shape urban development and affect the quality 
of low income housing in developing countries. Specifically, we explore how a large 
informal housing sector, resulting from land invasions or illegal land sales, affects urban 
form and housing quality.       
Informal transactions and squatting give rise to differing implied quality of land 
title and levels of ownership risk for occupants. Differences in title quality, especially 
when land is not formally conveyed, can have profound effects on economic 
development in general (Alchian and Demsetz, 1973; Alston, et al., 1996; Besley, 1995; 
Bohn and Deacon, 2000; De Soto, 2000) and urban development in particular (Miceli, et 
al., 2003; Turnbull, 2008). The underlying question addressed in the next three chapters 
is whether observed land use patterns are consistent with the predicted implications of 
ownership risk. This chapter briefly examines the current literature on property rights and 
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urban development and builds on Turnbull’s (2008) model of squatting and eviction to 
make predictions about the spatial distribution and density patterns of informal 
settlements within a city. Chapter 7 considers the extent to which the initial legal status of 
the squatter settlement creates legacy effects on the type and quantity of subsequent 
investments in upgrading property after the settlement has been legalized and brought 
into the formal sector. Although the literature on informal property markets is large and 
varied, there has been to date no formal tests of the predicted ties between the initial 
legality of an urban settlement and the subsequent land use and property value. As a 
result, the nature of the squatting-urban development nexus remains an open question. In 
order to begin filling this gap in the literature, chapter 8 tests the squatting-land use 
relationships implied by theory, using block level data for Cochabamba, Bolivia. 
Cochabamba embraces a variety of informal settlements—from both land invasions and 
illegal consensual sales—as well as a range of current legal status, and therefore offers a 
particularly useful case for empirical study.  
Squatting and Urban Development 
The property rights-urban land development nexus has been the focus of growing 
attention in the field of urban economics in recent years. Part of this literature 
concentrates on the dynamic effects of insecure property rights arising from public 
sources like land use regulations and takings by governments, or private sources like 
squatters and adverse possession46.  Turnbull (2005) argues that ownership risks arising 
from private sources (like squatters) tend to hasten the pace of land development at the 
                                                 
 
 
46 See Turnbull (2005) for an overview of this literature. 
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city level more than ownership risks arising from government taking or regulation 
because they affect all land in an urban area rather than the narrower range of plots that 
are typically the target of government policy. Ownership risk arising from private sources 
also affects developers’ choices of structural density. Whether ownership risk causes 
higher or lower structural density depends on the relative growth in the demands for 
alternative land uses over time; greater ownership risk will increase (decrease) the 
optimal development structural density when the demand for structural density of the 
plots with ownership risk is decreasing (increasing) over time. One implication is that, 
other things equal, locales with disorganized or corrupt titling systems and/or where 
squatting is pervasive will have less undeveloped land remaining in the urban interior 
than comparable cities with secure property rights. When applied to ownership risk from 
private sources, these models are useful for comparisons across different urban areas but 
they may not be as useful for empirical studies of land development patterns within a 
single urban area.47  In any case, at the moment there are no empirical tests of models 
explaining the effects of squatter settlements on urban development.48   
 Jimenez (1985) offers a second type of model to explain the behavior of entire 
squatter communities invading government owned lands. In his model, the squatter 
community decides on the number of squatters to settle as a community. Additional 
members in the squatting community increase government’s costs of land clearing and 
                                                 
 
 
47 This is because the risk to ownership that arises from private sources is spread equally across a particular 
urban area. The opposite is true when looking at ownership risk arising from public regulations such as 
zoning where the regulation targets specific parts of the urban area.  
48 Miceli, et al. (2002) focus on the effects of private source ownership risk from encroachment, 
conveyance errors, and fraud on property values in Chicago. As such, it does not address the level of 
ownership risk commonly associated with squatting or other forms of illegal settlement.  
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therefore decrease the probability of eviction. At the same time, however, additional 
members in the squatting community increase the cost of providing public services and 
property upgrading once the community is settled. Jimenez (1985) concludes that greater 
government efforts to reduce squatter settlements will actually result in more populated 
squatter communities. 
A third type of model that appears in the urban economics literature concerning 
urban development and squatter settlements views the squatting process as an interaction 
between the individual squatter or squatter community and the private land owner in a 
dynamic context of a two-period environment (Jimenez and Hoy, 1991; Turnbull, 2007). 
The landowner holds undeveloped land in the first period that has an expected future 
value once it is developed for the formal sector in the second period. The greater the 
future expected value of the land, the more resources the owner will expend to secure 
eviction when he is ready to develop it. The squatters, however, invade the land in the 
first period while taking into account that the landowner may evict them in the second 
period. The squatters’ investments in housing capital therefore reflect their anticipation of 
the likelihood of future eviction by the landowner.  
 In the Jimenez and Hoy (1991) model, squatters respond to the eviction plans 
announced by the landowner in the first period, regardless of whether the announced 
strategy represents a credible threat by the landowner. In this setting, the landowner’s 
inability to legally collect rent from squatters prompts more frequent eviction than is 
efficient. Because squatters’ housing demands are negatively related to the perceived 
probability of eviction, the inefficiently frequent eviction by the landowner leads to lower 
than efficient levels of investment in housing by squatters.  
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Turnbull (2008), on the other hand, assumes that squatters will believe the 
landowner’s eviction threat only if it is credible, that is, if the owner’s benefits from 
evicting the squatters in the second period exceed the costs. By excluding the possibility 
of non-credible threats by the landowner in the first period of the model, Turnbull (2008) 
finds a different result than Jimenez and Hoy (1991) concerning the squatter’s housing 
investment strategy. In Turnbull’s model, squatters have an incentive to over-invest in 
housing capital, making it more costly for the landowner to implement the eviction 
strategy. This leads to greater than efficient structural densities in squatter settlements.  
 Jimenez (1985) and Turnbull (2008) both predict that the density of a squatter 
settlement is positively related to the vigor of the landowner’s eviction strategy, whether 
the owner is a private party or government. These predictions, however, have not been 
tested empirically. The empirical question of whether squatter settlements present greater 
structural densities than comparable non-squatter settlements also remains unsettled. We 
come back to these questions in chapter 8.  The next section presents the Turnbull (2007) 
model of squatter-landlord behavior and extends it by adding a spatial component in the 
demand for land in the formal sector.  
Squatting, Eviction, and Density 
The Squatting Model 
The Turnbull (2008) two-period model assumes a representative squatter who 
makes the decision on how much capital, h, to invest on a single plot of land owned by 
the landlord. The landlord then decides whether to develop the land for formal sector use 
in taking into consideration the capital investment made by the squatter in the first period. 
Her decision takes into account the value of the developed land in the formal property 
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market, V, where V reflects the state of the formal property market, indexed by s such that 
Vs>0. The index s is distributed over [0,1] with a cumulative density F.  
Before developing the land for the formal land market, the landowner must first evict the 
squatter and clear his capital investment h from land at cost C(h). The model assumes that 
additional capital per unit land h while holding land fixed increases landlords’ clearing 
costs Ch>0. The intuition behind this assumption is straight forward; removing a two 
story house from a plot of land, for example, is expected to require more resources than 
removing a single story house from the same plot of land.  The landowner will develop 
the land in the formal land market only if the present value of the net rent in the realized 
state s, V(s) is greater than or equal to the cost of clearing the land C(h): V(s)≥ C(h)  (with 
Vs>0 and Ch>0). In this manner, the land owner evicts the squatters and develops the land 
for formal sector use whenever the realized state of demand, s, in the formal land market 
is greater than the critical value θ satisfying  
    V(θ)= C(h)        (1) 
Thus, the landowner’s eviction strategy is summarized by θ implicitly defined by (1). 
Solving implicitly,  
    θ =φ(h)      (2) 
with φ’ > 0.   
The representative squatter knows the landowner’s eviction policy at the outset and 
includes it in his decision as a probability of eviction given by the function 
       ( ) ( )
1
dF sπ θ
θ
= ∫       (3) 
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Given the landowner’s credible strategy, the squatter maximizes her utility, which is a 
function of housing capital h and non-housing consuming goods x. subject to an income 
constraint   
I = px +rh      (4) 
where I is monetary income, and r and p represent the prices of capital and non-housing 
goods respectively. If the squatter is evicted he enjoys a utility u(x,0) and if the squatter is 
not evicted he enjoys utility u(x,h). Thus, the squatter’s best response to the landowner’s 
eviction policy is to maximize the expected utility function  
Eu= [1- π(θ)] u(x,h) + π(θ) u(x,0)    (5) 
subject to (4). Doing so, the squatter’s optimal strategy conditional on the landowner’s 
behavior can be expressed as the implicit solution to the appropriate necessary conditions 
as 
    h = ψ(θ, I, p, r)      (6) 
where it can be shown that income normality or neutrality (ψI ≥0)  implies ψθ>0. 
Thus, under this set up, equations (2) and (6) can be used to show that the squatter’s 
optimal level of housing capital and the landowner’s critical demand state are strategic 
complements. Therefore, the private market equilibrium is given by the Nash solution 
{θ*,h*} satisfying  (2), (6) and the usual stability conditions.   
The Intra-Urban Spatial Component 
Squatter settlements are mostly an urban phenomenon; yet, most models that 
explain squatting behavior and urban development omit a spatial element. The model 
described above is easily modified to introduce a spatial component to better understand 
the manner in which squatter settlements shape urban areas. 
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 Bid rent functions decrease with distance from the city center in the standard 
neoclassical mono-centric urban land market (Mills, 1972; Muth, 1969). Land located 
near the central business district (CBD) garners higher rents in the formal sector than land 
located at the periphery where the price of urban land is driven equal to the price of 
agricultural land. For simplicity, figure 6.1 depicts a two zone circular urban area with 
center k0, the single point representation of the CBD, and radius k2.  The first zone 
perfectly circumscribes the urban center with radius k1 (with k2> k1) and the second zone 
comprises the residential area between k1 and k2. The distance k from the CBD to any 
point in the city were zone 1 ends and zone 2 begins is k1 and the distance between the 
CBD and the city limit is k2.  
 
 
Figure 6.1: 
Two-Zone City 
 
 Assuming that residents working in the city’s formal sector commute to the CBD, 
location equilibrium requires that land rent, hence land value, decreases with distance k 
from the CBD, approaching the agricultural land rent at the city limit. Competition for 
land near the CBD will increase the demand for developed property in all states in the 
formal land market at a faster rate than it will for property far from the CBD. Thus, 
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distance k will enter the land owner’s net return function increasing the demand for 
developed property as a shift parameter that varies with distance from the CBD, V(s, β(k)) 
where Vβ>0 and βk<0 Vk=Vββk<0. The equilibrium critical value θ* satisfying (2) and (6) 
is now a function of distance k. 
Totally differentiating (2) and (6) and solving for the comparative static predictions in the 
usual manner yields  
0
(1 )
* V
k V
k
h
βθ
φ ψ
β
θ θ
∂ = − >∂ −  
showing that the equilibrium critical value θ* increases with distance from the CBD. This 
result is intuitively appealing. Greater distance from the CBD decreases the demand for 
developed land in the formal sector and therefore diminishes the range of second period 
demand states that make clearing land of squatters worthwhile to the landowner. The 
resultant increase in the critical value θ* with greater distance reduces the range of states 
in which land will be formally developed, so squatting will be more likely to persist 
closer to the city fringe than near the CBD. 
Illegal Subdivisions 
Squatting is one option open to urban area residents. Another common strategy 
found in Latin America is that of urbanizing land despite prohibition by municipal land 
development regulations (Abramo, 2003). This practice of illegal land subdivision is 
commonly referred to as illegal “loteos” in Latin America, where land owners of 
agricultural land (usually with the help of professional “loteadores”) divide their land and 
sell it as developable land to individuals or communities who then construct their own 
dwellings on these plots.  
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 Turnbull (2008) also presents a model of an informal land market, interpreted 
here as the market for illegal subdivisions. The key difference between the informal 
market and the squatting situation is that the landowner can collect rent, R, from the 
informal settlers occupying the land in question in the former while no rent is collected in 
the latter. This is an informal transaction, that is, the transaction is not recognized under 
law. Therefore, the landlord remains free to clear the land in the second period and 
develop it for the formal sector if the gains from doing so exceed the costs, in forgone 
informal rent plus the clearing cost. Preserving the notation, the landowner’s decision 
rule to develop in the formal sector is now given by: 
      V(θ) - C(h) ≥R      (7) 
which yields a new optimal strategy function for the landowner 
     θ=φ ̃(h)      (8) 
The informal settler’s expected utility function remains the same as in the 
squatter’s case (4), but now the expected utility function is maximized subject to budget 
constraint (9) that includes the payment R in the first period: 
I = px +rh +R     (9) 
The necessary conditions for the informal settler’s problem lead to a new housing 
demand function  
h =ψ(p, r, I, R)    (10) 
The Nash equilibrium for the informal land market { h, θ , R} can be compared 
with the equilibrium {θ*,h*} for the squatter case. In general, the rent R entering the 
landowner’s function in the illegal subdivision case increases the owner’s opportunity 
cost of developing the land for the formal sector. In other words, it reduces the range of 
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demand states for which it would be profitable to clear the land and develop it for the 
formal sector. On the settler’s side, the extra payment R reduces his equilibrium utility 
level and therefore the demand for housing capital, h. As a result, in general, equilibrium 
eviction rates are lower in the illegal subdivision case (θ >θ*) as is the equilibrium 
housing demand (h<h*)49.   
Comparing Squatting and Illegal Subdivision Outcomes 
The model does not make any explicit predictions about rent gradients in informal 
settlements beyond what location equilibrium predicts. It does, however, offer insights 
about density gradients. The previous result is straightforward: illegal subdivision 
generally leads to a lower density than does squatting.  But more can be said. Because 
formal sector land rents tend to decline with distance from the CBD, structural density in 
the formal sector similarly declines with distance from the CBD. But what do we observe 
in an informal market comprising both squatters and illegal subdivisions? Informal 
market participants make decisions under the same economic incentives as their formal 
sector counterparts. Thus, sites near employment centers or amenities will tend to be 
more highly valued than locations not so fortunately situated. So, it is not surprising that 
we will observe negative rent and density gradients in informal settlements as well.  
This yields a pattern of urban land use according to legal status of the original 
settlement. Refer to the linear city in Figure 6.2. The density curves for the informal 
sector (squatters and illegal subdivisions) lie above the corresponding formal sector 
density curve for equivalent distances from the CBD, as depicted for the outlying 
                                                 
 
 
49 There may also be cases in which the informal subdivision market will have higher eviction rates or 
higher housing capital but never both at the same time (Turnbull ,2007). 
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locations in the figure (recall that informal land development is more likely in the 
outlying locations than closer to the CBD).  
The model presented in this chapter suggests that informal development tends to 
use higher-than-efficient levels of capital per unit of land. This is because the amount of 
capital squatters invest on the land is directly related to their strategy to avoid eviction. 
The more capital they invest the less likely that they will face eviction. Squatters tend to 
have less income than city residents who have access to formal sector housing. As a 
result, in order to achieve high capital per unit of land, squatters tend to choose smaller 
plots of land than their counterparts in the formal sector in conjunction with several other 
squatters when occupying plots of land50. This creates informal settlements with greater 
number of homes and population per unit of land (i.e. higher density) than comparable 
formal settlements. Further, the density gradients for the informal sector tend to be 
steeper than in the formal market. This is because, even though proximity to the CBD 
increases structural density in both sectors, it also increases the probability of eviction in 
the informal sector and therefore increases the capital/land ratio faster in the informal 
sector than in the formal one as we move closer to the CBD.   In Figure 6.2, formal sector 
development takes place in the zone nearest the CBD to ka, informal subdivisions occupy 
the city from ka to kb and squatters occupy the city from kb to the city limit kc. 
 
                                                 
 
 
50 This effect is partially due to the normality of housing and the fact that formal sector consumers enjoy 
greater real income than do  informally employed squatters. 
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Figure 6.2: 
Density Function of a Linear City with Informal Settlements 
 
Implications for Community Squatting 
The model above focuses on a representative squatter and an individual 
landowner. However, cases in which organized communities obtain land through both 
illegal land transactions and squatting are common and amply documented in the 
informal settlement literature. The Jimenez (1985) model describes the behavior of a 
squatter community invading public lands. Recall that the community’s problem in this 
model is to determine the optimal number of squatters. Additional squatters lower the 
probability of eviction as they increase the costs of land clearing the landowner faces 
(there is a community level decision on the settlement’s structural density). But 
additional members in the community also increase the costs of future public service 
provision and property upgrading once the community is settled. The formal model used 
above does not include the infrastructure and community service complications arising 
from community squatting, but it arrives at the same implication regarding density. 
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CHAPTER 7 
LEGAL STATUS AND URBAN REDEVELOPMENT 
 
In the last decade several countries have gone through great efforts to legalize 
squatter settlements and illegal subdivisions by providing property titles to squatters. 
These programs are being evaluated on several fronts. Specifically, the links between 
property titles and property values, health, child labor, access to credit, among others, 
have been the subject of several studies (Jimenez, 1984; Lanjouw and Levy, 2002; Do 
and Iyer, 2002; Besley, 1995; Carter and Olinto, 2000; Field, 2003; Galiani and 
Shargrodsky, 2004). This section explores the relationship between land title 
regularization of informal settlements and property redevelopment. Our interest lies with 
the property redevelopment/upgrading decision squatters and owners of property located 
in illegal subdivisions face once they receive legal recognition in the form of a property 
title. 
 We begin the analysis by recognizing that redevelopment/upgrading decisions 
involve expectations about the property’s most profitable use in the future. Since urban 
growth and economic development are inherently dynamic processes, agents will 
maximize land profits by choosing the time and type of development they put in their 
property, basing their decisions on expectations of the city’s future growth. Different 
plots of land will have different development options depending on their location in the 
urban area. For this reason, we explore informal settlement upgrading after title 
regularization using a partial equilibrium model of land development based on a standard 
spatial dynamic framework developed in a series of papers by Fujita (1982), Wheaton 
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(1982), and Turnbull (1988). While the original formulation treats location explicitly, we 
focus on individual plots of land and can therefore suppress location notation without loss 
of generality.  
 Consider a residential land user facing the decision to redevelop her property after 
a land title regularization program has granted her property rights that are recognized by 
law51.  Following the established notation, the property has a structural density of h0 at 
the time the property is regularized and formal title issued to the squatter.  If the property 
owner wants to redevelop the land she must clear the land at cost C, which is an 
increasing function of the current structural density h0. Building the new structure 
requires costs D, which is a function of the new structural density put in place hn with D’ 
> 0 and D’’ > 0. The present value of land profit is 
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∞− − −= + − +∫ ∫   (11) 
where T is the time period during the which the property is redeveloped, R(h0, t) is the 
property rent during time period t with the structural density as it is at the time of 
regularization, R(hn, t) represents the property rent during time period t if a new 
construction with structural density hn replaces the original h0, and r is a discount rate.  
 Maximizing (11) with respect to hn yields the structural density condition  
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In the same manner, maximizing (11) with respect to T yields  the timing condition 
                                                 
 
 
51 Following mainstream law and economics literature we define property rights as a bundle of rights given 
to an individual over a defined property that include the right to use the property, exclude others from using 
the property and dispose of the property.   
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The structural density condition requires that the stream of extra revenues 
resulting from the redevelopment equals the extra cost of redevelopment in present value 
terms. The timing condition requires that the marginal benefit of waiting for 
redevelopment (equal to the savings of not incurring on the costs of demolition and new 
development plus the gains from the property under the current construction) equals the 
marginal cost of waiting (given by the forgone income from the property with the new 
construction in place). Conditions (12) and (13) yield the optimal time T* for 
redeveloping the property at a new structural density hn* replacing the current structure 
h0.   
 Totally differentiating the system (12) and (13) and solving in the usual manner 
shows that the optimal waiting time T* unambiguously increases as initial levels of 
density h0 increase:  
    
0
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This result is intuitively appealing. Timing, in a redevelopment decision, is 
fundamentally a choice of how long to wait before redeveloping the property in order to 
make it more marketable. If the property is not redeveloped the owner earns rents 
produced by the original structure and she saves the (annualized) costs of redevelopment, 
which entail demolition costs and new development capital improvements. On the other 
hand, by waiting to redevelop the owner forgoes the income she would receive from the 
property when upgraded to hn. The optimal development time T* occurs when the 
marginal benefit of waiting is equal to the marginal cost of waiting. So what does this 
result mean for a legalized squatter settlement? In the previous chapter we established 
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that informal settlements tend to have higher structural densities than settlements 
originated in the formal sector as part of their survival strategy. When a plot of land has 
already been developed (by squatters in this case), redevelopment involves demolition 
costs, which increase the benefit of waiting. Greater initial structural density (in squatter 
settlements) translates into higher demolition costs, which in turn increase the benefit of 
holding off on property improvements a little longer. This means that property owners in 
former (legalized) squatter settlements will tend to hold off their redevelopment decision 
for longer periods of time than owners of property originated in the formal sector. The 
slower redevelopment will in turn have an effect on the quality of housing in squatter 
settlements.   
Now we turn to the optimal density question: what is the optimal density of 
redevelopment (hn) in former squatter settlements? The effect of initial development 
density h0 on the planed future density hn* depends on how the demand for density 
changes over time for the particular plot of land. Each location in the urban area will have 
competing demands for alternative uses over time. When the demand for alternative uses 
for a plot of land are changing over time in a way that the future best and highest use has 
a greater structural density than the current highest and best use, the demanded density is 
said to be rising over time (Wheaton 1982; Turnbull, 1988).  In this case, greater initial 
density h0 increases the optimal future density hn*.  
    
0
* 0nh
h
∂ >∂   if Rht >0 
On the other hand, when the demand for alternative uses for a plot of land are changing 
over time in a way that the best future use has a lower structural density than current use, 
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the demanded density is said to be decreasing over time. In this case, the initial 
development density h0 decreases the optimal future density hn*. Thus,  
 
0
* 0nh
h
∂ <∂  if Rht <0 
These results suggest that settlements with higher initial levels of structural 
density tend to redevelop/upgrade later and at higher (lower) densities than comparable 
settlements that stared with lower structural densities in regions of the urban area where 
the demanded density is rising (decreasing) over time. Turnbull (1988) shows that the 
demanded density can be rising anywhere throughout a growing mono-centric urban area 
with homogeneous amenities, but it can be falling over time only at the urban periphery. 
 As we explained in the model of squatter behavior, informal settlements will tend 
to take place in the outskirts of the city. As the city grows, however, several of these 
settlements end up as interior areas of the city by the time they receive formal titles, areas 
where demanded density is rising over time. This suggests that informal settlements will 
eventually redevelop with even greater densities than comparable legally developed 
settlements. As a result, we expect to observe lower quality of housing (i.e. later 
redevelopment/upgrading) and greater density in settlements that originated informally 
when compared with similar settlements that originated legally. We test this prediction 
empirically in the next chapter using the case of Cochabamba, a medium sized Bolivian 
city.  
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CHAPTER 8 
DATA AND EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY 
 
Brief History of Urban Cochabamba 
Cochabamba was founded in 1574 as a center of food production and shipment 
that for the booming colonial mining industry in the western part of what is known today 
as Bolivia. Situated at 8,360 feet (2,550 meters) above sea level on the fertile lands of the 
low valley region of the state of Cochabamba, the city became the largest distribution 
center for the grain and chicha52  that was produced in its hinterland (Solares and 
Rodriguez-Ostria, 1990). Up to the 1900’s, the city experienced slow growth (see map 
8.1.1) as its economy remained virtually unchanged (Ledo and Escobar, 1988). Even after 
Bolivia’s independence from Spanish colonialism in 1825, neither its production nor its 
production methods changed significantly (Solares and Bustamante, 1986). By 1900, the 
city’s population grew to become the second largest city in Bolivia, with 21,886 habitants 
living in an urban area of around 230 Hectares (see tables 8.1.1 and 8.1.2) 
The period between 1900 and 1950 represents the first significant population 
growth episode caused by a wave of peasants leaving the countryside and migrating to 
Cochabamba in search of a better life. Solares and Rodriguez-Ostria (1990) attribute this 
first wave of rural-urban migration in Cochabamba to a large number of discharged 
soldiers in the Chaco war that Bolivia lost in 1935 to Paraguay. Many of the soldiers 
                                                 
 
 
52 A popular alcoholic beverage made of fermented maize 
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were farmers who used to work under the “pongueaje” system53. They decided to 
establish residence in the city to avoid returning to the conditions of their farm life. The 
migrants were not welcomed to the city as the established middle class reacted with fear 
to the wave of new indigenous migrants and the city was not prepared to accommodate 
the new comers. The result was the first housing crisis in the city (Goldstein, 2004). 
Physically, the city began its expansion in this period, incorporating neighborhoods to the 
north and south (see figure 8.1). The introduction of the automobile and the construction 
of the airport in the south of the city also contributed to this spatial expansion. But it was 
the population explosion that put the most pressure on land located at the city limits. As 
the indigenous migrants began urbanizing the southern part of the city, the need for a 
comprehensive growth plan became evident and the fearful ruling elite did not wait long 
to embark on the task. 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
53 System of indentured servitude, equivalent to bonded labor in the US 
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Figure 8.1: 
Cochabamba’s Urban Growth 1812-2001 
 
The First Law of Urbanization and Squatters Settlements   
In the early 1940s Cochabamba was experiencing unprecedented rapid growth 
that was perceived as chaotic and dangerous to the city by the ruling elite (Solares and 
Rodriguez-Ostria, 1990). One of the main preoccupations was the growth created by 
loteadores54 . These individuals would subdivide rural land with no services or 
transportation connection to the city, advertise it as future modern urbanization, and sell 
to migrants coming to the city. As Solares and Rodriguez-Ostria (1990) describe, press 
                                                 
 
 
54 Illegal land broker/speculator 
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editorials often referred to loteadores as “enemies of Cochabamba” but public repudiation 
could not stop their lucrative practice. It was not until 1946 that the first “General Law of 
Urbanization” was enacted to define legal urbanizations as those that complied with 
municipal guidelines and had public services. The General Law of Urbanization was later 
complemented with the 1950 comprehensive plan that regulated the city’s future growth 
(Solares and Rodriguez-Ostria 1990). The plan was later updated in 1961 and 1985. One 
of the main characteristics of the comprehensive plan was based on the “garden city” 
concept taken from the writings of Ebenezer Howard (1902). This concept advocated the 
creation of greenbelts surrounding decentralized urban satellites. The plan’s concept 
brought special attention to green areas that surrounding the city by serving as natural 
boundaries to the urban space and separating the city from other neighboring urban 
centers: “Sacaba” situated on the east, “Quillacollo” on the west; and a third urban center 
to be created later in what is now the “Valle Hermoso” neighborhood in Cochabmaba 
(Goldstein, 2004). 
The comprehensive plan came at a time when drastic transformations were taking 
place in Bolivia. In 1952, a popular uprising guided by the Nationalist Revolutionary 
Movement (MNR in Spanish) party toppled the military government and instituted 
profound social and economic changes in the country. These changes included an 
agrarian reform that redistributed agrarian land in the western and central part of the 
country to peasant workers. By this time, Bolivia’s main cities were still experiencing a 
housing crisis created by rural-urban immigration. When city dwellers who lived as 
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renters observed their rents rising they began to organize in “sindicatos de inquilinos”55  
and push for an urban reform (Solares, 1999). 
  The MNR’s government response to the housing problem was to enact the Urban 
Reform Law in 1956. This law involved the expropriation of undeveloped land parcels 
greater than 1 hectare in urban centers to distribute it to the “sindicatos de inquilinos” that 
denounced the existence of such plots. It is hard to quantify the effect of such reform in 
Cochabamba since the city did not have a cadastre at the time, but some authors estimate 
that no more than 5 hectares56 were affected by the reform (Rivera, 2005). Solares (1999) 
claims that this reform was not effective as it tended to favor government-supporting 
groups only and it was not enough to solve the housing crisis of the time. In 1960, under 
these conditions, the “sindicato unico pro vivienda” San Miguel began the first successful 
land invasion at the southeastern part of the city on the San Miguel hill (see figure 8.2). 
The San Miguel hill was a part of a green belt proposed in the municipality’s 
comprehensive plan and part of a reforestation project. The worst encounters between the 
squatter settlers and municipal police took place in 1961. The squatters were organized 
and armed with dynamite. At the end, the “sindicato” prevailed and by 1962 the squatter 
settlement occupied the entire Cerro Verde and San Miguel hills. After a series of legal 
battles, these settlements were later regularized and property titles were given to the 
squatters in the late 1970’s (Solares, 1999).    
                                                 
 
 
55 Renter unions 
56 At this time, the city had an area of about 1300 hectares. As a result, less than 0.3% of the city’s area was 
affected by the urban reform law. 
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After 12 years in government, the MNR party fell to the military regime led by 
Rene Barrientos, later replaced by a series of military dictatorships that governed Bolivia 
until 1982. According to Solares (1999), these military regimes did not significantly 
change the existing housing policy. However, two aspects influenced urban growth 
during these regimes in the 1950s and early 1960’s: (1) Most of the renter’s unions were 
abolished or lost power as they were considered a threat to military regimes; and (2) 
squatter evictions became more effective because they had complete military support. An 
example of these changes in government response to squatters was the violent eviction 
that took place in the eastern part of the city in 197957. Despite these conditions, during 
this period, there was one successful land invasion in barrio El Solterito. There was also 
the beginning of one of the largest squatter settlements in the city: barrio Alto 
Cochabamba in the southern part of the city (see figure 8.2). 
During 1950-1976 the city approximately doubled its population and its urbanized 
area. This period also marked a turning point in the city’s history as it had its first forms 
of illegal growth- mostly in the form of land invasions. In this period illegal settlements 
accounted for about 10% of the urban area growth (see table 8.1). The rapid population 
growth and the lack of available legal urban space were the precursors of an explosion of 
illegal settlements in years to come. 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
57 In this incident 400 families were evicted at nighttime and relocated after a long and painful struggle to 
what is known today as Barrio 24 de Enero (Neighborhood January 24th)  (Richmond, 1997). 
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Figure 8.2: 
Selected Illegal Settlements in Cochabamba 
 
The Illegal City 
In the period between 1976 and 1992, the city had an annual population growth 
rate of 4.55 % and the urban area grew by about 2800 hectares. Various factors motivated 
this rapid growth. Among the most important was the drop in international prices of 
mineral exports that created a financial crisis at the national level which prompted the 
closing of state mines in the western part of the country. This event, coupled with a 
severe drought in the western region, encouraged thousand of indigenous land workers 
and miners to look for better opportunities in Cochabamba and Santa Cruz.  
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In Cochabamba, the new migrants found a booming illegal land sale market that 
could accommodate them in the southern part of the city. Some migrant communities 
took advantage of a government plan (Plan socio Urbano) to obtain land and regularize it 
even if the acquisition was not completely legal- for example, the case of “Villa Mejico” 
(1978); or it was recognized by the municipal comprehensive plan- for example, the case 
of “Villa Sebastian Pagador I” (1977) in the southeast (see map 8.1.2). 
Other communities were acquired directly from loteadores through illegal land sales. 
  Municipal authorities failed to control this type of development because they 
lacked the political and economic resources required for massive evictions (Solares and 
Bustamante, 1986).  By the late 1970’s the municipal authorities realized that the 
comprehensive plan was obsolete and tried to update it in 1985. At this point, the 
municipality declared most of the growth taking place in the southeastern part of the city 
as illegal and took action denying public service provision and freezing all attempts from 
settlers to legalize these plots (Goldstein, 2004). This strategy, however, did not 
discourage loteadores from subdividing and selling more land in this  and other regions of 
Cochabamba. It was not until 1993 that the municipality opened the opportunity for these 
settlements to be regularized. During 1976-1992, the city’s urbanized area grew by 2,778 
hectares. Only 70% of those were legal (see Table 8. 2.).     
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Table 8.1: 
 Population Growth in Cochabamba 1900-2001 
 
Time period 1900-1950 1950-1976 1976-1992 1992-2001 
Population at the beginning of 
period 21,886 80,795 203,447 414,307 
Population at the end of period 80,795 203,447 414,307 517,024 
Years 50 26 16 9 
Annual Population growth rate 2.65 3.62 4.55 2.49 
Source: Ledo (1988) and Bolivian Census 1992, 2001 
 
Facing the Problem of Illegal Settlements 
After several years of virtually ignoring illegal land subdivisions in the southern 
part of the city, the municipal government began applying a policy of inclusion to these 
settlements (Goldstein, 2004). This policy shift in policy was caused in large part by a 
second wave of structural reforms at the national level began in 1985. These reforms 
included the widespread privatization of public enterprises and an aggressive plan of 
administrative and fiscal decentralization that gave more importance and power to state 
and municipal governments. Of special interest to urban development were the Law of 
Popular Participation (LPP)58, the Law of Administrative Decentralization (LAD)59, and 
the Law of Municipalities (LM)60. The LPP authorized the creation of a new stratum of 
an elected political leadership below the municipal level. Under the LPP, urban and rural 
neighborhood organizations could be constituted as “Organizaciones Territoriales de 
Base) (OTB) (basic territorial organizations) and were able to obtain public funds directly 
from the central government for development projects that concerned their jurisdictions. 
                                                 
 
 
58 The law of popular participation, also known as “Ley 1551 de participacion popular” was enacted by 
congress in April 20th 1994. 
59 Ley de decentralizacion administrativa 1654, enacted by congress July 28, 1995  
60 Ley de Municipalidedes 2028, enacted by congress in  October 28, 1999 
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By the late 1990’s there were around 343 OTBs in the city of Cochabamba; most 
of them in areas with a large proportion of illegal settlements (Cochabamba-Municipality 
(2005)). The LPP also defined municipal and state boundaries. Thus, under the new 
boundary delimitation, Cochabamba’s municipal government incorporated its 9th and 
13th district. The former district was mostly rural at the time, but today is the district with 
the highest level of illegal subdivisions. The former was a national park situated in the 
northern part of the city. As a national protected area, the park became under the state 
government control. However, because of its location it was part of the municipal 
government’s jurisdiction. Municipal and state governments engage in disputes over 
territorial management of the park to this day.  
The LAD came to strengthen the LPP by giving state governments more 
autonomy in the use of funds and financing mechanisms. But it was the LM that gave 
municipalities the power to administer their own revenue systems and increased their 
police power and resources for planning and evictions.  
 The political and administrative structural reforms taking place during the 1990’s 
at the national level gave municipalities more funds and authority to face their 
urbanization problems. It also gave them more incentives to incorporate illegal 
settlements into the city -especially into the city’s revenue system. Under the LPP 
organized neighborhoods could obtain resources directly from the central government to 
upgrade and build services on their own. Under the LM, the municipality could now take 
some of the political credit for the upgrades as well as access to additional sources of 
revenue from legalizing and taxing these settlements. Along these lines, the municipal 
government of Manfred Reyes villa (1993-2002) created decentralized offices or sub-
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municipalities, also known as zonal workshops. The main objective was to regularize 
illegal settlements and to control the urbanization process in protected areas better, 
following the updated plan of 1981 (Goldstein, 2004).  
In the 1992-2001 period, most of the illegal settlements in the southeastern part of 
the city were regularized through the issuing of titles for individual land plots. This 
massive legalization effort was accompanied by an upgrade of the entire cadastre system 
and brought neighborhoods to comply with some urbanization rules. In some cases, the 
municipality had to adapt the rules to the established development characteristics. As a 
consequence, for example, it decreased the minimum allowed plot size from 250 to 180 
square meters (Cochabamba-Municipality (2005)).). In the period between 1992 and 
2001, Cochabamba’s population grew at a much slower rate than it did in the previous 50 
years. But the lower population growth rate did not stop the boom in illegal subdivision 
markets taking place in district 9 corresponding to the southern part of the city. During 
this period, the city added about 1,000 Hectares of urbanized land. 70 % of this urban 
expansion was in the form of illegal subdivisions.   
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Table 8.2: 
Urbanized Area Growth 1812 –2001 
 
Time period 
1574-
1812 
1812-
1900 
1900-
1945 
1945-
1976 
1976-
1992 
1992-
2001 Total 
Growth in # of city blocks 74 92 588 2171 2655 1001 6581 
Growth in Urbanized Area 
(Hectares) 77 110 1,110 2,049 2,778 957 7,081 
Growth in # of legal city 
blocks 74 92 588 1892 1527 149 4322 
Growth in Legal Urbanized 
Area (Ha) 77 110 1,110 1,870 1,956 285 5,408 
% Legal Growth (Area) 100 100 100 91 70 30 76 
% Legal Growth (city 
blocks) 100 100 100 87 58 15 66 
Source: National Institute of statistics INE Cartographic data 1976, 1992, 2001 and 
Solares (1990)   
 
Illegal Subdivisions of the XXI Century 
The 2001 population census showed that the southern part of the city had the 
highest growth rate by means of illegal subdivisions. The census revealed that the city is 
still attracting rural migrants who settle this area through illegal purchases of land. 
During 1992-2001 the population in this area quadrupled and the number of illegal 
settlements grew at a yearly rate of approximately 20% (Montano, 2007). Facing this 
phenomenon, the municipality started a new regularization plan supported by the law of 
Regularizacion de Fundos Urbanos signed by president Carlos D. Mesa in 2002. The law 
creates programs of Shared Responsibility Agreement (ARCO in Spanish) that requires 
municipalities and central government to regularize illegal settlements that originated 
before 1998.  
To date, the rate of urbanization through illegal land subdivisions far exceeds the 
rate of regularization (Solares, 2006). Overall, in the past 10 years, government response 
towards illegal subdivisions ranges from quick evictions to full regularizations with no 
consistent pattern. In many cases, the municipal government ignores new settlements as 
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illegal land brokers have devised more effective ways to evade municipal regulations 
(Montano, 2007). Violent land disputes among settlers are common in certain areas of the 
city’s southern districts because plots are sold several times to different owners or to 
different communities (Cochabamba-Municipality (2005)).). These disputes have turned 
more violent with rising expectations of regularization. Nonetheless, land prices 
increased dramatically in anticipation of regularization (Farfan, 2004). 
A Typology of Settlements Based on Legality of Origin 
The theoretical model proposed in this dissertation predicts that the legal origin of 
a settlement is directly related to its structural density because it determines the optimal 
strategy settlers will follow in order to avoid eviction based on landowners’ credible 
threats. For the purpose of this dissertation we identified 5 types of settlements according 
to their legal origin in the city of Cochabamba: (1) Legal settlements, (2) Squatter 
settlements, (3) Government supported settlements, (4) Illegal land subdivisions, and (5) 
Illegal subdivisions in protected areas. All these types of settlements are presented in 
figure 8.3. 
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Figure 8.3: 
Settlements by Legal Origin 
 
Legal Settlements  
By definition, legal settlements are those that comply with the laws of urbanism 
and the laws of property. Legal settlements are typically developed on purchased land. 
Every purchase needs to be recorded in the real estate office and the sale needs to be 
notarized as a public document. In addition, before a legal settlement is developed, the 
municipality has to approve that the development follows all the regulations established 
in the city’s master plan and that all the fees and taxes are paid in full. Successful 
completion of all of these requirements typically result in the issuance of a “property 
title” which is the only legal document that gives the “owner” the legal right to use, 
transfer, and dispose of the property in the eyes Bolivian law. Although, the laws and 
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regulations have changed over time, all development that did not break existing laws at 
the time is considered a legal settlement. This type of settlement, by definition, did not 
follow any strategy to avoid eviction at the time of origin.  
Squatter Settlements 
This type of settlement refers to those neighborhoods that originated from an 
individual or a community invading land owned by other public or private parties. The 
laws of property were broken because no sale of land was completed before the 
occupation and no registry of property transfer was made in the real estate office. 
Moreover, in addition to violation of property laws, all squatter settlements broke the 
norms of urbanism by taking place in land reserved for uses other than residential and 
without any consideration of building codes. The first squatter settlements were formed 
in the early 1960’s and two other settlements followed in the 1970’s. Although the first 
squatter settlement faced the hardest opposition from government and battled evictions 
more than the other two, all of them faced legal battles and high probability of eviction 
from the time of initial settlement until they were fully regularized and titled. Our 
theoretical model predicts that this type of settlement will exhibit higher densities than 
comparable legal settlements and comparable illegal subdivisions. 
Government Supported Settlements 
Until the MNR government came to power in 1952, housing policy for the poor 
had been reduced to rent controls that had little or no effect on solving the housing crisis 
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in the city of Cochabamba61. It was in the late 1950’s that the national government 
decided to actively participate in the planning and construction of housing for the poor by 
creating several offices and plans that were to work with municipal government. In 1956, 
one of the first interventions was the construction of the neighborhood Barrio Minero as 
part of the “Consejo Nacional de Vivienda” (CONAVI) in the southeastern part of the 
city followed by other major interventions under the “Plan Socio-Urbano” such as 
“Sebastian Pagador I”,  “Villa Mejico,” and “Las Ulalas”.  
This type of development was originated by organized communities that received 
support from the central government to acquire land in vacant plots, and then acquired 
municipal support in the planning stage. Nonetheless, in most cases these communities 
settled in the areas before the land transfers were completed or even initiated -as in the 
case of “Villa Mejico” (Torrico, 1999). In other cases, the municipality had not even 
approved their settlement - as in the case of “Villa Sebastian Pagador” (Goldstein, 2004). 
In most of these cases the communities took the land, and developed it in order to 
pressure the municipality to approve the plans and legalize ownership of the settlements. 
Thus, this type of development responded to a strategy similar to that of the squatters but 
with a lower probability of eviction since they knew that there was an a priori intention 
from the municipal government to help them settle, even if it was not on the places or in 
the circumstances these developments took place. Thus, we expect this type of 
                                                 
 
 
61 This rent controls were first enacted in 1937 by President German Busch and then again in 1945 by 
President Gualberto Villarroel. However, none of them had a significant effect on reducing rents or solving 
the housing crisis (Solares, 1999)   
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development to have greater structural densities than comparable legal settlements but 
less structural density than squatter settlements.  
Illegal Land Subdivisions 
This type of development refers to those settlements that originated under direct 
violation of the laws of urbanism. Usually, these settlements originated in rural lands 
owned by agrarian communities that benefited from the agrarian reform of 1952. As these 
lands were subdivided among community members’ families over the years following the 
agrarian reform, they became inefficient for agricultural use. These owners then sold their 
plots to illegal land brokers or loteadores, who subdivided them and sold them as urban 
land. Property laws were not completely violated because there was an exchange of rents 
and some documents signed (as public documents in some cases) but rarely recorded in 
the real estate office (Zapotocka de Ballon, 2007 ). This is by far the most common type 
of illegal settlement in Cochabamba and it is as common today as it was in the early 
1970’s (Montano, 2007). The strategy in this type of development is to build with enough 
density to avoid evictions; but since this type of settlers pay for the land, landowners’ 
credible threats of eviction require less structural density than squatter settlements. Thus, 
we expect these types of settlements to have less structural density than comparable 
squatter settlements but have higher structural density than comparable legally developed 
land.  
Illegal Land Subdivisions in Protected Areas 
This final type of development shares the same characteristics as the illegal 
subdivision development described above with the difference that its location is in 
national parks (forest areas). At the time these forest areas were declared national parks 
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they were owned by private parties. National park regulations did not expropriate the 
lands but restricted their use for forestry or specific types of agriculture. National park 
regulations were respected until the late 1980’s but changes in the law created an 
opportunity for illegal land brokers to subdivide these lands and sell them as urban.   
As explained above, national parks control was given to state governments under 
the LAP, however, the Law of Municipalities gave municipal governments control of all 
the area situated in urban municipal districts including parks. This incongruence in law 
gave room for disputes over national park jurisdiction.  Many illegal land brokers took 
advantage of the situation and used this opportunity to develop land on in the northern 
part of the city (Solares, 2006). Because municipal and state governments could not agree 
on jurisdictional issues no evictions or enforceable controls were imposed. Furthermore, 
because this land was not developable under the national park law, owners did not have 
the incentive to claim it back. In recent years the municipality initiated an effort to 
regularize the legal situation of some developments situated in the northern part of the 
city, but because of their national park status, they require changes in national law which 
have proved difficult to obtain. Our model would predict this development to have lower 
structural density than comparable squatter settlements or illegal subdivisions but more 
density than comparable legal settlements. 
Data and Empirical Models 
To test our hypotheses, we use city blocks as our unit of analysis. The data is 
drawn from the 1992 and 2001 censuses collected by the Bolivian National Institute of 
Statistics (INE in Spanish) for the entire city. Land prices were obtained from the 
municipality’s cadastre system, which was updated in 2002. In order to classify the 
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settlements by legal origin, we used municipality maps reflecting the city’s master plans 
in 1945, 1961, 1977, and 1998. We also relied on the expert advice of urban historian 
Humberto Solares when classifying city blocks according to their legal origin62. Table 8.3 
presents the variables used in the empirical analysis.  
Population Density Models 
We use several common rent and density gradient specifications to test the 
relationship between a settlement’s legal origin and its characteristics in the year 2001. 
Our simplest model uses a basic negative exponential function where density follows an 
exponential function (Clark, 1951; Mills, 1972; Muth, 1969), 
0
k xD D e γ β− +=  
where D is a measure of density, D0 is the density at the CBD, k is a measure of distance 
from the CBD, and γ  denotes the density gradient holding other variables fixed. We also 
include a vector X of variables thought to influence population density, such as distance 
to a major transportation artery, block income, provision of public services, direction 
from the CBD (in octants), time period of consolidation, and a set of dummy variables 
indicating legal origin type63. Table 8.2.1 presents descriptive statistics for all the 
variables used in the analysis. 
                                                 
 
 
62 Professor Solares of San Simon University is one of the most recognized urban historians in 
Cochabamba, with several books and influential professional reports on the city’s urban history. 
63 We used information in the 2001 census to construct an income scale at the block level applying factor 
analysis. The variables included in the analysis were: percent of households in the block that own a TV set, 
percent of households in the block that own a car, percent of households in the block that own a refrigerator 
in the kitchen, and percent of households in the block that own a telephone line. These 4 variables produced 
a highly reliable index of city block income (Cronbach Alpha = .88) that explained 75 % of the combined 
variance of the variables used. For details on the construction of this variable please refer to the appendix 
section. 
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Following Frankena (1978) we also consider an alternative functional form using a third 
degree polynomial specification: 
     
2 3
1 2 3( )
0
k k k xD D e γ γ γ β+ + +=  
Finally, a third variant follows Kau and Lee (1976), allowing for different functional 
forms in the gradient estimation using a Box-Cox transformation of the form: 
     0 1
( ) 1D k k x
λ
γ γ βλ
− = + +  
We use two indicators to measure development density: total population per hectare and 
total number of homes per hectare, exploiting the principle that structural density and 
population density are vertical translations of each other in standard urban economics 
literature.  
Land Price Models 
We also estimate land price gradients, using analogues to the density gradient 
models described above. Land prices are measured in 2002 US dollars per hectare. Our 
interest in the land price gradient is driven by the rent relationship implied by the 
underling density gradient and the degree to which the legal status of the settlement 
confers secure title to land occupiers. 
Housing Quality Models 
The variables indicating settlement housing quality are measured as a proportion 
of homes in a city block that fall into a high, medium and low quality (Q) classification. 
We used the Bolivian INE index to define housing structure quality by evaluating each 
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home’s construction materials in walls, roofs and floors64. Because these variables 
represent proportions, we used fractional Logit specifications as suggested by Papke and 
Wooldrige (1996) 65 . Thus, the housing quality models are estimated using  
     ( )Q G x uβ= +  
where G(·) is a logistic function and vector x includes distance from the CBD, distance to 
a major transportation artery, block income (scale), % of homes in the block connected to 
the sewer system, direction from the CBD (in octants), time period of consolidation, % of 
homes occupied by owner, and legal origin type. 
                                                 
 
 
64 The appendix contains the details on how this variable is constructed. 
65 We also estimated these models using two-limit linear Tobit specifications. The results were virtually the 
same as those obtained from the fractional Logit marginal effects evaluated at sample mean values. 
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Table 8.3: 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Block's Legal Origin  City Blocks N Percent Cum. 
Illegal Subdivision (protected area) 334 5.06 5.06 
Squatter Settlement 304 4.61 9.67 
Public Supported Subdivision 221 3.35 13.01 
Illegal Subdivision (Still Illegal) 581 8.8 21.81 
Illegal Subdivision (Now legal) 818 12.39 34.21 
Legal 4,343 65.79 100 
Consolidation Time Period City Blocks N Percent Cum. 
1574-1812 74 1.12 1.12 
1812-1900 91 1.38 2.5 
1900-1945 584 8.85 11.35 
1945-1976 2,171 32.89 44.24 
1976-1992 2,656 40.24 84.47 
1992-2001 1,025 15.53 100 
Octant (Origin =CBD) City Blocks N Percent Cum. 
1. N-NE 611 9.26 9.26 
2. NE-E 533 8.07 17.33 
3. E-SE 228 3.45 20.78 
4. SE-S 1,987 30.1 50.89 
5. S-SW 802 12.15 63.04 
6. SW-W 431 6.53 69.57 
7. W-NW 727 11.01 80.58 
8. NW-N 1,282 19.42 100 
Block characteristics City Blocks N Meana 
Std. 
Deva. 
Population Density (Pop/Ha) 5896 115.4 80.59 
Homes Density  (Homes/Ha) 5949 27.27 19.68 
Land Price ($US/Sq m) 6601 79.37 74.54 
Distance from the CBD (Km) 6601 4.47 2.23 
Distance to a major Road (m) 6601 855.56 1266.08 
% Homes connected to sewer system 5880 52.65 45.14 
% Homes occupied by owner 5880 54.31 21.6 
% Homes under Antichresis tenure 5880 8.81 10.5 
% Homes under monthly rent tenure 5880 23.59 17.56 
Income (Factor) 5787 0 2.03 
% of High Quality homes  5880 40.65 32.22 
% of Medium Quality homes  5880 56.87 31.19 
% of Low Quality homes  5880 2.5 8.4 
a. Calculated using the number of city blocks observed for each variable 
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Empirical Results 
Tables 8.4 and 8.5 show the density gradient estimates using both population 
density and structural density, respectively, for the various specifications. Given the high 
correlation between population destiny and structural density implied by standard land 
use theory the similarity between the results using these indicators is not surprising66.  In 
both tables, column 1 shows the simple negative exponential specification and column 2 
allows for differences in gradients across legal origin types. Column 3 shows the cubic 
function estimates and columns 4 and 5 present the Box- Cox transformation estimates in 
both tables. In the simple negative exponential specification (column 1 in both tables), all 
of the coefficients on legal origin binary indicators using formal development as the 
reference group are positive and statistically significant. This shows that development in 
the informal sector occurs at higher density than development in the formal sector as the 
theoretical model presented in chapter 6 suggests.  
City blocks that originated as squatter settlements through violent invasions of 
land tend to have 57% more housing units per hectare than comparable formal 
development. Further, city blocks that originated as squatter settlements tend have higher 
population and structural densities than blocks that originated as informal land sales 
(which tend to have 33% more housing units per hectare than formal development) and 
government supported subdivisions (which tend to have 31% more housing units per 
hectare than formal development). Interestingly, the highest density was observed for 
                                                 
 
 
66 In our sample the Pearson correlation coefficient between the population per hectare and number of 
houses per hectare was 0.94. 
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recent illegal subdivisions, which tend to have 62% more homes per hectare than 
comparable settlements originated in the formal sector. 
The empirical models show that there are differences in density gradients within 
different types of informal development as evidenced by the statistically significant 
coefficients on the interaction terms between the legal origin indicators and distance from 
CBD in models 2 and 5 of tables 8.4 and 8.5 figure 8.4 depicts these differences in 
density gradients across legal status using the Box-Cox estimates from model 5 in table 
8.4. Squatter settlements, illegal subdivisions on protected land and recent illegal 
subdivisions have steeper density gradients than formal sector development while 
government supported subdivisions and the first illegal subdivisions in the city have 
flatter density gradients than formal sector development. These comparisons are 
calculated for locations between k1 and k2 where informal development is likely to take 
place67. In this section of the city, the rank of structural density from most dense to least 
dense is given by squatter settlements followed by recent illegal subdivisions, 
government supported subdivisions, illegal subdivisions on protected land, old illegal 
subdivisions and formal sector development. 
                                                 
 
 
67 In Cochabamba k1and k2 occur at about 3 Km and 10 Km from the CBD respectively. 
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Table 8.4: 
Population Density Models 
 
Model 1 2 3 4 5 
Dependent variable Log(pop/Ha) Log(pop/Ha) Log(pop/Ha) (Pop/Ha)λ (Pop/Ha)λ 
Box-Cox transformation estimate λ - - - 0.5092 0.5223 
Distance to CBD (Km) -0.08 -0.0895 -0.3031 -0.7926 -0.9562 
 [0.0138]*** [0.0165]*** [0.0643]*** [0.1008]*** [0.1282]*** 
(Distance to CBD (Km))2   0.0597   
   [0.0138]***   
(Distance to CBD (Km))3   -0.0041   
   [0.0009]***   
Distance to a major Road (m) 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0007 0.0009 
 [0.0000]*** [0.0000]*** [0.0000]*** [0.0001]*** [0.0002]*** 
% Homes connected to sewer system  0.0067 0.0067 0.0071 0.0623 0.0656 
 [0.0005]*** [0.0005]*** [0.0005]*** [0.0038]*** [0.0042]*** 
%  Homes occupied by owner  0.0008 0.0009 0.0007 0.0026 0.0054 
 [0.0009] [0.0009] [0.0009] [0.0060] [0.0064] 
Neighborhood Income (factor) -0.0347 -0.035 -0.0316 -0.5862 -0.6139 
 [0.0130]*** [0.0131]*** [0.0131]** [0.0894]*** [0.0946]*** 
Illegal Subdivision (Protected Area) 0.1501 1.3519 0.0981 1.5681 10.7532 
 [0.0828]* [0.3483]*** [0.0852] [0.6052]*** [2.1518]*** 
Squatter  (Invasion) 0.5698 0.6731 0.6182 6.7052 16.4291 
 [0.0550]*** [0.1755]*** [0.0555]*** [0.5407]*** [2.2341]*** 
Government supported subdivision 0.3353 -1.4128 0.2918 2.8237 -13.6172 
 [0.0573]*** [0.2835]*** [0.0584]*** [0.5182]*** [2.7523]*** 
Illegal Subdivision (New: Still Illegal) 0.6246 0.5713 0.5702 3.3686 4.7916 
 [0.0837]*** [0.2751]** [0.0869]*** [0.6108]*** [2.2611]** 
Illegal Subdivision (Old: Now legal) 0.3064 -0.0952 0.2756 1.2592 -3.4945 
 [0.0529]*** [0.1566] [0.0543]*** [0.3966]*** [1.3032]*** 
Illegal Subdivision (protected area) *CBD dist  -0.0002   -0.0016 
  [0.0001]***   [0.0004]*** 
Squatter  (Invasion) *CBD dist  0   -0.0032 
  [0.0001]   [0.0007]*** 
Government supported subdivision*CBD dist  0.0004   0.0035 
  [0.0001]***   [0.0005]*** 
Illegal Subdivision (New: still Illegal) *CBD dist  0   -0.0002 
  [0.0000]   [0.0003] 
Illegal Subdivision (Old: Now legal) *CBD dist  0.0001   0.0007 
  [0.0000]**   [0.0002]*** 
      
Constant 3.6498 3.6061 3.6922 11.0886 11.0667 
 [0.1062]*** [0.1085]*** [0.1106]*** [1.0104]*** [1.0868]*** 
Observations 5787 5787 5787 5787 5787 
R-squared 0.24 0.25 0.24 0.32 0.33 
Robust standard errors in brackets      
* Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1% 
   (1) For brevity coefficients on direction (octants) and time of consolidation variables are not shown in this table.  
 
 120
Table 8.5: 
Structural Density Models 
 
Model 1 2 3 4 5 
Dependent variable Log(pop/Ha) Log(pop/Ha) Log(pop/Ha) (Pop/Ha)λ (Pop/Ha)λ 
Box-Cox transformation estimate λ - - - 0.5092 0.5223 
      
Distance to CBD (Km) -0.08*** -0.0895*** -0.3031*** -0.7926*** -0.9562*** 
 [0.0138] [0.0165] [0.0643] [0.1008]*** [0.1282] 
(Distance to CBD (Km))2   0.0597***   
   [0.0138]   
(Distance to CBD (Km))3   -0.0041***   
   [0.0009]   
Distance to a major Road (m) 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0007*** 0.0009*** 
 [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0001]*** [0.0002] 
% Homes connected to sewer system  0.0067*** 0.0067*** 0.0071*** 0.0623*** 0.0656*** 
 [0.0005] [0.0005] [0.0005] [0.0038]*** [0.0042] 
%  Homes occupied by owner  0.0008 0.0009 0.0007 0.0026 0.0054 
 [0.0009] [0.0009] [0.0009] [0.0060] [0.0064] 
Neighborhood Income (factor) -0.0347*** -0.035*** -0.0316** -0.5862*** -0.6139*** 
 [0.0130] [0.0131] [0.0131] [0.0894]*** [0.0946] 
Illegal Subdivision (Protected Area) 0.1501* 1.3519*** 0.0981 1.5681*** 10.7532*** 
 [0.0828] [0.3483] [0.0852] [0.6052]*** [2.1518] 
Squatter  (invasion) 0.5698*** 0.6731*** 0.6182*** 6.7052*** 16.4291*** 
 [0.0550] [0.1755] [0.0555] [0.5407]*** [2.2341] 
Government Supported Subdivision 0.3353*** -1.4128*** 0.2918*** 2.8237*** -13.6172*** 
 [0.0573] [0.2835] [0.0584] [0.5182]*** [2.7523] 
Illegal Subdivision (still illegal) 0.6246*** 0.5713** 0.5702*** 3.3686*** 4.7916** 
 [0.0837] [0.2751] [0.0869] [0.6108]*** [2.2611] 
Illegal Subdivision (now legal) 0.3064*** -0.0952 0.2756*** 1.2592*** -3.4945*** 
 [0.0529] [0.1566] [0.0543] [0.3966]*** [1.3032] 
Illegal Subdivision (protected area) *CBD dist  -0.0002***   -0.0016*** 
  [0.0001]   [0.0004] 
Squatter  (invasion) *CBD dist  4.7e-05   -0.0032*** 
  [0.0001]   [0.0007] 
Government Supported Subdivision*CBD dist  0.0004***   0.0035*** 
  [0.0001]   [0.0005] 
Illegal Subdivision (still illegal) *CBD dist  5.7e-06   -0.0002 
  [0.0000]   [0.0003] 
Illegal Subdivision (now legal) *CBD dist  0.0001**   0.0007*** 
  [0.0000]   [0.0002] 
      
Constant 3.6498*** 3.6061*** 3.6922*** 11.0886*** 11.0667*** 
 [0.1062] [0.1085] [0.1106] [1.0104] [1.0868] 
Observations 5787 5787 5787 5787 5787 
R-squared 0.24 0.25 0.24 0.32 0.33 
Robust standard errors in brackets      
* Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1% 
For brevity coefficients on direction (octants) and time of consolidation variables are not reported in this table. 
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Figure 8.4: 
Estimated Density Gradients by Settlement Type (Box-Cox Results) 
 
The price gradient estimates shown in table 8.6 reveal that city blocks that 
originated as squatter settlements tend to have lower rents and steeper rent gradients than 
comparable city blocks that originated in the formal sector. Given that squatter 
settlements were regularized and formally titled in the 1980s, this result suggests that 
former squatter settlements have a legacy effect of sub-optimal land use at present time. 
City blocks in recent illegal subdivisions and illegal subdivisions on protected land also 
present lower and steeper price gradients than comparable city blocks that originated in 
the formal sector. Since these types of settlements are not yet regularized, these lower 
rents may be capturing an eviction threat risk premium. Interestingly, old informal 
subdivisions that were regularized during the 1990s have a flatter price gradient than that 
of formal subdivisions. Consequently, old informal subdivisions have higher rents than 
comparable formal development as distance from the CBD increases. This difference 
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may be capturing the land regulation effects in development that originated in the formal 
sector.  This result can be observed in figure 8.5 where the price gradient estimates from 
the Box -Cox model in column 5 are depicted graphically.  In the region of the urban area 
between k1 and k2, old illegal subdivisions tend to have the highest land rents followed by 
legal development and government supported subdivisions, which have similar rent 
gradients. Below legal development land rents lay illegal subdivisions on protected land, 
followed by recent illegal subdivisions and squatters, in that order.    
Perhaps one of the most interesting findings is that, for settlements originated in 
the informal sector, structural density does not necessarily follow land prices in the way 
standard urban economics theory predicts. In standard urban economic theory land prices 
are positively related to structural density. Thus, sectors of the urban where the land is 
relatively cheap tend to have lower structural densities than other sectors where land rents 
are greater. Squatter settlements, which, ceteris paribus, have lower land rent than any 
other type of development, also tend to exhibit the highest density. This reflects the 
importance of a settlement’s legal origin. The legal origin determines the settlement’s 
pattern of occupation, which in turn determines its development settlement’s trajectory 
over time. This legacy effect can be also observed in housing quality, as suggested by the 
redevelopment model presented in chapter 7. 
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Table 8.6: 
Land Rent Models 
 
Model 1 2 3 4 5 
Dependent variable Log($ /sqm) Log($ /sqm) Log($ /sqm) ($ /sqm)λ ($ /sqm)λ 
Box-Cox transformation estimate λ       -2.146 -2.192 
      
Distance to CBD (Km) -0.1272*** -0.1828*** -1.0963*** -9.49E-06*** -1.32e-06***
 [0.0060] [0.0087] [0.0283] [4.12e-07] [4.97e-07] 
(Distance to CBD (Km))2   0.1634***   
   [0.0050]   
(Distance to CBD (Km))3   -0.0078***   
   [0.0003]   
Distance to a major Road (m) 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0*** 9.42e-09*** 4.24e-09*** 
 [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [4.10e-10] [5.36e-10] 
% Homes connected to sewer system  0.0011*** 0.0004** 0.0006*** 2.11e-07*** 1.16e-07*** 
 [0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0002] [1.26e-08] [1.14e-08] 
%  Homes occupied by owner  0.0008*** 0.0005** 0.0006*** 5.03e-09 -1.32e-08 
 [0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0002] [1.56e-08] [1.26e-08] 
Illegal Subdivision (Protected Area) -0.1416*** -1.2594*** -0.0709** -0.00001*** -0.000094***
 [0.0331] [0.0691] [0.0299] [2.39e-06] [4.19e-06] 
Squatter  (invasion) -0.3298*** -0.4301*** -0.2834*** -0.000036*** 2.89e-06*** 
 [0.0195] [0.0744] [0.0193] [1.82e-06] [3.97e-06] 
Government Supported Subdivision 0.0251 -0.5607*** 0.1812*** 0.000002 -0.000048***
 [0.0161] [0.0492] [0.0114] [1.70e-06] [6.75e-06] 
Illegal Subdivision (still Illegal) -0.0421** -0.5602*** -0.0167 -0.000016*** -0.00007*** 
 [0.0185] [0.0695] [0.0161] [1.52e-06] [4.46e-06] 
Illegal Subdivision (now legal) 0.1585*** -0.7824 0.0793*** 0.000014*** -0.00007*** 
 [0.0150] [0.0469] [0.0088] [1.41e-06] [4.30e-06] 
Illegal Subdivision (protected area) 
*CBD dist  0.0002***   1.58e-08*** 
  [1.4e-05]   [8.85e-10] 
Squatter  (invasion) *CBD dist  1.7e-05   -1.24e-*** 
  [2.1e-05]   [1.09e-09] 
Government Supported 
Subdivision*CBD dist  0.0001***   1.12e-08*** 
  [9.76e-06]   [1.29e-09] 
Illegal Subdivision (still illegal) *CBD 
dist  0.0001***   9.84e-09*** 
  [1.1e-05]   [7.21e-10] 
Illegal Subdivision (now legal) *CBD 
dist  0.0002***   1.34e-08 *** 
  [8.82e-06]   [7.08e-10] 
      
Constant 5.9271*** 6.0288*** 6.3713*** 0.465997*** 0.4563*** 
 [0.0348] [0.0360] [0.0353] [2.80e-06] [2.32e-06] 
Observations 5880 5880 5880 5880 5880 
R-squared 0.69 0.71 0.78 0.72 0.76 
Robust standard errors in brackets      
* Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1% 
For brevity coefficients on direction (octants) and time of consolidation variables are not reported in this table.  
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Figure 8.5: 
Estimated Price Gradients by Settlement Type (Box-Cox Results) 
 
Table 8.7 shows the neighborhood housing quality estimates for the fractional 
Logit model. Columns 1, 2, and 3, predict the percentage of houses in a city block that 
can be classified as high, medium and low quality respectively.  The main variables of 
interest are the neighborhood’s legal origin and the interaction terms between the legal 
origin and neighborhood income. The coefficient on the income variable in the three 
models reflects the effect of rising income on the type of housing quality for city blocks 
that originated in the formal sector holding other characteristics fixed.  
The estimates show that, holding other block characteristics constant, rising 
income increases the percentage of high quality housing and decreases the percentage of 
medium and low quality housing in blocks that originated in the formal sector. The 
coefficients on the legal origin binary indicators represent the difference in the percentage 
of homes falling in a quality category between blocks developed in the formal sector and 
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blocks developed under each particular informal modality holding other variables 
constant and holding income constant. Thus, comparing city blocks with similar 
characteristics, blocks that originated as squatter settlements tend to have fewer high 
quality houses than blocks that originated in the formal sector. Further, blocks that 
originated as squatter settlements tend to have higher rates of medium and low quality 
housing than blocks that originated in the formal sector. 
The coefficients on the income-legal origin interaction terms show the differences 
in the effect of income on city block housing quality between blocks that originated in the 
formal sector and those that originated in the informal sector. The negative signs for the 
income-legal origin interaction term coefficients in table 8.7, columns 1 suggest that 
income tends to increase the percentage of high quality housing in blocks that originated 
in the formal sector at a higher rate than it does in city blocks that originated in the 
informal sector. The positive signs of the interaction term coefficients in column 2 
indicate that income leads to a more modest increase in the percentage of medium quality 
housing in blocks that originated in the formal sector than in city blocks that originated in 
the informal sector. For easier interpretation, we present marginal effects for the legal 
origin indicator variables and their interaction terms in table 8.8. Holding other 
characteristics constant at sample mean levels, the proportion of high quality housing in 
former squatter settlements tends to be about 20 percentage points lower than the 
proportion of high quality homes in formally originated settlements.  
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Table 8.7: 
Housing Quality Models - Fractional Logit Specification 
 
Model 1 2 3 
Dependent variable Proportion of Proportion of Proportion of 
  High Q homes Medium Q homes Low Q homes 
Distance from the CBD (Km) -0.0434 0.0555 -0.116 
 [.021]** [.0202]*** [.0516]** 
% Homes connected to sewer system 0.004 -0.003 -0.009 
 [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
Distance to a major road (Km) -0.1075 0.118 -0.14 
 [0.0327]*** [0.03]*** [0.0651]** 
% homes under Antichresis  0 0.002 -0.016 
 [0.002] [0.002] [0.005]*** 
% homes under rent  -0.004 0.007 -0.015 
 [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.002]*** 
Income (factor) 0.471 -0.417 -0.534 
 [0.018]*** [0.018]*** [0.050]*** 
Illegal Subdivision (protected area) -0.08 0.105 0.014 
 [0.120] [0.117] [0.334] 
Squatter  (Invasion) -1.047 1.05 0.672 
 [0.145]*** [0.135]*** [0.236]*** 
Government supported subdivision -0.371 0.376 0.47 
 [0.099]*** [0.095]*** [0.203]** 
Illegal Subdivision (New: Still Illegal) -0.141 0.249 0.411 
 [0.145] [0.141]* [0.257] 
Illegal Subdivision (Old: Now legal) -0.47 0.727 -1.429 
 [0.095]*** [0.095]*** [0.318]*** 
Illegal Subdivision (protected area) * 
Income -0.004 0.08 0.027 
 [0.074] [0.064] [0.148] 
Squatter * Income -0.301 0.404 0.221 
 [0.109]*** [0.090]*** [0.131]* 
Government supported subdivision * 
Income -0.3 0.294 0.291 
 [0.145]** [0.129]** [0.136]** 
Illegal Subdivision (still Illegal) * Income 0.013 0.238 -0.045 
 [0.071] [0.067]*** [0.110] 
Illegal Subdivision (Now legal) * Income -0.209 0.373 -0.469 
 [0.050]*** [0.053]*** [0.140]*** 
Constant 0.804 -1.123 -3.703 
 [0.151]*** [0.146]*** [0.680]*** 
Observations 5794 5794 5794 
Robust standard errors in brackets    
* Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1%  
(a) Coefficients are Logit estimates    
(b)  For brevity coefficients on direction (octants) and time of consolidation variables are not shown. 
 
 127
The interaction effect between squatter settlement and the income scale shows 
that an increase of one unit in the income scale raises the proportion of high quality 
homes in former squatter settlements at a 5 percentage points lower rate than it does for 
formally originated blocks. 
 
Table 8.8: 
Fractional Logit Estimates (Marginal Effects) 
 
Model 1 2 3 
Dependent variable Proportion of Proportion of Proportion of 
  High Q homes Medium Q homes Low Q homes 
  Legal Origin Binary Indicators**     
  Illegal Subdivision (protected area) -0.019 0.025 0 
  Squatter -0.207 0.219 0.012 
  Government supp subdivision -0.084 0.088 0.007 
  Illegal Subdivision (still Illegal) -0.033 0.06 0.006 
  Illegal Subdivision (Now legal) -0.105 0.164 -0.01 
  Legal Origin-Income Interaction terms***     
  Illegal Subdivision (protected area) * Income -0.001 0.019 0 
  Squatter * Income -0.045 0.066 0.005 
  Government supp subdivision * Income -0.063 0.065 0.006 
  Illegal Subdivision (still Illegal) * Income 0.003 0.055 -0.001 
  Illegal Subdivision (Now legal) * Income -0.043 0.074 -0.002 
  *Each of the coefficients is evaluated at mean levels and holding other binary variables at 0 
  ** Measures effect of a discrete change from 0 to 1   
  *** Measures marginal effect dy/dx  
 
          The interaction terms provide evidence of a lock-in effect taking place in informal 
sector development. Even when informal settlements are regularized or “legalized”, their 
upgrading occurs more slowly and at lower rates than in comparable settlements that 
originated in the formal sector. Furthermore, a simple comparison between the interaction 
term coefficients in table 8.8 as well as the settlements structural density gradients in 
figure 8.4 indicates that the magnitude of this lock-in effect seems to be proportional to 
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the settlement structural density. These relationships are what is expected in light of the 
theoretical models presented in chapters 6 and 7.   
Conclusions 
Illegal settlements constitute a large portion of urban development in many 
developing countries. Moreover, a large percentage of urban growth in many regions of 
the world takes place in the form of illegal settlements of one type or another, the bulk of 
which are identified as slums. It is becoming increasingly important to understand the 
effects of this type of growth on overall urban development. The empirical literature 
dealing with these questions has been hampered by the limited availability of relevant 
data.  
Chapters 6 and 7 laid out two models dealing with the initial squatter settlement and 
subsequent redevelopment effects of illegal settlements, paying special attention to the 
spatial land use implications of illegal settlements. This chapter provided a new empirical 
look at the slum formation process. In this chapter we tested the theoretical predictions 
using data from Cochabamba, Bolivia, a city with long experience with a wide variety of 
informal urban settlements.  
The theory suggests that illegal settlers tend to invest in greater structural density 
than is efficient, their behavior reflecting the best response to landowners’ credible 
threats of later eviction. The empirical results are consistent with the theoretical 
predictions; neighborhoods that originated as squatter settlements exhibit greater density 
than comparable illegal subdivisions. Further, illegal settlements of all forms exhibit 
greater density than comparable legal settlements. The land rent analysis reveals that 
squatter settlements are not the best and highest use for the land; land rents tend to be 
 129
significantly lower than rents in comparable legal settlements. In the case of illegal 
subdivisions, land rents tend to mimic those of the legal market more closely, as 
expected. 
In terms of redevelopment after the settlements is formally titled or regularized, 
the theory predicts that the original status of an illegal settlement has significant legacy 
effects on future neighborhood upgrading. Greater initial density of development tends to 
delay redevelopment and upgrading; hence, it tends to reduce future housing quality in 
the neighborhood. Our empirical estimates confirm these predictions; neighborhoods that 
originated as illegal settlements generally have lower housing quality than comparable 
legal settlements even after legalization. In addition, income tends to have a lower 
marginal effect on housing quality in illegal settlements than it does in comparable legal 
settlements. These results help to explain the pervasiveness of low housing quality and 
the low rates of neighborhood upgrading in former squatter settlements even long after 
regularization.  
This chapter presented one of the first empirical studies of how property rights, 
property title quality, and related institutions affect urban land use in developing 
countries. The need to understand the future consequences of current slum formation is 
growing as this mode of development itself grows. This is essential for effective housing 
and land use policy in an era in which poverty is becoming an increasingly urban 
phenomenon. Applying the arguments of De Soto (2000) and others, we need to 
understand the channels through which property rights institutions affect urban 
development before establishing the micro foundations for broader economic 
development questions. This section of the dissertation represents a step in that direction. 
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CHAPTER 9 
HOUSING POLICY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
 
This chapter presents a succinct evaluation of low-income housing policy in 
developing countries in light of our findings. This discussion is divided into two sections, 
each analyzing a specific policy field of low-income housing. The first section deals with 
policies related to informal settlements. We begin this section with a brief history of 
policies used to deal with informal settlements in the past 50 years. We then turn to the 
effects of current policies on low income housing conditions and comment on new policy 
directions governments take to better address the problems associated with informal 
settlements.  The second section of this chapter concentrates on rental housing policies 
and their effect on the quality and availability of housing for the poor. We then evaluate 
current claims that portray the Antichresis system as a tool for low-income housing. The 
final section concludes.      
Brief History of Informal Settlement Policy in Developing Countries 
In the past 50 years, governments in developing countries have applied different 
combinations of policies to deal with the rapidly growing presence of slums in urban 
areas. These policies have not been uniform over time and place and range from violent 
evictions to benign neglect. These policies have not been homogeneous within urban 
areas either. It is common practice in many cities around the developing world to observe 
forceful evictions in some slum areas of a city and relative tolerance in other slum areas 
of the same city (UN HABITAT, 2003). 
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The phenomenon of squatter settlements and the informal economy began to draw 
attention from academics and government officials in the 1940’s. At the time, and 
through the 1950’s, mainstream development economists attributed the growth of the 
informal sector to the existence of a large labor force surplus that had to create 
employment and housing for itself in order to survive (Wilson, 1998). Thus, at this point, 
the informal economy and squatter settlements were conceived as byproducts of 
underdevelopment that would disappear as soon as poor countries entered an 
industrialized stage (Moser, 1994). The policy of choice towards informal settlements 
during these years was to simply ignore squatter settlements with the idea that they would 
disappear. This policy later became know as benign neglect (UN HABITAT, 2003). 
After decades of ignoring informal settlements, governments realized that this type of 
development was guiding most of the urban growth. This realization brought a radical 
shift in the policy towards squatter settlements and introduced the practice of large scale 
forceful evictions during the 1960s and 1970s. In many Latin American countries this 
policy tool was used by military regimes, which were characterized by highly centralized 
government power. Forceful evictions, however, proved to be ineffective and costly in 
political and economic terms. As a consequence, they became less popular in Latin 
America during the 1980’s as country governments became more democratic. This was 
not the case for several African nations where violent forceful evictions are still the 
policy of choice (UN HABITAT, 2003). 
During the 1980’s it became clear that informal settlements were not going to 
disappear any time soon, and that governments did not have the resources or the capacity 
to stop informal growth. The policy options then were less clear: governments could not 
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completely permit informal settlements but they could not control it either. As a result, 
governments adopted a policy of partial neglect. In Latin America, the policy of partial 
neglect came at a time when American and British scholars began writing about the 
benefits of “spontaneous self-help” housing as tool for fighting poverty by documenting 
the Peruvian experience (Mangin, 1967; Turner, 1982).  Turner (1982), in an influential 
writing, suggested that government participation in housing policy for the poor should be 
limited to land provision assistance, small cash transfers at specific stages of the 
settlement’s development, and technical support in settlement planning. In several cases 
governments used these suggestions to justify policies of partial neglect in the name of 
housing policy for the poor (Solares, 1999). Furthermore, governments would use partial 
neglect policies towards informal settlements and keep the probability of eviction latent 
in order to position the informal settlers in a clientilistic relation. These governments then 
would ask for political support in exchange for tenure security (Coppedge, 1993).  
By the late 1980’s, amidst a wave of economic reforms taking place in the United 
States and England to downsize government and celebrate private entrepreneurship, 
Hernando de Soto (1989) changed the perception developing lending organizations had 
regarding the informal economy and informal housing. De Soto’s argument is that 
government’s inefficient bureaucracy and outdated regulations were the main causes of 
informality (De Soto, 1989). Using the city of Lima as a case study, he persuasively 
argues that poor settlers faced with large legal and bureaucratic costs of obtaining land 
through legal means have no other alternative than to invade plots of land and engage in 
self-help housing construction. De Soto’s policy prescription is simple: provide property 
titles to all illegal settlers and let them unleash the power of their capital (as collateral) to 
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upgrade their property and create businesses (De Soto, 2000). De Soto’s ideas became, as 
Woodruff (2001) describes, a “smash hit” in the media and in the developing policy 
community. Soon after, during the 1990’s, institutions like the World Bank began 
financing large-scale titling programs around the world. The results of such programs are 
currently being evaluated.     
Today’s Housing Policy 
Today, informal settlement policy is generally characterized by a combination of 
relative tolerance and eviction followed by a regularization (land titling) program for 
settlements that survive eviction (Solares, 1999; Smolka, 2003). Some studies find that 
issuing property titles to informal owners has a positive impact on beneficiaries’ well-
being. Studies in Peru and Argentina show that owners of informal settlements that 
received property titles tend to have relatively higher housing quality and child education 
investment (Galiani and Schargrodsky, 2006), better child health (Galiani and 
Schargrodsky, 2004), and supply more labor than informal settlers with no formal 
property title (Field, 2003). Interestingly, however, none of the mentioned studies find a 
positive and significant relation between formal title provision and increased access to 
bank loans. Calderon (2003) finds that less than a quarter of households receiving formal 
titles use bank loans to upgrade their houses in Peru. Similarly, Galiani and Schargrodsky 
(2006) find that only 4% of owners who receive titles obtain mortgage loans in a former 
squatter settlement in Argentina.  Surprisingly both of these studies report that the modest 
housing upgrades done by beneficiaries of titling programs were made with their own 
resources as opposed to loans that could have financed greater housing upgrading. 
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These and other studies are now being portrayed as evidence of a missing link between 
formal titles and access to financial markets (The Economist, 2006), and therefore a big 
weakness in the philosophy of large scale De Soto-style titling programs.  
 The theoretical model presented in chapter 7 of this dissertation presents a 
tentative answer to why beneficiaries of titling programs tend to withhold significant 
investments in property upgrading longer than their counterparts in formal settlements. 
Our model showed that the greater the initial density of development in a settlement, the 
longer the optimal time for redevelopment/upgrading tends to be. Thus, our model 
predicts that squatter settlements that go through a title regularization program will not 
make serious upgrading or redevelopment investments at the same rate property 
originated in the formal sector does largely because they originate with greater density. 
We found this pattern in Cochabamba, Bolivia in the empirical analysis presented in 
chapter 8. As a result, the model presents a compelling argument as to why former 
squatters do not use bank loans to upgrade their properties like owners of formally 
originated property.  
Our findings raise serious concerns about the practice of relative tolerance 
towards informal development. Keeping a threat of eviction latent with the possibility of 
granting a title to those settlements that avoid eviction in the future creates incentives that 
have perverse future consequences for a settlement. As explained by the theoretical 
model in chapter 6, the threat of eviction induces squatters to over-invest in housing 
capital in order to reduce the credible eviction threat and increase the chance of receiving 
formal title in the future. This strategy creates a legacy effect that leads owners to 
postpone large investments in housing upgrading for longer periods of time. As a result, 
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the incentives created by current policies drive future squatters to build high density and 
low quality housing and curtails the incentive to upgrade their property after they receive 
titles for this properties. In a sense, a policy that seems benevolent and pro-poor has 
perverse effects in the long run for poverty alleviation strategies. Our work does not 
question titling programs per se, but raises questions about the costs of a policy that 
combines relative tolerance towards squatter settlements with the expectation of a title in 
terms of future quality of housing for the poor. 
Informal settlements represent one of the only long-term strategies for low-
income populations to own a house in developing countries. Throughout the last 50 years, 
governments experimented with several policy tools to deal with informal settlements 
with no clear results in terms of living conditions for the poor. Both benign neglect and 
forceful evictions proved to be costly and ineffective, and the current policy, of relative 
tolerance combined with a possibility of title, has perverse effects on future upgrading 
incentives. There is no silver-bullet in low-income housing policy, but chapters 6 though 
8 of this dissertation show the important negative legacy effects of informal settlements 
on urban development in terms of living conditions. These findings call for a shift in 
policy concerning informal settlements from  “dealing with informal settlements” to a 
“helping the poor obtain housing in the formal sector” paradigm. This shift, in turn, calls 
for innovative tools to acquire and develop land that can later be accessed by the poor. 
This dissertation does not present policy prescriptions for dealing with existing or 
potential informal settlements. Our findings, however, highlight some of the costs 
associated with the current policy in terms of legacy effects that undermine future 
upgrading possibilities. It also offers one of the first empirical studies of how informal 
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development strategies shape urban form in developing countries. This represents an 
important contribution for the understanding of the mechanisms through which property 
rights affect economic development.  
Rental Housing for the Poor 
Urban dwellers in developing countries use a variety of tenure mechanisms to 
access housing. This wide variety in tenure type modalities that shape housing markets 
are influenced by several aspects such as the types of landlords, tenants, legal status of 
properties and existing legal and social frameworks (Payne, 1997). Owner-occupied 
housing represents one type out of many housing tenure modalities observed in housing 
markets, yet it has become the gold standard of low-income housing policy for most 
governments and international development organizations. As Kumar (2001) states, 
“National housing policies show little sign of deviating from their primary objective – 
conferring ownership rights” (p. 1). This myopic view of housing policy creates a one-
dimensional approach that obviates diverse and dynamic needs and priorities of different 
landlords and tenants in a housing market. In other words, it ignores that the poor can 
(and do) also gain from having access to rental markets. Recognizing the neglect toward 
polices that facilitate housing alternatives for the poor, some authors recently began to 
explore how innovative methods, other than ownership, can be fostered by governments 
and international aid organizations (Payne, 1997). One of the tenure modalities gaining 
recognition is that of the Antichresis contract (Payne, 2002b; Farfan, 2002). Even though 
the Antichresis contract has been in use since biblical times in different countries, its 
study by mainstream economics as a tool for housing is fairly recent. This dissertation 
proposes a model of the Antichresis contract that explains its coexistence with the 
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commonly used periodic-rent lease and allows us to analyze its potential for helping the 
poor. 
The Antichresis Contract as a Tool for the Poor 
We began our analysis of the Antichresis contract by recognizing that the division 
of property rights produces to two potential inefficiencies arising from information 
asymmetries between landlord and tenant: The problem of adverse selection of tenants, 
and the problem of moral hazard in landlord maintenance investments. The first is an 
information problem in which the landlord cannot observe the probability that the tenant 
will become illiquid and therefore unable to comply with the contractual obligation of 
timely rental payments. In the event of tenant illiquidity, the landlord faces costs in the 
form of forgone income and eviction costs. Therefore, because landlords require a 
minimum expected return for the housing services they provide to a tenant, other things 
being equal, the probability of encountering an illiquid tenant increases the rental 
payment for a property. This aspect is crucial in the analysis of rental markets in 
developing countries where the probability of encountering a potentially illiquid tenant is 
high because of the inherent poverty and the lack of information systems (e.g. credit 
reports) available to landlords. Furthermore, the costs faced by landlords in the event of 
tenant illiquidity tend to be greater in developing countries because of inefficient court 
systems and “tenant-friendly” regulations that make evictions very costly. 
The Antichresis contract requires the tenant to pay a large lump sum upfront and 
the landlord returns on that lump sum amount represent the payments for the property. 
The tenant is not required to make any more payments and therefore the probability of 
him becoming illiquid during the contract term is irrelevant to the landlord. In this sense, 
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the Antichresis mechanism solves the problem of adverse selection. As a result, holding 
everything else constant, the implicit rental payments are expected to be lower under 
Antichresis than they would be under a periodic rent agreement. This characteristic 
makes the contract appealing as a tool for housing the poor. On the other hand, the 
Antichresis mechanism may be unattainable for the poorest populations which usually do 
not have access to the large up-front lump sums required to enter an Antichresis 
agreement. 
Tenants that have access to a large lump sum to enter an Antichresis agreement 
tend to be those that will have a lower probability of illiquidity during the contractual 
arrangement in the first place, so every else being equal, we would expect to observe a 
sorting of liquid (richer) tenants into Antichresis and probable illiquid (poorer) tenants 
into periodic rent agreements. This reasoning suggests that the Antichresis agreement can 
be an effective mechanism to lower rental payments (by solving the adverse selection 
problem) for those who can afford to access the system. Tenants who cannot access the 
Antichresis mechanism will only have the option of periodic rent contracts at higher 
yearly rents than their counterparts under Antichresis agreements. 
Following the discussion above, it is tempting to picture a market where 
individuals with higher income levels sort into Antichresis agreements and individuals 
with lower income levels sort into periodic rent agreements. As explained in chapter 3, 
however, the Antichresis does not solve the moral hazard problem of landlord 
maintenance investment as effectively as the periodic rent agreement does. Therefore, 
properties where the supply of landlord inputs has a large effect on tenant value will gain 
more from being in a periodic rent contract than in an Antichresis contract. As a result, 
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we should expect to observe higher income individuals still choosing monthly rent 
contracts when living in a property type that requires greater levels of landlord 
maintenance investment. This is because property types for which the losses arising from 
the moral hazard problem outweigh the expected losses from the adverse selection 
problem will tend to be under monthly rent and vice versa. This point is important from a 
policy perspective because government actions that increase the costs of the adverse 
selection problem will tend to increase the range of property types for which the 
Antichresis contract dominates the monthly rent contract. Increases in court inefficiency 
and/or in the costs of tenant evictions, for example, will make it more profitably for 
landlords to offer their properties under Antichresis as opposed to monthly rents for a 
greater variety of property types68. Thus, such policies will tend to decrease the range of 
property types available for individuals who cannot access an Antichresis contract. As a 
result, laws that are usually thought to be “tenant friendly” by increasing the bureaucratic 
process of tenant eviction due to illiquidity tend to have the perverse consequence of 
restricting the choices for poor individuals seeking to enter the housing rental market in 
markets where the Antichresis option is available for landlords. 
Policies that make tenant eviction more costly will tend to drive landlords toward 
Antichresis agreements, but the same can be argued for policies than make the monthly 
rent agreement less profitable such as rent controls or taxes. The rationale behind rent 
controls is that they will keep rental prices at affordable levels for the poor and thereby 
                                                 
 
 
68 These policies will tend to increase parameter C of the model presented in chapter 3 which produces a 
shift downwards in the landlord profit curve for a monthly rent agreement in figure 3.5.1 
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increase their access to housing services69. However, in markets where landlords have the 
option of using unregulated Antichresis agreements, rent controls will tend to make the 
Antichresis agreement more attractive to landlords for a greater range of property types - 
thus restricting access to housing by economically disadvantaged groups. This was the 
case in Korea during the 1990’s, where strict rent controls drove landlords to use the 
Chonsei lease, a Korean version of the Antichresis contract (Ambrose and Kim, 2003).  
Differences in tax rates between Antichresis and monthly rent contracts may also 
drive landlords to prefer one contractual arrangement to another. Some authors argue that 
high tax rates and registration costs pose a major obstacle for landlords and tenants to 
enter Antichresis agreements and therefore represent a threat to the Antichresis system in 
the Bolivian case (Farfan, 2002; 2004). Our data paints a different picture. A sample of 
market data from the city of Cochabamba reveals that the majority (95%) of Antichresis 
agreements are taxed at a lower rate than monthly rent contracts. We found that 60% of 
the Antichresis contracts had tax rates running 12 percentage points lower than the tax 
rates for equivalent units under monthly rent contracts. Our results show that everything 
else being equal, landlords would actually prefer Antichresis contracts to rental contracts 
based on tax rates. Furthermore, the data shows that properties with lower rents (i.e. those 
more accessible to poorer tenants) tend to have a lower tax rates for tenants under 
Antichresis than they would under monthly rent. Thus, we found no evidence that tax 
rates pose a threat to the Antichresis system or tend to exclude the poor from Antichresis 
agreements in the Bolivian case.  
                                                 
 
 
69 This policy is also commonly referred in the literature as a “first generation” rent control (Buckley, 
2005). 
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Helping the Antichresis Help the Poor 
Previous sections of this dissertation argue that the Antichresis contract can be a 
very effective tool for landlords and tenants, but its nature does not serve the most 
disadvantaged populations. Poorer tenants that cannot raise a relatively large cash lump 
sum do not have access to Antichresis agreements. Moreover, this chapter argues that 
policies that make evictions costly or otherwise make the monthly rent contract less 
profitable, tend to drive landlords of a wider range of property types towards Antichresis 
agreements further restricting the range of housing options for the poorest sectors. So 
how can the Antichresis contract be used to help the poor?  
Consider subsidized loans for Antichresis targeted to the poorest prospective 
tenants. Under this policy, beneficiaries would access loans at a subsidized rate to be used 
for entering an Antichresis agreement for housing purposes. Every month, beneficiaries 
could make payments on the principal and interest until the loan is completely paid. After 
then loan is paid, beneficiaries would own the Antichresis lump sum and could use it for 
entering other Antichresis contracts or any other productive activity. In this sense the 
subsidized loan would have two main benefits; (1) it would help the beneficiary enter an 
Antichresis agreement for housing, and (2) it would help the beneficiary to save. One 
additional benefit of this policy is that it would not distort landlord profits and therefore 
will not drive landlords from one contract to another. The main drawback of this policy, 
however, rests with tenant illiquidity. In this case, the government assumes the risk of 
default and is left with no instruments to force tenants to honor their debt (because 
government cannot evict tenants without hurting the landlord). Thus, this policy not only 
shifts the problem of adverse selection of tenants to government, but it also introduces a 
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different moral hazard problem. The combination of these problems will likely make the 
policy extremely costly. 
In conclusion, the Antichresis contract is an important contractual agreement for 
society but its use as an innovative tool for helping the poor as claimed by various 
authors seems to be limited at best. On the contrary, the Antichresis mechanism may 
serve to restrict options for the poor in markets where periodic rent agreements are 
heavily regulated or function under laws that make tenant eviction costly.    
Conclusions 
This section of the dissertation evaluated policies for low income housing in 
developing countries in the light of our findings in previous chapters.  The chapter 
presents no policy prescriptions but it highlights the costs of current policies that deal 
with squatter settlements in terms of legacy effects that hinder informal settlements’ 
upgrading possibilities. The second section studies how commonly used policies such as 
rent controls, or regulations that make tenant eviction costly tend to restrict options for 
the poorest tenants. Finally, this chapter presented an analysis that dispels claims that 
portray the Antichresis system as a tool for helping the poor using the theoretical 
framework developed in chapter 3 and empirical data from chapter 4. 
 The link between property rights and economic development has been a focus of 
interest since the early years of economic science. Even though very few mainstream 
economists would question that secure property rights are a precondition for economic 
development, the mechanisms through which property rights guide incentives and how 
these can lead to economic development is still contested territory. This dissertation 
explores some of the issues faced by developing countries in the low-income housing 
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policy field. It concentrated on the issue of informal development and the Antichresis 
tenure modality taking property rights as a foundation for the theoretical analysis.  The 
squatter model shows how unsecured property rights drive informal settlers into a certain 
strategy that takes into account landowners’ best responses. Landowners, in turn, base 
their decisions on how profitable it is for them to exercise their property rights and 
reclaim a property after squatters occupy it. The Antichresis analysis, on the other hand, 
focuses on another dimension of property rights by exploring the economic incentives 
that arise when property rights are divided. Results from both models show that when 
regulatory environments threaten property rights, policies intended to help the poor gain 
access to decent housing can have perverse consequences. In this sense, this dissertation 
highlights the importance of considering institutional aspects that govern property rights 
in a market in order to design effective housing polices for the poor. Furthermore, this 
study stresses the dire need for more theoretical and empirical studies that help discover 
the mechanisms through which institutions such as property rights can help the poor 
obtain access to a better future. This dissertation represents a step towards that goal.      
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APPENDIX A 
CONSTRUCTION OF THE HOUSING QUALITY VARIABLES 
 
For the purpose of this dissertation, housing quality refers exclusively to 
construction materials employed in the housing structure. Construction materials were 
classified into low, medium or high quality using the Bolivian National Institute of 
Statistics (INE) as shown in table A-1.  
 
Table A1: 
Classification of Housing Construction Quality by Main Materials Used in Walls, 
Roof and Floors 
 
Quality Wall Materials Roof Materials Floor Materials 
  Bricks, Cement, Concrete Tiles (cement, clay fiber-cement) Treated wood 
High     Carpets 
      Tile, ceramic 
Medium Rock Zinc plates Brick 
  Adobe (covered)   Cement 
  Adobe (not covered) Palma, Cane, Dirt Dirt 
Low Cane, Palma   Other Other 
  Other     
 
The next step was to construct a set of housing quality variables that reflected the 
percentage of houses in a city block that fell in the high, medium, or low classification 
according to the construction materials employed in the housing structure. Houses that 
had high quality materials in at least 2 parts of their structure were classified as high 
quality houses. In the same line, houses that had low quality materials in at least 1 part of 
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their structure were classified as low quality houses. Finally, all houses that did not fall 
into the high or low quality categories were classified as medium quality houses.   
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APPENDIX B 
CONSTRUCTION OF THE INCOME FACTOR 
 
Bolivia’s last population census (2001) did not ask respondents to provide their 
level of income. However, the survey included a series of questions concerning home 
appliances, household equipment, and household education choices, among others. A 
group of these indicators was used to construct an income index at the census block level 
using exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis.  
The variables used to construct the index using a principal component extraction method 
of factor analysis were: 
A) % of households in the block that own a TV set. 
B) % of households in the block that own a car. 
C) % of households in the block that own a refrigerator. 
D) % of households in the block that own a telephone line. 
The correlation matrix for these variables is presented below in table B.1 
 
Table B.1  
Correlation Matrix of Variables Used to Construct the Block Income Index 
 
  Tvpnt Carpnt Refripnt Phonepnt 
Tvpnt 1.00    
Carpnt 0.45 1.00   
Refripnt 0.69 0.67 1.00  
Phonepnt 0.59 0.73 0.84 1.00 
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A principal component analysis used on the 4 variables produced a set factors of 
which the first one explained about 75% of the variance in the 4 variables combined 
(Eigen value = 2.98). The second factor explained only 14 % of the variance in the 4 
variables combined (Eigen value =.58). Using the Kaiser-Guttman rule we confidently 
conclude that these 4 variables produce only 1 principal component (i.e. block income) 
with a decent degree of reliability70. The estimated Eigen-values for each component are 
depicted in table B.2.  Finally, the block income variable was constructed using the 
estimated Eigen-vectors (factor loadings) presented in table B.3. 
 
Table B.2:   
Estimated Eigen-Values Using Principal Component Extraction Method  
 
Component Eigen value Difference Proportion Cumulative
Component 1 2.98 2.40 0.74 0.74 
Component 2 0.58 0.29 0.15 0.89 
Component 3 0.29 0.14 0.07 0.96 
Component 4 0.15 . 0.04 1.00 
 
 
Table B.3:  
Factor Loadings Used to Estimate the Block Income Variable 
 
Variable Component 1 
Tvpnt 0.45 
Carpnt 0.47 
Refripnt 0.54 
Phonepnt 0.53 
 
                                                 
 
 
70 The Cronbach alpha coefficient for these 4 variables was .88. We also applied Confirmatory Factor 
Analysis to test the one-factor model. The results give ample support for the one-factor model: Model χ²= 
12.96 (df =1); Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA)=0.04; 90% confidence interval for the 
RMSEA = (0.024; 0.066); Comparative Fit Index (CFI) = 0.99   
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